The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience explained
This chapter explores the role of conscience as an internal impartial spectator that corrects the natural selfishness of human passions.
What happens
This chapter explores the role of conscience as an internal impartial spectator that corrects the natural selfishness of human passions. Smith argues that while our passive feelings are deeply self-interested, our active principles can be generous and noble due to the influence of conscience—the 'man within'—which judges our conduct and enforces impartiality between ourselves and others. He contrasts this internal moral authority with external social pressures and critiques extreme philosophical positions that either demand excessive sympathy for distant others or excessive indifference to one's own interests.
Themes in this chapter
The Impartial Spectator
Central to the chapter: conscience is described as 'the man within,' 'the great judge and arbiter of our conduct,' who corrects the misrepresentations of self-love and enforces impartiality.
Self-Love and the Social Order
Smith examines the tension between natural self-love and the need for social harmony, arguing that conscience overrides selfish impulses to maintain justice and propriety.
Desire for Praiseworthiness vs. Mere Praise
The chapter emphasizes the internal desire to be worthy of praise (conscience) over external approval, as seen in the dread of 'inward disgrace' and the love of 'honourable and noble' character.
Characters to notice
- Mr. John Smith
Used as a hypothetical example of a man of humanity who would be more disturbed by losing his little finger than by the ruin of a hundred million brethren, illustrating the natural selfishness of passive feelings.
Key passages
“It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.”
Smith argues that mere benevolence is too weak to overcome selfishness; instead, conscience—an internal impartial judge—provides the powerful motive for moral action.
This passage introduces the central concept of conscience as the 'impartial spectator' that governs moral conduct.
“When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble?”
Smith poses the puzzle of why humans can act altruistically despite naturally selfish emotions, which he resolves by invoking conscience.
This rhetorical question frames the chapter's core inquiry into the origin of moral motivation.
“There is no commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward disgrace of such an action, the indelible stain which it would forever stamp upon his own mind, than the greatest external calamity which, without any fault of his own, could possibly befall him.”
An ordinary honest person fears internal shame from wrongdoing more than any external misfortune, showing the power of conscience.
Smith emphasizes the primacy of internal moral judgment over external consequences.