The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
VI: In What Cases the Sense of Duty Ought to Be the Sole Principle of Our Conduct; and in What Cases It Ought to Concur with Other Motives explained
Smith examines when conduct should be guided solely by a sense of duty (general rules of morality) versus when it should also be animated by natural passions.
What happens
Smith examines when conduct should be guided solely by a sense of duty (general rules of morality) versus when it should also be animated by natural passions. He distinguishes justice, whose rules are precise and admit no exceptions, from other virtues like prudence, generosity, and gratitude, whose rules are loose and require modification. He argues that justice must be followed strictly from regard to the rule itself, while other virtues often require passion for the object. He also discusses the danger of an erroneous conscience, especially from false religious notions, which can lead to vice despite sincere intentions.
Themes in this chapter
Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
Smith argues that justice has precise, inviolable rules, unlike beneficence and other virtues, and that strict adherence to justice is essential for social order.
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
The chapter explores how propriety dictates when to follow general rules versus natural passions, especially in the context of gratitude, resentment, and ambition.
General Rules of Morality Regarded as Laws of the Deity
Smith discusses the danger of an erroneous conscience, particularly from false religious notions, which can pervert natural moral sentiments despite sincere intentions.
Characters to notice
- Cardinal de Retz
Cited as an example of a statesman whose daring and extensive projects, though unjust, are admired for their irregular greatness.
- Machiavel
Referenced implicitly in the discussion of heroes and conquerors whose ambition dazzles the imagination even when unjust.
Key passages
“The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition.”
Justice is like grammar: its rules are precise and must be followed exactly. Other virtues are like the loose guidelines critics give for writing elegantly—they offer a general ideal but no infallible directions.
Smith uses this analogy to highlight the unique precision and indispensability of justice compared to other virtues.
“A man often becomes a villain the moment he begins, even in his own heart, to chicane in this manner. The moment he thinks of departing from the most staunch and positive adherence to what those inviolable precepts prescribe to him, he is no longer to be trusted.”
Once a person starts rationalizing exceptions to the rules of justice, even in private thought, they risk becoming a villain, as no one can predict how far their guilt will go.
Smith warns against subtle justifications for violating justice, emphasizing the danger of moral slippery slopes.
“Nothing is more graceful than the behaviour of the man who appears to resent the greatest injuries, more from a sense that they deserve, and are the proper objects of resentment, than from feeling himself the furies of that disagreeable passion; who, like a judge, considers only the general rule, which determines what vengeance is due for each particular offence.”
The most admirable person punishes not out of personal fury but from a calm sense of duty, applying the general rule of justice like an impartial judge, even showing mercy when possible.
Smith illustrates the ideal of self-command in executing justice, where reason governs passion.