The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
II: Of Those Passions Which Take Their Origin from a Particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination explained
Smith examines passions that arise from a peculiar turn or habit of the imagination, such as romantic love, which are natural but rarely sympathized with by others.
What happens
Smith examines passions that arise from a peculiar turn or habit of the imagination, such as romantic love, which are natural but rarely sympathized with by others. He explains that while we cannot enter into the lover's specific attachment, we can sympathize with the secondary passions (hope, fear, distress) that the situation produces. Love is often seen as ridiculous but not odious, and its mixture of humanity and generosity makes it somewhat agreeable. Smith also notes the need for reserve when discussing personal attachments, studies, or professions, as others cannot share the same degree of interest.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith explores how sympathy (or its lack) shapes our moral response to passions like love, which are natural but not universally shared.
The Impartial Spectator
The chapter implicitly invokes the impartial spectator by examining how a third person views the lover's passion as disproportionate and ridiculous.
Characters to notice
- Ovid
Mentioned as an example of agreeable, gallant love poetry, contrasted with the grave style of Cowley and Petrarca.
- Horace
Cited alongside Ovid for his gallant and agreeable treatment of love.
- Tibullus
Referenced for his poetic description of pastoral tranquillity and retirement in the context of romantic hope.
Key passages
“The imaginations of mankind, not having acquired that particular turn, cannot enter into them; and such passions, though they may be allowed to be almost unavoidable in some part of life, are always, in some measure, ridiculous.”
Because most people's imaginations haven't developed the same specific focus, they cannot share in these passions, which makes them seem somewhat absurd even if they are natural.
Smith explains why love, though natural, appears ridiculous to those not in love.
“It interests us not as a passion, but as a situation that gives occasion to other passions which interest us; to hope, to fear, and to distress of every kind.”
We are not interested in love itself, but in the hopes, fears, and distresses that arise from the lover's situation.
Smith distinguishes between primary and secondary passions in generating sympathy.
“The reserve which the laws of society impose upon the fair sex, with regard to this weakness, renders it more peculiarly distressful in them, and, upon that very account, more deeply interesting.”
Social constraints on women's expression of love make their distress more acute and therefore more engaging for spectators.
Smith notes how social norms amplify the dramatic interest of love in women.