The Theory of Moral Sentiments · Chapter
Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues explained
This chapter distinguishes two sets of virtues: the amiable virtues, founded on the spectator's effort to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned, and the respectable virtues, founded on the person's effort to bring do
What happens
This chapter distinguishes two sets of virtues: the amiable virtues, founded on the spectator's effort to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned, and the respectable virtues, founded on the person's effort to bring down his emotions to what the spectator can go along with. It explores how amiable virtues like humanity and condescension arise from sympathy, while respectable virtues like self-command and magnanimity arise from self-government. The chapter also discusses the difference between virtue and mere propriety, noting that virtue is excellence beyond the ordinary, and that we often judge actions by two standards: absolute perfection and the common degree of excellence.
Themes in this chapter
Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command
The chapter explicitly defines amiable virtues as stemming from sensibility and respectable virtues as stemming from self-command, emphasizing that virtue is excellence beyond common propriety.
The Impartial Spectator
The impartial spectator is central to the chapter's analysis, as the standard for self-command and the basis for judging the propriety of emotions and actions.
Key passages
“Upon these two different efforts, upon that of the spectator to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned, and upon that of the person principally concerned to bring down his emotions to what the spectator can go along with, are founded two different sets of virtues.”
Two types of virtues arise from two efforts: the spectator trying to feel what the main person feels, and the main person reducing their emotions to a level the spectator can accept.
This introduces the foundational distinction between amiable and respectable virtues.
“As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is found capable of loving us.”
Just as Christianity commands loving others as ourselves, nature commands that we love ourselves only to the extent that others can love us.
This connects moral sentiment to Christian ethics and natural law.
“Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary.”
Virtue is not ordinary but is an exceptional and admirable quality that surpasses common behavior.
This defines virtue as distinct from mere propriety.