The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
III: Of Those Systems Which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation explained
Smith examines two classes of systems that base moral approbation on sentiment.
What happens
Smith examines two classes of systems that base moral approbation on sentiment. The first, represented by Dr. Hutcheson, posits a distinct 'moral sense' analogous to external senses. Smith critiques this view, arguing that it leads to absurd consequences, such as being unable to call depraved moral faculties 'vicious.' He also notes that such a sentiment lacks a common name, unlike other passions. The second system explains approbation through sympathy with utility, akin to admiring a well-contrived machine. Smith distinguishes this from his own system, which derives moral sentiments from four sources: sympathy with the agent's motives, sympathy with the beneficiary's gratitude, conformity to general rules, and the perception of utility.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith contrasts systems that posit a distinct moral sense with those based on sympathy, arguing that sympathy (with motives, gratitude, and utility) can account for moral approbation without invoking a new faculty.
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
Smith notes that correct moral sentiments are laudable and that virtue requires habit and resolution, not just delicacy of sentiment, linking to propriety and self-command.
Characters to notice
- Dr. Hutcheson
Smith discusses Hutcheson's theory of a moral sense as a reflex internal sense, distinct from self-love and reason, and critiques its implications.
- Mr. Locke
Mentioned in relation to Hutcheson's classification of direct and reflex senses, where Locke's faculty of reflection is considered a direct internal sense.
Key passages
“The qualities, he allows, which belong to the objects of any sense, cannot, without the greatest absurdity, be ascribed to the sense itself. Who ever thought of calling the sense of seeing black or white, the sense of hearing loud or low, or the sense of tasting sweet or bitter? And, according to him, it is equally absurd to call our moral faculties virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil.”
Hutcheson admits that qualities of sense objects cannot be attributed to the sense itself, so calling moral faculties virtuous or vicious is as absurd as calling sight black or white.
Smith highlights a logical flaw in Hutcheson's moral sense theory: it cannot account for moral evaluation of the faculty itself.
“When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, according to the foregoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine.”
Smith summarizes his own system: moral approbation arises from sympathy with the agent's motives, sympathy with the recipient's gratitude, conformity to general rules, and the beauty of utility in promoting happiness.
Smith distinguishes his four-source theory from Hutcheson's single moral sense, emphasizing the role of sympathy and utility.