The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of Those Systems Which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence explained
Smith examines the system that identifies virtue solely with pure and disinterested benevolence, primarily as advanced by Dr.
What happens
Smith examines the system that identifies virtue solely with pure and disinterested benevolence, primarily as advanced by Dr. Hutcheson. He critiques this view for neglecting the moral value of self-interested motives and the inferior virtues like prudence and temperance, arguing that human nature requires a balance of motives and that the impartial spectator's sympathy, not utility alone, should measure virtue.
Themes in this chapter
Self-Love and the Social Order
Smith argues that self-love can be a laudable motive and that the system of benevolence unfairly dismisses it, as human nature requires a mix of motives for social harmony.
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
Smith critiques the benevolence system for ignoring propriety and the proper degree of affections, which he sees as essential to virtue.
Characters to notice
- Dr. Hutcheson
Presented as the chief proponent of the system that virtue consists in pure and disinterested benevolence, arguing that any selfish motive diminishes merit.
Key passages
“This was a selfish motive, he thought, which, so far as it contributed to any action, demonstrated the weakness of that pure and disinterested benevolence which could alone stamp upon the conduct of man the character of virtue.”
Hutcheson believed that any selfish motive, including the desire for self-approbation, revealed a deficiency in the pure benevolence that alone makes an action virtuous.
Smith summarizes Hutcheson's strict view that virtue requires absolute disinterestedness.
“The condition of human nature were peculiarly hard, if those affections, which, by the very nature of our being, ought frequently to influence our conduct, could upon no occasion appear virtuous, or deserve esteem and commendation from anybody.”
It would be an unfair burden on human nature if the affections that naturally guide our behavior could never be considered virtuous or praiseworthy.
Smith argues against Hutcheson's exclusion of self-interested motives from virtue.