The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety explained
This section explores the foundation of moral judgment in sympathy, explaining how we approve or disapprove of others' passions based on our ability to sympathize with them.
What happens
This section explores the foundation of moral judgment in sympathy, explaining how we approve or disapprove of others' passions based on our ability to sympathize with them. It introduces the concept of the impartial spectator and distinguishes between the amiable and respectable virtues.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
The chapter introduces sympathy as the mechanism through which we approve or disapprove of others' passions.
The Impartial Spectator
The concept of an impartial spectator is introduced as the standard for propriety in moral judgments.
Characters to notice
- Epicurus
Mentioned in the context of systems that derive moral approval from self-love.
- Mr. Hobbes
Referenced for his system that reduces moral sentiments to self-love.
- Dr. Hutcheson
Cited for his view that moral approval arises from a distinct moral sense.
Key passages
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
Even if humans are inherently selfish, they still naturally care about others' well-being and find pleasure in their happiness.
Opening statement establishing the universal human capacity for sympathy.
“When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm.”
Observing a blow about to strike someone else causes us to instinctively recoil as if we were the target.
Example of physical sympathy illustrating how we share others' sensations.