The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
I: Of Sympathy explained
Smith introduces sympathy as a fundamental principle of human nature, arguing that even the most selfish individuals possess an innate concern for others.
What happens
Smith introduces sympathy as a fundamental principle of human nature, arguing that even the most selfish individuals possess an innate concern for others. He explains that sympathy arises not from witnessing the passion itself but from imagining ourselves in the sufferer's situation, and he illustrates this with examples ranging from physical reactions to the plight of the insane and the dead.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith defines sympathy as fellow-feeling with any passion, not just sorrow, and argues it is the basis for moral judgment through imagining ourselves in another's situation.
Key passages
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
No matter how selfish we think humans are, they naturally care about others' fortunes and find others' happiness necessary for their own, even if they gain nothing but the pleasure of witnessing it.
Smith establishes the innate human tendency toward sympathy, countering the view that humans are purely self-interested.
“Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.”
Sympathy comes less from seeing someone's emotion directly and more from imagining the circumstances that caused it.
Smith clarifies that true sympathy depends on understanding the situation, not just observing the emotion.