The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.
Chapter 1
Advertisement to the Sixth Edition
Smith explains that since the first publication in 1759, he has made several corrections and illustrations to the work, but was prevented from revising it until now due to various occupations. He outlines the principal alterations: a new chapter in Part I, four new chapters in Part III, an entirely new Part VI, and reorganization of passages on Stoical philosophy in Part VII. He also notes minor corrections and reaffirms his intention to write a theory of jurisprudence, though he acknowledges his advanced age makes completion uncertain.
Chapter 2
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
This chapter introduces the foundational concept of sympathy as the basis for moral judgment, exploring how individuals evaluate their own and others' actions through an imagined impartial spectator. It examines the interplay between self-love and social order, the distinction between praiseworthiness and mere praise, and the role of propriety and virtue in shaping moral sentiments.
Chapter 3
Part I: Of the Propriety of Action
This chapter introduces the concept of propriety in action, exploring how sympathy forms the basis for moral judgment and how we assess the appropriateness of emotions and behaviors in ourselves and others.
Chapter 4
Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety
This section explores the foundation of moral judgment in sympathy, explaining how we approve or disapprove of others' passions based on our ability to sympathize with them. It introduces the concept of the impartial spectator and distinguishes between the amiable and respectable virtues.
Chapter 5
I: Of Sympathy
Smith introduces sympathy as a fundamental principle of human nature, arguing that even the most selfish individuals possess an innate concern for others. He explains that sympathy arises not from witnessing the passion itself but from imagining ourselves in the sufferer's situation, and he illustrates this with examples ranging from physical reactions to the plight of the insane and the dead.
Chapter 6
Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy
Smith explores the innate human pleasure derived from mutual sympathy—the correspondence of sentiments between individuals. He argues that this pleasure cannot be reduced to self-interest, as it is instantaneous and often arises from trivial occasions. Sympathy enlivens joy and alleviates grief, and the desire for sympathy is stronger for painful emotions like grief and resentment than for agreeable ones. The chapter also examines the reciprocal nature of sympathy: we are pleased when we can sympathize with others and hurt when we cannot.
Chapter 7
Of the Manner in Which We Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of Other Men, by Their Concord or Dissonance with Our Own
This chapter explores how we judge the propriety or impropriety of others' passions by comparing them with our own sympathetic emotions. When our feelings perfectly coincide with another's, we approve; when they do not, we disapprove. Even in cases where immediate sympathy is absent, such as when we are distracted or the person is unknown, we can still approve based on a conditional sympathy derived from past experience. The chapter also distinguishes between judging the propriety of an affection (its relation to its cause) and its merit or demerit (its tendency to produce beneficial or hurtful effects).
Chapter 8
The Same Subject Continued
Smith continues his exploration of sympathy, describing how individuals adjust their emotions to achieve concord with spectators. He distinguishes between judgments of objects that do not personally affect us (where agreement reflects taste and judgment) and those that do (where mutual adjustment is crucial for social harmony). The chapter emphasizes the role of society in calming passions and the importance of the impartial spectator within oneself.
Chapter 9
Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
This chapter distinguishes two sets of virtues: the amiable virtues, founded on the spectator's effort to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned, and the respectable virtues, founded on the person's effort to bring down his emotions to what the spectator can go along with. It explores how amiable virtues like humanity and condescension arise from sympathy, while respectable virtues like self-command and magnanimity arise from self-government. The chapter also discusses the difference between virtue and mere propriety, noting that virtue is excellence beyond the ordinary, and that we often judge actions by two standards: absolute perfection and the common degree of excellence.
Chapter 10
Section II: Of the Degrees of the Different Passions Which Are Consistent with Propriety
This section examines how the propriety of passions depends on their degree, with a certain mediocrity being the standard that spectators can sympathize with. Passions that are too high or too low are deemed improper, and the acceptable pitch varies among different passions based on how much sympathy they naturally elicit.
Chapter 11
Of the Passions Which Take Their Origin from the Body
Smith examines the passions that arise from bodily states, such as hunger, sexual desire, and pain, arguing that they are considered indecent because spectators cannot readily sympathize with them. He contrasts these with passions originating from the imagination, which evoke stronger sympathy due to the mind's flexibility. The chapter explores the virtue of temperance in restraining bodily appetites and the admiration for constancy in enduring physical pain.
Chapter 12
II: Of Those Passions Which Take Their Origin from a Particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination
Smith examines passions that arise from a peculiar turn or habit of the imagination, such as romantic love, which are natural but rarely sympathized with by others. He explains that while we cannot enter into the lover's specific attachment, we can sympathize with the secondary passions (hope, fear, distress) that the situation produces. Love is often seen as ridiculous but not odious, and its mixture of humanity and generosity makes it somewhat agreeable. Smith also notes the need for reserve when discussing personal attachments, studies, or professions, as others cannot share the same degree of interest.
Chapter 13
Of the Unsocial Passions
Smith examines hatred and resentment as unsocial passions that require significant moderation to become socially acceptable. He argues that these passions are naturally disagreeable because they divide our sympathy between the person feeling them and the person they are directed against. To be proper, resentment must be tempered by magnanimity and a regard for the impartial spectator, expressed with restraint and only in response to serious provocations. Smith contrasts these passions with social ones like joy and gratitude, noting that anger and hatred are harsh, discordant, and destructive to both the individual and society, yet they serve a necessary function as guardians of justice when properly regulated.
Chapter 14
IV: Of the Social Passions
Smith contrasts the social and benevolent affections—such as generosity, humanity, kindness, and compassion—with the unsocial passions of hatred and resentment. He argues that the social passions are naturally agreeable because they elicit a redoubled sympathy from the impartial spectator, who sympathizes both with the person feeling them and with the object of those feelings. The chapter emphasizes the pleasure derived from mutual love and esteem, the harmony they create in families and friendships, and the universal approval they receive. In contrast, violent hatred and resentment are condemned as destructive to society, making the person who harbors them an object of dread.
Chapter 15
Of the Selfish Passions
Smith examines the 'selfish passions'—grief and joy arising from personal fortune—as a middle category between social and unsocial passions. He argues that we sympathize more readily with small joys and great sorrows, while envy hinders sympathy with sudden prosperity and trivial griefs provoke ridicule rather than compassion.
Chapter 16
Section III: Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity Upon the Judgment of Mankind with Regard to the Propriety of Action; and Why It Is More Easy to Obtain Their Approbation in the One State Than in the Other
This section examines how prosperity and adversity influence moral judgments, arguing that people are more likely to approve of actions in prosperous circumstances than in adverse ones, due to sympathy with joy and aversion to sorrow.
Chapter 17
I: That Though Our Sympathy with Sorrow Is Generally a More Lively Sensation Than Our Sympathy with Joy, It Commonly Falls Much More Short of the Violence of What Is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
Smith examines the asymmetry between our sympathy with sorrow and joy. While sorrow elicits a more noticeable but ultimately weaker sympathetic response compared to the sufferer's actual feelings, joy—absent envy—can be more fully shared. He argues that our admiration for those who master their grief in adversity stems from the effort required, whereas intemperate joy is contemptible. The chapter contrasts the spectator's limited grief with the sufferer's composure, using examples like Cato and Socrates to illustrate magnanimity.
Chapter 18
II: Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
This chapter explores the human desire for wealth, power, and distinction, arguing that it is driven not by material necessity but by the desire for sympathy, attention, and approbation from others. Smith examines how rank and status command natural deference, how the rich and powerful are admired for their station rather than their virtue, and how the fall from greatness is felt as an unbearable loss of public regard. He illustrates these points with historical examples, including Louis XIV and the captive king of Macedon.
Chapter 19
III: Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which Is Occasioned by This Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
This chapter examines how the natural human tendency to admire the rich and powerful and to neglect the poor leads to a corruption of moral sentiments. Smith argues that while this disposition helps maintain social order, it often causes people to respect wealth and greatness over wisdom and virtue, leading to the emulation of vice and the neglect of true merit. He contrasts the paths to virtue and fortune in different social stations, noting that in middling and inferior stations, honesty and ability generally lead to success, while in superior stations, flattery and falsehood often prevail. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the futility of pursuing greatness through immoral means, as shame and remorse inevitably follow.
Chapter 20
Part II: Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment
This part introduces the concepts of merit and demerit as the proper objects of reward and punishment. Merit is defined as an action that deserves reward because it is the proper object of gratitude, while demerit is an action that deserves punishment because it is the proper object of resentment. The discussion emphasizes the role of sympathetic feelings in determining moral approval or disapproval of actions and their consequences.
Chapter 21
Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
This section introduces the concepts of merit and demerit as distinct from propriety and impropriety. Merit is the quality deserving reward, and demerit the quality deserving punishment. The sentiment or affection underlying an action is examined in two relations: its cause (determining propriety) and its intended effect (determining merit or demerit). The chapter sets the stage for exploring how we sense good or ill desert.
Chapter 22
I: That Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and That, in the Same Manner, Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
This chapter establishes that actions deserving reward are those that are the proper and approved objects of gratitude, while actions deserving punishment are those that are the proper and approved objects of resentment. It distinguishes gratitude and resentment from other passions like love and hatred, emphasizing that gratitude requires personal recompense and resentment demands personal retribution, which naturally leads to the political ends of punishment: correction of the criminal and example to the public.
Chapter 23
II: Of the Proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment
This chapter defines the proper objects of gratitude and resentment as those that an impartial spectator would sympathize with. It explores how sympathy with the beneficiary's joy leads to approval of gratitude toward the benefactor, and how sympathy with the sufferer's distress leads to approval of resentment against the offender, even extending to an imaginary resentment on behalf of the dead, which grounds the natural law of retaliation.
Chapter 24
III: That Where There Is No Approbation of the Conduct of the Person Who Confers the Benefit, There Is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of Him Who Receives It: And That, on the Contrary, Where There Is No Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person Who Does the Mischief, There Is No Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of Him Who Suffers It
This chapter explores the conditions under which sympathy with gratitude or resentment arises. It argues that if the motives of a benefactor are not approved (e.g., foolish or trivial), observers have little sympathy with the recipient's gratitude. Conversely, if the motives of a wrongdoer are approved as proper, observers cannot sympathize with the victim's resentment. Examples include the prodigality of James I versus the frugality of Charles I, and the lack of sympathy for a murderer's resentment at his own execution.
Chapter 25
IV: Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters
This chapter recapitulates the conditions under which we sympathize with gratitude and resentment. It argues that we fully sympathize with gratitude only when we approve of the benefactor's motives, and with resentment only when we disapprove of the agent's motives. The propriety or impropriety of the affection behind an action determines whether we regard the benefactor as deserving reward or the offender as deserving punishment.
Chapter 26
V: The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
This chapter analyzes the sense of merit and demerit as compounded sentiments. Merit arises from a direct sympathy with the agent's motives and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient. Demerit arises from a direct antipathy to the agent's motives and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer. The chapter illustrates these sentiments through historical examples of beneficent and cruel actions.
Chapter 27
Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence
This section examines the distinction between justice and beneficence, arguing that justice is the only virtue that can be enforced by external sanctions, while beneficence is left to the free will of individuals. It explores the role of the impartial spectator in determining the propriety of actions and the necessity of justice for the stability of society.
Chapter 28
I: Comparison of Those Two Virtues
Smith distinguishes between beneficence and justice, arguing that beneficence is free and cannot be extorted by force, while justice may be enforced. Beneficence excites gratitude and reward; its mere absence is blamable but not punishable. Justice, by contrast, is a negative virtue that prevents harm; its violation is injury, excites resentment, and merits punishment. The impartial spectator approves of force to restrain injustice but not to compel beneficence among equals, though civil government may sometimes prescribe duties of beneficence.
Chapter 29
II: Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit
This chapter explores the nature of justice, remorse, and the consciousness of merit. Smith argues that no impartial spectator can approve of harming another except in response to injury. He emphasizes the need to humble self-love and view oneself as others do. The chapter details the hierarchy of crimes—murder being the most atrocious, followed by theft and breach of contract—and describes the psychological torment of remorse, contrasted with the serenity of meritorious action.
Chapter 30
III: Of the Utility of This Constitution of Nature
Smith examines how nature has fitted humans for society, arguing that while beneficence is the ornament of society, justice is its essential foundation. He explores the psychological mechanisms behind our moral judgments, showing that our concern for punishing injustice arises primarily from sympathy with the injured individual rather than from a regard for societal order. He contrasts punishments for crimes like murder, which naturally excite our indignation, with those for offenses against military discipline, which require a deliberate effort to endorse. Smith concludes that nature has implanted a sense of ill-desert and terror of punishment to enforce justice, the main pillar upholding human society.
Chapter 31
Section III: Of the Influence of Fortune Upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with Regard to the Merit or Demerit of Their Actions
This section examines the tension between the abstract principle that moral praise or blame should be based solely on intention, and the actual human tendency to let the consequences of actions influence our sentiments of merit or demerit. Smith explains the cause, extent, and purpose of this irregularity of sentiment, which arises from the influence of fortune.
Chapter 32
Of the Causes of This Influence of Fortune
This chapter examines how fortune influences our moral sentiments of gratitude and resentment. Smith argues that for an action to be a proper object of gratitude or resentment, it must not only cause pleasure or pain but also be capable of feeling those sensations and be performed with intentional design. When consequences are unintended, our sentiments are moderated, and fortune thus plays a key role in shaping our judgments of merit and demerit.
Chapter 33
Of the Extent of This Influence of Fortune
This chapter examines how fortune influences our moral judgments, specifically in two ways: first, it diminishes our sense of merit or demerit when actions fail to produce their intended effects, and second, it increases our sense of merit or demerit when actions accidentally cause extraordinary pleasure or pain. Smith discusses how even the impartial spectator feels this irregularity, and explores examples such as the difference in gratitude toward a friend who fails versus one who succeeds, the treatment of messengers of good or bad news, and legal distinctions of negligence.
Chapter 34
III: Of the Final Cause of This Irregularity of Sentiments
Smith examines why human moral sentiments are irregularly influenced by the actual consequences of actions, rather than solely by intentions. He argues that this irregularity, though seemingly unjust, serves a vital social purpose: it restrains punishment to outward actions (not mere thoughts), encourages active virtue over indolent benevolence, and ultimately reflects divine wisdom in ordering human nature for the happiness and perfection of the species.
Chapter 35
Part III: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty
This part examines how we judge our own sentiments and conduct by imagining how an impartial spectator would view them, introducing the concept of the impartial spectator as the basis for self-approbation and self-disapprobation, and explores the sense of duty derived from general rules of morality.
Chapter 36
Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation
Smith argues that our judgments of our own conduct are based on the same principle as our judgments of others: we imagine how an impartial spectator would view our actions. He uses the metaphor of a mirror provided by society to explain how we come to see ourselves, and emphasizes that virtue and vice are defined by their effects on others, not by self-reflection.
Chapter 37
II: Of the Love of Praise, and of That of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of That of Blameworthiness
This chapter explores the distinction between the desire for praise and the desire for praiseworthiness, as well as the dread of blame versus blameworthiness. Smith argues that while these principles are akin and often blended, they are distinct and independent. The love of praiseworthiness is not derived from the love of praise; rather, praise gains its value as proof of praiseworthiness. Unmerited applause is contemptible, but unmerited censure can deeply wound even a wise man, due to the greater pungency of pain over pleasure and the uncertainty about one's own character.
Chapter 38
Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience
This chapter explores the role of conscience as an internal impartial spectator that corrects the natural selfishness of human passions. Smith argues that while our passive feelings are deeply self-interested, our active principles can be generous and noble due to the influence of conscience—the 'man within'—which judges our conduct and enforces impartiality between ourselves and others. He contrasts this internal moral authority with external social pressures and critiques extreme philosophical positions that either demand excessive sympathy for distant others or excessive indifference to one's own interests.
Chapter 39
Of the Nature of Self-Deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules
This chapter explores how self-deceit distorts our moral judgments, especially regarding our own conduct, and how general rules of morality arise from repeated observations of others' actions and sentiments. Smith argues that these rules, formed from experience, help correct the partiality of self-love and guide us toward impartial judgment.
Chapter 40
V: Of the Influence and Authority of the General Rules of Morality, and That They Are Justly Regarded as the Laws of the Deity
This chapter explores how general rules of morality, derived from our natural sentiments, come to be regarded as authoritative laws, often attributed to the Deity. Smith argues that these rules, which guide our sense of duty, are essential for directing human conduct, especially for the majority who may lack refined moral sentiments. He discusses how nature and man both aim to correct the distribution of rewards and punishments, though man's efforts are limited. The chapter also examines how a regard for these rules, instilled by education and religion, forms the basis of a dependable character and distinguishes a man of principle from a worthless one.
Chapter 41
VI: In What Cases the Sense of Duty Ought to Be the Sole Principle of Our Conduct; and in What Cases It Ought to Concur with Other Motives
Smith examines when conduct should be guided solely by a sense of duty (general rules of morality) versus when it should also be animated by natural passions. He distinguishes justice, whose rules are precise and admit no exceptions, from other virtues like prudence, generosity, and gratitude, whose rules are loose and require modification. He argues that justice must be followed strictly from regard to the rule itself, while other virtues often require passion for the object. He also discusses the danger of an erroneous conscience, especially from false religious notions, which can lead to vice despite sincere intentions.
Chapter 42
Part IV: Of the Effect of Utility Upon the Sentiment of Approbation
This chapter examines how the perception of utility—the fitness or usefulness of an object or action—influences our moral approval. Smith argues that we often approve of qualities or systems not merely for their immediate benefit but for their beauty, order, and the sense of harmony they produce. He connects this aesthetic pleasure to moral judgment, suggesting that the appearance of utility can enhance our sentiment of approbation, even when the practical consequences are remote or indirect.
Chapter 43
Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon All the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of This Species of Beauty
Smith explores how the perception of utility contributes to beauty, arguing that the fitness of objects to serve their ends often becomes more valued than the ends themselves. He illustrates this through examples like watches and household arrangements, and extends the principle to wealth and social systems, introducing the 'invisible hand' concept to explain how individual self-interest can unintentionally promote public good.
Chapter 44
Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon the Characters and the Actions of Men; and How Far the Perception of This Beauty May Be Regarded as One of the Original Principles of Approbation
Smith argues that the perception of utility is not the primary ground of moral approbation; rather, a sense of propriety, distinct from utility, underlies our approval of virtues such as prudence, self-command, humanity, generosity, and public spirit. He illustrates how self-command and prudence are approved because they align with the impartial spectator's sentiments, and contrasts humanity (based on fellow-feeling) with generosity (which requires self-sacrifice and magnanimity). The chapter concludes that moral sentiments presuppose an impartial arbiter, whose sympathy grounds self-applause or self-condemnation.
Chapter 45
Part V: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation
This chapter examines how custom and fashion shape our moral sentiments, influencing what we approve or disapprove of in ourselves and others. Smith argues that repeated exposure and social trends can alter our sense of propriety and virtue, sometimes leading to a corruption of moral judgments.
Chapter 46
I: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Our Notions of Beauty and Deformity
This chapter explores how custom and fashion shape our judgments of beauty and deformity, extending beyond dress and furniture to architecture, poetry, music, and even natural objects. Custom creates habitual associations that make certain combinations feel proper or improper, while fashion—a species of custom tied to high rank—lends grace to forms through association with the great. The chapter argues that these principles influence moral sentiments as well, accounting for varied opinions across ages and nations.
Chapter 47
II: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Moral Sentiments
Smith examines how custom and fashion influence moral sentiments, arguing that while they affect our judgments of beauty and conduct, they cannot entirely pervert our fundamental moral sense. He explores how different professions, ranks, and nations develop varying standards of propriety, and how customs can sometimes authorize actions that shock natural moral principles, such as the exposure of infants in ancient Greece.
Chapter 48
Part VI: Of the Character of Virtue
Smith introduces the examination of individual character under two aspects: its effect on the individual's own happiness and its effect on the happiness of others, setting the stage for a detailed analysis of virtue.
Chapter 49
Section I: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Affects His Own Happiness; or of Prudence
This section defines prudence as the virtue concerned with the care of one's health, fortune, rank, and reputation. It describes the prudent man as cautious, sincere, reserved, and industrious, prioritizing security and steady accumulation over risk. The prudent man is guided by the impartial spectator and avoids the ostentation and follies of more brilliant but imprudent figures. The section also contrasts the social perception of great crimes versus petty ones, noting that imprudence often determines the degree of condemnation.
Chapter 50
Section II: Of the Character of the Individual, So Far as It Can Affect the Happiness of Other People
This section explores how individual character affects the happiness of others, focusing on the distinction between justice and beneficence. It argues that only proper resentment for injustice can justify harming another in the eyes of the impartial spectator, and that a sacred regard not to hurt others constitutes the character of the perfectly just man. The section then outlines the natural order for distributing our limited powers of beneficence, first towards individuals and then towards societies.
Chapter 51
I: Of the Order in Which Individuals Are Recommended by Nature to Our Care and Attention
Smith explores the natural order of our affections and beneficence, beginning with self-care, then family, then friends, and finally the rich and poor. He emphasizes the role of habitual sympathy and the impartial spectator in guiding moral conduct, and discusses how nature prioritizes social order through respect for rank and fortune.
Chapter 52
II: Of the Order in Which Societies Are by Nature Recommended to Our Beneficence
This chapter explores how the same principles that guide our beneficence toward individuals also extend to societies, with the state or sovereignty being the most strongly recommended due to its importance and our personal connections to it. It discusses patriotism, the impartial spectator's perspective on self-sacrifice, the detestability of treason, national prejudice, and the dynamics of civil faction versus foreign war. It also contrasts the 'man of system' who rigidly imposes ideal plans with the truly public-spirited reformer who respects established institutions and prejudices, and examines the role of different orders and societies within a state in maintaining constitutional stability.
Chapter 53
III: Of Universal Benevolence
Smith argues that while our effective good deeds are limited to our own society, our goodwill can extend to the entire universe. Universal benevolence is rooted in sympathy and the desire for happiness of all sensible beings. The wise and virtuous man submits to the will of the divine Director, sacrificing personal and local interests for the greater good of the universe, much like a good soldier obeys his general. However, Smith cautions that contemplation of the universe must not lead to neglect of practical duties to family, friends, and country.
Chapter 54
Section III: Of Self-Command
This section examines the virtue of self-command, focusing on how the impartial spectator's approval varies with different passions. It discusses how the point of propriety differs for passions that unite versus those that divide society, and explores the standards by which we judge our own merit and conduct, emphasizing the ideal of perfect propriety versus common attainment.
Chapter 55
Conclusion of the Sixth Part
The conclusion of Part VI recapitulates the three principal virtues—prudence, justice, and beneficence—as recommended by self-love and benevolence, respectively, and emphasizes that all are ultimately directed and enforced by regard for the impartial spectator. It contrasts these with the virtues of self-command, which are primarily motivated by the sense of propriety and the desire to align one's passions with the sentiments of the impartial spectator. The text distinguishes between restraint based on prudential considerations (which may leave passions smoldering) and restraint based on a sense of propriety (which truly moderates and subdues the passions).
Chapter 56
Part VII: Of Systems of Moral Philosophy
Smith surveys and critiques various systems of moral philosophy, including those based on propriety, prudence, and benevolence, and discusses the corruption of moral sentiments by wealth and rank.
Chapter 57
Section I: Of the Questions Which Ought to Be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
Smith introduces the two fundamental questions of moral theory: what constitutes virtue, and by what mental faculty we approve of virtue. He argues that all major moral systems derive from natural principles but are often partial and imperfect. He outlines the first question (the nature of virtue) as debated by Hutcheson, Clark, and others, and the second question (the source of moral approval) as debated by proponents of self-love, reason, moral sense, or sympathy.
Chapter 58
Section II: Of the Different Accounts Which Have Been Given of the Nature of Virtue
Smith introduces three main accounts of virtue: virtue as propriety (proper government of all affections), virtue as prudence (judicious pursuit of self-interest), and virtue as benevolence (disinterested concern for others). He argues that all other accounts reduce to one of these three.
Chapter 59
Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Propriety
This chapter examines philosophical systems that define virtue as propriety, focusing on Plato and Aristotle. It argues that while propriety is essential to virtue, it is not sufficient; beneficent actions deserve recompense and harmful actions deserve punishment, which these systems fail to fully explain. The impartial spectator is presented as the true measure of propriety.
Chapter 60
Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Prudence
This chapter examines Epicurus's system, which reduces all virtue to prudence by making bodily pleasure and pain the sole ultimate objects of desire and aversion. Smith contrasts this with the systems of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, who held that virtue is desirable for its own sake and that many other objects (knowledge, family, country) are ultimately valuable. Smith argues that Epicurus overlooked the profound human desire for praiseworthiness and the dread of being contemptible, which cannot be reduced to mere bodily consequences. However, Smith acknowledges that virtue is indeed prudent and advantageous, as Socrates argued, and that this prudential aspect adds an additional beauty to virtue.
Chapter 61
Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence
Smith examines the system that identifies virtue solely with pure and disinterested benevolence, primarily as advanced by Dr. Hutcheson. He critiques this view for neglecting the moral value of self-interested motives and the inferior virtues like prudence and temperance, arguing that human nature requires a balance of motives and that the impartial spectator's sympathy, not utility alone, should measure virtue.
Chapter 62
IV: Of Licentious Systems
Smith critiques Dr. Mandeville's system, which he argues erases the distinction between vice and virtue by reducing all virtuous actions to vanity. Smith contrasts this with the ancient systems of propriety, benevolence, and prudence, which, despite their defects, encourage virtuous habits. He distinguishes between the desire for praiseworthiness, the love of true glory, and mere vanity, emphasizing the sublime motive of acting from a regard to what is right, independent of actual praise.
Chapter 63
Section III: Of the Different Systems Which Have Been Formed Concerning the Principle of Approbation
This section introduces the second major question in moral philosophy: the principle of approbation, or the mental faculty that makes certain characters agreeable or disagreeable. Smith outlines three competing accounts—self-love, reason, and sentiment—as the source of moral approval and disapproval, noting that while the question is theoretically important, it has no practical effect on moral judgments.
Chapter 64
Of Those Systems Which Deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-Love
Smith critiques systems that derive moral approbation from self-love, particularly those of Hobbes, Puffendorff, and Mandeville. He argues that while virtue appears beautiful due to its utility in maintaining social order, this political view cannot be the original ground of moral approval. He clarifies that sympathy is not a selfish principle, as it involves an imaginary change of persons, not merely of circumstances, and is entirely occupied with the other person's situation.
Chapter 65
Of Those Systems Which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation
Smith examines the view that reason is the foundation of moral approbation, acknowledging that reason discovers general rules of morality through induction, but arguing that the first perceptions of right and wrong arise from immediate sense and feeling, not reason. He critiques Hobbes's doctrine that civil law is the sole standard of right and wrong, and credits Hutcheson for distinguishing the roles of reason and moral sense.
Chapter 66
III: Of Those Systems Which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
Smith examines two classes of systems that base moral approbation on sentiment. The first, represented by Dr. Hutcheson, posits a distinct 'moral sense' analogous to external senses. Smith critiques this view, arguing that it leads to absurd consequences, such as being unable to call depraved moral faculties 'vicious.' He also notes that such a sentiment lacks a common name, unlike other passions. The second system explains approbation through sympathy with utility, akin to admiring a well-contrived machine. Smith distinguishes this from his own system, which derives moral sentiments from four sources: sympathy with the agent's motives, sympathy with the beneficiary's gratitude, conformity to general rules, and the perception of utility.
Chapter 67
Section IV: Of the Manner in Which Different Authors Have Treated of the Practical Rules of Morality
Smith contrasts two approaches to moral rules: the ancient moralists (like Cicero and Aristotle) who describe virtues generally, and the casuists and natural jurisprudence writers who seek precise rules, especially for justice. He argues that justice alone admits exact rules, while other virtues are loose and indeterminate. The chapter also explores the natural desire for sincerity and the pitfalls of deceit, equivocation, and reserve, noting how casuists have dealt with these issues.
Chapter 68
Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages
This chapter explores the origins and evolution of language, focusing on the invention of nouns, adjectives, prepositions, and grammatical cases. It argues that early languages avoided abstract terms like adjectives and prepositions by varying noun endings, and that case systems emerged as a natural, concrete way to express relations without abstraction. The chapter also contrasts the flexibility of ancient languages (e.g., Latin) with the rigidity of modern ones (e.g., English), highlighting how grammatical structure affects literary composition.
Chapter 69
Endnotes
Smith addresses objections to his system, clarifying that the sentiment of approbation, though founded on sympathy, is always agreeable, while the sympathetic passion itself may be agreeable or disagreeable. He defends the foundation of our sense of demerit on sympathy with resentment, arguing that resentment, when properly moderated, is approved and even esteemed. He distinguishes between the approbation of propriety, which requires perceived concord of sentiments, and the approbation of merit, which does not. He also discusses the economy of nature in endowing mankind with instincts for both ends and means, particularly regarding punishment and the preservation of society.
