The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
II: Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit explained
This chapter explores the nature of justice, remorse, and the consciousness of merit.
What happens
This chapter explores the nature of justice, remorse, and the consciousness of merit. Smith argues that no impartial spectator can approve of harming another except in response to injury. He emphasizes the need to humble self-love and view oneself as others do. The chapter details the hierarchy of crimes—murder being the most atrocious, followed by theft and breach of contract—and describes the psychological torment of remorse, contrasted with the serenity of meritorious action.
Themes in this chapter
The Impartial Spectator
Smith repeatedly invokes the impartial spectator as the standard for moral judgment, particularly in restraining self-love and evaluating one's own conduct.
Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
The chapter focuses on justice as the most sacred set of moral rules, whose violation provokes the strongest resentment and punishment, contrasting with the milder sentiment of beneficence.
Key passages
“There can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us.”
The only acceptable reason for harming someone is in response to a wrong they have committed against us.
Smith establishes the principle that retaliation is the sole justifiable motive for injury.
“Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant part of it.”
While each person naturally sees themselves as all-important, to others they are just one among many.
Smith highlights the disparity between self-importance and the impartial view of others.
“If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, ... he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with.”
To gain the approval of an impartial observer, a person must temper their natural self-preference to a level others can accept.
This encapsulates Smith's core idea of moral restraint through the impartial spectator.
“The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others.”
The most important rules of justice protect life, then property, and finally contractual rights.
Smith ranks crimes by severity, with murder as the worst, followed by theft, then breach of promise.
“Such is the nature of that sentiment, which is properly called remorse; of all the sentiments which can enter the human heart the most dreadful. It is made up of shame from the sense of the impropriety of past conduct; of grief for the effects of it; of pity for those who suffer by it; and of the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly provoked resentment of all rational creatures.”
Remorse is a complex and terrible emotion combining shame, grief, pity, and fear of punishment for wrongdoing.
Smith provides a detailed psychological account of the guilty conscience.