The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation explained
Smith argues that our judgments of our own conduct are based on the same principle as our judgments of others: we imagine how an impartial spectator would view our actions.
What happens
Smith argues that our judgments of our own conduct are based on the same principle as our judgments of others: we imagine how an impartial spectator would view our actions. He uses the metaphor of a mirror provided by society to explain how we come to see ourselves, and emphasizes that virtue and vice are defined by their effects on others, not by self-reflection.
Themes in this chapter
The Impartial Spectator
Smith introduces the concept of the impartial spectator as the internal mechanism for self-approbation and self-disapprobation, essential for moral self-evaluation.
Desire for Praiseworthiness vs. Mere Praise
The chapter distinguishes between being the object of approbation and deserving it, highlighting the importance of praiseworthiness over mere praise.
Characters to notice
- The Impartial Spectator
Central to the chapter: the imagined impartial spectator is the internal judge by which we approve or disapprove of our own conduct.
Key passages
“We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us.”
We cannot judge our own feelings or actions without stepping back and seeing them from an outsider's perspective.
This introduces the core idea of self-distancing for moral self-assessment.
“Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with...”
Society acts as a mirror, reflecting back to us how our actions are perceived, allowing us to see our own moral character.
Smith uses the mirror metaphor to explain how social interaction enables self-knowledge.
“When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons...”
In self-judgment, we split into an impartial spectator and the person being judged, a necessary division for moral evaluation.
This division is key to understanding Smith's model of self-approbation.