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The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter

I: That Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and That, in the Same Manner, Whatever Appears to Be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment explained

This chapter establishes that actions deserving reward are those that are the proper and approved objects of gratitude, while actions deserving punishment are those that are the proper and approved objects of resentment.

What happens

This chapter establishes that actions deserving reward are those that are the proper and approved objects of gratitude, while actions deserving punishment are those that are the proper and approved objects of resentment. It distinguishes gratitude and resentment from other passions like love and hatred, emphasizing that gratitude requires personal recompense and resentment demands personal retribution, which naturally leads to the political ends of punishment: correction of the criminal and example to the public.

Themes in this chapter

  • Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament

    The chapter discusses reward and punishment as grounded in gratitude and resentment, which are foundational to justice and social order.

Key passages

  • To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that sentiment, which most immediately and directly prompts us to reward, or to do good to another.

    An action seems worthy of reward if it is the fitting target of the feeling that directly moves us to reward or benefit someone else.

    Defines the basis for deserving reward through the sentiment of gratitude.

  • Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him.

    Resentment is only fully satisfied when the offender not only suffers but also repents specifically for the harm they caused us.

    Highlights the personal and corrective nature of resentment as a basis for punishment.