The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
The Theory of Moral Sentiments explained
This chapter introduces the foundational concept of sympathy as the basis for moral judgment, exploring how individuals evaluate their own and others' actions through an imagined impartial spectator.
What happens
This chapter introduces the foundational concept of sympathy as the basis for moral judgment, exploring how individuals evaluate their own and others' actions through an imagined impartial spectator. It examines the interplay between self-love and social order, the distinction between praiseworthiness and mere praise, and the role of propriety and virtue in shaping moral sentiments.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith argues that moral approval or disapproval arises from our capacity to sympathize with the motives and feelings of others, forming the core of moral evaluation.
The Impartial Spectator
The concept of an impartial spectator within each person is introduced as the mechanism for self-judgment and moral conscience.
Characters to notice
- Dr. Hutcheson
Referenced as a prior moral philosopher whose views on moral sense are contrasted with Smith's sympathy-based system.
- Mr. Hobbes
Mentioned in the context of self-love theories that Smith critiques, arguing that sympathy is not reducible to self-interest.
- Dr. Mandeville
Alluded to in discussions of the corruption of moral sentiments by wealth and rank, opposing Mandeville's cynical view of virtue.
Key passages
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
Even if humans are fundamentally self-interested, they naturally care about others' well-being and find satisfaction in their happiness, independent of personal gain.
This opening statement establishes sympathy as an innate human trait, countering purely egoistic theories of human nature.
“We often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, as a sense of duty may require us to adopt the afflictions of our friends, even when they are not immediately present.”
We frequently feel sadness because others are sad, and moral obligation can compel us to share in the sufferings of those close to us, even when we are not directly affected.
Smith emphasizes that sympathy is not merely a reflexive emotion but can be cultivated through moral duty.