The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit explained
This section introduces the concepts of merit and demerit as distinct from propriety and impropriety.
What happens
This section introduces the concepts of merit and demerit as distinct from propriety and impropriety. Merit is the quality deserving reward, and demerit the quality deserving punishment. The sentiment or affection underlying an action is examined in two relations: its cause (determining propriety) and its intended effect (determining merit or demerit). The chapter sets the stage for exploring how we sense good or ill desert.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
The chapter distinguishes merit and demerit as based on the beneficial or hurtful effects of affections, which are judged through sympathetic engagement.
Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament
The introduction of merit (reward) and demerit (punishment) lays groundwork for later distinctions between justice and beneficence.
Key passages
“There is another set of qualities ascribed to the actions and conduct of mankind, distinct from their propriety or impropriety, their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a distinct species of approbation and disapprobation. These are Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deserving reward and of deserving punishment.”
Beyond judging actions as proper or improper, we also assess them as deserving reward or punishment—this is the sense of merit and demerit.
Smith introduces merit and demerit as a separate category of moral evaluation.
“upon the beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection proposes or tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill desert of the action to which it gives occasion.”
Whether an action deserves reward or punishment depends on the beneficial or harmful outcomes it aims to bring about.
Merit and demerit are tied to the intended consequences of an action, not just its propriety.