The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
II: Of the Love of Praise, and of That of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of That of Blameworthiness explained
This chapter explores the distinction between the desire for praise and the desire for praiseworthiness, as well as the dread of blame versus blameworthiness.
What happens
This chapter explores the distinction between the desire for praise and the desire for praiseworthiness, as well as the dread of blame versus blameworthiness. Smith argues that while these principles are akin and often blended, they are distinct and independent. The love of praiseworthiness is not derived from the love of praise; rather, praise gains its value as proof of praiseworthiness. Unmerited applause is contemptible, but unmerited censure can deeply wound even a wise man, due to the greater pungency of pain over pleasure and the uncertainty about one's own character.
Themes in this chapter
Desire for Praiseworthiness vs. Mere Praise
The central theme of the chapter: Smith distinguishes the desire for praise (the favorable sentiments of others) from the desire for praiseworthiness (being the proper object of those sentiments), arguing the latter is primary and not derived from the former.
The Impartial Spectator
Smith introduces the necessity of becoming the impartial spectator of one's own character and conduct, viewing oneself with the eyes of other people to achieve self-approbation and confirm praiseworthiness.
Characters to notice
- Cicero
Quoted regarding the inconsistency of despising glory while being mortified by unjust reproach.
Key passages
“Praise and blame express what actually are, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness what naturally ought to be, the sentiments of other people with regard to our character and conduct.”
Praise and blame reflect what people actually feel about us, while praiseworthiness and blameworthiness refer to what those feelings naturally ought to be.
Smith establishes the normative distinction between actual and deserved moral judgments.
“The love of praiseworthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise.”
The desire to be worthy of praise does not originate solely from the desire to receive praise.
Key thesis: the two principles are distinct and independent, though often blended.
“We must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct. We must endeavour to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them.”
To judge ourselves properly, we must adopt the perspective of an impartial observer, seeing our actions as others would see them.
Introduction of the impartial spectator as a tool for self-assessment and moral judgment.
“The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praiseworthiness.”
Even genuine praise brings little satisfaction unless it serves as evidence that we truly deserve it.
Praise derives its value from its connection to praiseworthiness, not from mere flattery.
“A woman who paints, could derive, one should imagine, but little vanity from the compliments that are paid to her complexion.”
A woman who uses makeup would gain little pride from compliments on her skin, as the praise is for an artificial appearance.
Analogy illustrating the emptiness of unmerited praise and the mortification of contrast with reality.