The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Section I: Of the Questions Which Ought to Be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments explained
Smith introduces the two fundamental questions of moral theory: what constitutes virtue, and by what mental faculty we approve of virtue.
What happens
Smith introduces the two fundamental questions of moral theory: what constitutes virtue, and by what mental faculty we approve of virtue. He argues that all major moral systems derive from natural principles but are often partial and imperfect. He outlines the first question (the nature of virtue) as debated by Hutcheson, Clark, and others, and the second question (the source of moral approval) as debated by proponents of self-love, reason, moral sense, or sympathy.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith mentions 'a modification of sympathy' as one possible principle by which the virtuous character is recommended to us, foreshadowing his own theory.
Self-Love and the Social Order
Self-love is listed as one of the proposed faculties that might recommend virtue, particularly through the perception of private interest.
Characters to notice
- Dr. Hutcheson
Cited as an example of a philosopher who locates virtue in benevolence.
Key passages
“If we examine the most celebrated and remarkable of the different theories which have been given concerning the nature and origin of our moral sentiments, we shall find that almost all of them coincide with some part or other of that which I have been endeavouring to give an account of”
Smith claims that all major moral theories align with aspects of his own system.
This establishes Smith's synthetic approach, showing how his theory incorporates and reconciles previous views.
“In treating of the principles of morals there are two questions to be considered. First, wherein does virtue consist? ... Secondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us?”
Moral philosophy must answer two questions: the definition of virtue and the psychological mechanism of moral approval.
This frames the entire structure of Smith's inquiry into moral systems.