The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of Those Systems Which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation explained
Smith examines the view that reason is the foundation of moral approbation, acknowledging that reason discovers general rules of morality through induction, but arguing that the first perceptions of right and wrong arise from immediate sens
What happens
Smith examines the view that reason is the foundation of moral approbation, acknowledging that reason discovers general rules of morality through induction, but arguing that the first perceptions of right and wrong arise from immediate sense and feeling, not reason. He critiques Hobbes's doctrine that civil law is the sole standard of right and wrong, and credits Hutcheson for distinguishing the roles of reason and moral sense.
Themes in this chapter
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
Smith discusses how virtue consists in conformity to reason in the sense of discovering general rules, but emphasizes that the original perceptions of virtue and vice come from immediate sense and feeling.
Characters to notice
- Dr. Hutcheson
Praised as the first to clearly distinguish that moral distinctions arise from immediate sense and feeling, not reason alone.
- Mr. Hobbes
His doctrine that a state of nature is a state of war and that civil law is the sole standard of right and wrong is discussed and refuted.
Key passages
“But though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality, and of all the moral judgments which we form by means of them; it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed.”
Reason gives us general moral rules, but the initial sense of right and wrong in specific cases comes from immediate feeling, not reason.
Smith clarifies the limited role of reason in moral perception.
“Dr. Hutcheson had the merit of being the first who distinguished with any degree of precision in what respect all moral distinctions may be said to arise from reason, and in what respect they are founded upon immediate sense and feeling.”
Hutcheson was the first to accurately separate the contributions of reason and moral sense to moral distinctions.
Smith credits Hutcheson with resolving the confusion between rationalist and sentimentalist accounts.