The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
IV: Of the Social Passions explained
Smith contrasts the social and benevolent affections—such as generosity, humanity, kindness, and compassion—with the unsocial passions of hatred and resentment.
What happens
Smith contrasts the social and benevolent affections—such as generosity, humanity, kindness, and compassion—with the unsocial passions of hatred and resentment. He argues that the social passions are naturally agreeable because they elicit a redoubled sympathy from the impartial spectator, who sympathizes both with the person feeling them and with the object of those feelings. The chapter emphasizes the pleasure derived from mutual love and esteem, the harmony they create in families and friendships, and the universal approval they receive. In contrast, violent hatred and resentment are condemned as destructive to society, making the person who harbors them an object of dread.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment
Smith explains that the social passions are agreeable because they generate a 'redoubled sympathy' in the impartial spectator, who sympathizes both with the person feeling the passion and with its object.
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
The chapter contrasts the propriety of benevolent affections with the impropriety of excessive hatred and resentment, which are deemed unfit for civil society.
Key passages
“Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem, all the social and benevolent affections, when expressed in the countenance or behaviour, even towards those who are not peculiarly connected with ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occasion.”
Benevolent feelings like generosity and kindness are universally pleasing to an impartial observer, even when directed at strangers.
Smith highlights the universal appeal of social passions through the mechanism of sympathy.
“What character is so detestable as that of one who takes pleasure to sow dissention among friends, and to turn their most tender love into mortal hatred?”
A person who enjoys causing discord among friends is considered utterly detestable.
Smith uses this rhetorical question to emphasize the moral repugnance of destroying affectionate bonds.
“There is a helplessness in the character of extreme humanity which more than anything interests our pity. There is nothing in itself which renders it either ungraceful or disagreeable. We only regret that it is unfit for the world, because the world is unworthy of it.”
Excessive kindness is pitiable not because it is ugly, but because the world is too harsh for such gentleness.
Smith suggests that even excessive benevolence is viewed with sympathy rather than contempt.