A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume.
Chapter 1
Epigraph
The epigraph quotes Tacitus, expressing the rare fortune of times when one can think what one wants and say what one thinks.
Chapter 2
Advertisement
In this brief advertisement, Hume explains that the present volumes cover only the understanding and passions, forming a complete chain of reasoning, and that he will proceed to morals, politics, and criticism if the public approves. He regards public approbation as his greatest reward and its judgment as his best instruction.
Chapter 3
A Treatise of Human Nature
This foundational chapter introduces Hume's ambitious project: to apply the experimental method of reasoning to moral subjects, establishing a science of human nature. It sets the stage for a detailed examination of the origins, composition, and associations of our perceptions, beginning with the distinction between impressions and ideas.
Chapter 4
Book I: Of the Understanding
This foundational chapter introduces Hume's empiricist philosophy, distinguishing between impressions and ideas, and establishing the principles of association that govern thought. It lays the groundwork for his skeptical inquiries into causality, the self, and morality.
Chapter 5
Part I: Of Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connection, Abstraction, etc.
This chapter introduces the foundational principles of Hume's empiricism, distinguishing between impressions and ideas, and explaining how ideas are derived from impressions. It explores the division of perceptions into simple and complex, the role of memory and imagination, and the principles of association that connect ideas. Hume also addresses the nature of abstract ideas and the limits of thought, arguing that all ideas are ultimately rooted in sensory experience.
Chapter 6
Section I: Of the Origin of Our Ideas
Hume introduces the fundamental distinction between impressions and ideas, defining impressions as the more forceful and lively perceptions (sensations, passions, emotions) and ideas as their faint images in thought. He further divides perceptions into simple and complex, asserting that every simple idea corresponds to a simple impression, with impressions taking precedence. He discusses the general rule that all simple ideas derive from impressions, acknowledges a singular exception (the missing shade of blue), and clarifies that this principle addresses the debate on innate ideas.
Chapter 7
Section II: Division of the Subject
Hume divides impressions into those of sensation and reflection, noting that simple impressions precede their corresponding ideas. He explains the order: sensation gives rise to impressions, which are copied as ideas; these ideas then produce impressions of reflection (desires, aversions, hopes, fears), which are in turn copied into ideas. Since impressions of reflection arise from ideas, Hume chooses to examine ideas first, leaving the study of sensations to anatomists and natural philosophers.
Chapter 8
Section III: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination
Hume distinguishes between memory and imagination as two faculties for recalling impressions. Memory retains vivacity and preserves the original order of impressions, while imagination produces fainter ideas and can freely transpose and change them. This liberty of imagination is grounded in the fact that all ideas are copied from impressions and that no impressions are perfectly inseparable.
Chapter 9
Section IV: Of the Connection or Association of Ideas
Hume explores the principles that guide the imagination in connecting simple ideas, identifying three associative qualities: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect. He argues that these principles act as a gentle force, making the imagination uniform and explaining the coherence of complex ideas. He extends the relation of cause and effect to include power and authority, and compares this mental attraction to physical attraction, cautioning against over-inquiring into causes. The chapter concludes by introducing the division of complex ideas into relations, modes, and substances.
Chapter 10
Section V: Of Relations
Hume distinguishes between natural relations, which connect ideas in the imagination, and philosophical relations, which are arbitrary comparisons. He enumerates seven fundamental philosophical relations: resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity/number, degrees of quality, contrariety, and cause and effect. He notes that resemblance is essential to all relations, and that difference is a negation rather than a positive relation.
Chapter 11
Section VI: Of Modes and Substances
Hume challenges the notion of substance as a distinct idea, arguing that it is merely a collection of simple ideas united by the imagination. He distinguishes between substances and modes, noting that substances are referred to an unknown something and can admit new qualities without changing their name, while modes cannot.
Chapter 12
Section VII: Of Abstract Ideas
Hume argues that all ideas are particular in nature, derived from impressions, and become general only through custom and association with general terms. He refutes the notion of abstract or general ideas, explaining that a general term revives a custom that allows the mind to recall particular ideas as needed. He also introduces the 'distinction of reason' to explain how we can distinguish aspects of a single object, such as figure and color, based on resemblances.
Chapter 13
Part II: Of the Ideas of Space and Time
This chapter examines the origins of our ideas of space and time, arguing that they are derived from impressions of external objects and internal perceptions. Hume contends that our idea of space comes from the manner in which visible and tangible objects are disposed, and our idea of time from the succession of perceptions. He argues against the notion of infinite divisibility, asserting that our ideas of space and time are finite and composed of indivisible points or moments. The chapter also includes a rejection of the idea of a vacuum, claiming that we cannot form a coherent idea of empty space, and a discussion of how the mind's capacity to perceive relations like contiguity and succession forms the basis for these ideas.
Chapter 14
Section I: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time
Hume begins his examination of space and time by addressing the doctrine of infinite divisibility. He argues that the mind's capacity is limited and cannot conceive of infinity, and that our ideas of finite qualities are not infinitely divisible but consist of simple and indivisible parts. He illustrates this with examples such as a grain of sand and a spot of ink, asserting that our senses and imagination reach a minimum, and that apparent complexity is due to the limitations of our perception, not the nature of objects.
Chapter 15
Section II: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time
Hume argues against the infinite divisibility of space and time, asserting that our ideas of extension and duration are composed of indivisible parts or moments. He contends that any demonstration of infinite divisibility is sophistical, as it conflicts with the clear and distinct ideas we form of these concepts. He also applies his maxim that whatever is clearly conceived is possible, thereby defending the notion of mathematical points and indivisible moments.
Chapter 16
Section III: Of the Other Qualities of Our Idea of Space and Time
Hume applies his principle that all ideas derive from impressions to the ideas of space and time. He argues that the idea of extension is a copy of the impressions of colored points or tangible atoms, and that abstract ideas are particular ideas considered in a certain light. Similarly, the idea of time is derived from the succession of perceptions, not from any distinct impression, and cannot be applied to unchangeable objects without a fiction. He also argues that indivisible points of space and moments of time must be filled with sensible qualities to be conceivable.
Chapter 17
Section IV: Objections Answered
Hume addresses objections to his theory of space and time, defending the finite divisibility of extension and the rejection of vacuum. He argues that mathematical points, when conceived as colored or solid, avoid the absurdity of nonentity and penetration. He also critiques the notion of an imaginary standard of equality, showing that our ideas of equality and right lines are based on sensory appearances and corrections, not on any perfect standard. Hume concludes that geometrical demonstrations for infinite divisibility are sophistical, as they rely on ideas that are themselves finite and indivisible.
Chapter 18
Section V: The Same Subject Continued
Hume continues his examination of the idea of extension and vacuum, addressing objections from metaphysics and mechanics. He argues that the idea of a vacuum is not derived from any impression, but arises from the confusion of ideas due to the relations of causation and resemblance. He also applies similar reasoning to the idea of time, asserting that time is nothing but the manner in which real objects exist, and that we have no idea of time without change. He concludes by confessing that his philosophy only aims to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, not the secret nature of bodies.
Chapter 19
Section VI: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence
Hume examines the ideas of existence and external existence, arguing that the idea of existence is not derived from a distinct impression but is identical with the idea of the object itself. He extends this reasoning to external existence, concluding that we cannot conceive of anything specifically different from our perceptions, and that our notion of external objects is merely a relative idea.
Chapter 20
Part III: Of Knowledge and Probability
This chapter explores the nature of knowledge and probability, distinguishing between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, and examining the foundations of causal reasoning and belief.
Chapter 21
Section I: Of Knowledge
Hume categorizes seven philosophical relations into two classes: those dependent solely on ideas (resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, proportions in quantity or number) and those that can change without altering the ideas (identity, relations of time and place, causation). He argues that only the former four can be objects of knowledge and certainty. Among these, three are known by intuition, while proportions in quantity or number require demonstration. Geometry, though useful, lacks perfect precision because its principles derive from appearances, whereas algebra and arithmetic achieve certainty through a precise standard. Hume also critiques the notion of abstract ideas, asserting that all ideas are copied from impressions and thus cannot be inherently obscure.
Chapter 22
Section II: Of Probability, and of the Idea of Cause and Effect
Hume examines the nature of causation, distinguishing it from other relations like identity and time/place. He argues that causation is the only relation that allows us to infer beyond our senses, and he seeks to find the impression from which the idea of causation arises. He identifies contiguity and succession as essential but insufficient, and introduces the concept of necessary connection, which he will investigate further.
Chapter 23
Section III: Why a Cause Is Always Necessary
Hume challenges the common philosophical maxim that everything which begins to exist must have a cause. He argues that this proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain, as it is not based on any of the infallible relations of ideas. He refutes several common arguments for the necessity of a cause, showing they all presuppose what they attempt to prove. He concludes that the belief in the necessity of a cause arises from observation and experience, not from reason, and sets the stage for his future inquiry into how experience gives rise to this principle.
Chapter 24
Section IV: Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect
Hume argues that all reasoning about causes and effects must ultimately rest on impressions from memory or senses. He illustrates this with the example of historical belief, such as the assassination of Caesar, showing that chains of inference must terminate in some present impression or memory, otherwise they are chimerical. He also addresses the objection that we can reason without recalling original impressions, noting that the conviction may persist even if the impressions are forgotten.
Chapter 25
Section V: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory
Hume explores the nature of impressions from the senses and memory, distinguishing them from imagination by their superior force and vivacity. He argues that belief is essentially the liveliness of perceptions, and that custom and habit can make imagined ideas feel like memories.
Chapter 26
Section VI: Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea
Hume examines how we infer causes from effects, arguing that this inference is not based on reason or the intrinsic nature of objects, but on experience of constant conjunction. He explores whether this transition is determined by the understanding or by imagination, concluding that it is a matter of custom and association, not rational demonstration. He also introduces the idea that necessary connection depends on the inference rather than the reverse.
Chapter 27
Section VII: Of the Nature of the Idea or Belief
Hume investigates the nature of belief, distinguishing it from mere conception. He argues that belief is not a new idea added to the conception of an object but rather a difference in the manner of conception, characterized by superior force, vivacity, or firmness. This lively idea is produced by a relation to a present impression, and is determined by custom or association rather than reason.
Chapter 28
Section VIII: Of the Causes of Belief
Hume investigates the origin of belief, proposing that it arises from a present impression that communicates vivacity to related ideas. He supports this with experiments on resemblance and contiguity, and argues that belief is a product of custom and habit, not reason. He concludes that all probable reasoning is a species of sensation, and that past experience operates insensibly to produce belief.
Chapter 29
Section IX: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits
Hume addresses an objection to his theory that belief is a lively idea related to a present impression. While resemblance and contiguity can enliven ideas, they are feeble and uncertain when alone. Causation, by contrast, provides a fixed and unalterable connection. Hume argues that belief arises only from causation, and that resemblance and contiguity only augment belief when they are conjoined with it. He illustrates this with examples of credulity, the weak belief in a future state, and the effect of seeing holy places on religious faith.
Chapter 30
Section X: Of the Influence of Belief
Hume explores how belief, defined as a vivid and intense conception, influences both passions and imagination. He argues that belief arises from custom and habit, and that it can elevate an idea to the level of an impression, thereby affecting the will and emotions. He contrasts the force of belief with the weaker effects of poetic fictions, noting that while poetry can engage the imagination, it lacks the solidity of genuine conviction. Hume also discusses how passions can in turn strengthen belief, and how general rules help correct the excesses of imagination.
Chapter 31
Section XI: Of the Probability of Chances
Hume examines the nature of probability, distinguishing it from knowledge and proofs. He argues that chance is merely the negation of a cause, leaving the mind indifferent. A superior combination of chances, such as a die with more sides marked one way, produces belief through the union of impulses from multiple equal chances, not through demonstration or probability. This belief is a form of vivacity in the idea, derived from custom and habit.
Chapter 32
Section XII: Of the Probability of Causes
Hume examines how we reason about causes when past experience shows contrary effects. He argues that our inferences are not based on reason but on habit and custom, which produce a belief that the future will resemble the past. When past experiments are contrary, the mind's determination is broken into pieces, and the force of the impression is diffused over the various images, leading to a weaker belief proportional to the number of contrary instances. He also discusses the role of analogy and general rules in probabilistic reasoning, noting that even minute differences in probability influence our judgment through custom rather than through direct perception.
Chapter 33
Section XIII: Of Unphilosophical Probability
Hume explores the nature of probability and belief, arguing that all judgments short of knowledge derive from the force and vivacity of perceptions. He examines how custom and general rules influence the imagination, leading to unphilosophical probabilities that can contradict judgment. He illustrates these principles with examples of open versus concealed satire, and the differing influence of direct versus oblique evidence on the passions.
Chapter 34
Section XIV: Of the Idea of Necessary Connection
Hume argues that the idea of necessary connection, or power, cannot be derived from any single instance of cause and effect, but arises from the customary transition of the mind after repeated similar conjunctions. He rejects the notion that power resides in objects, insisting it is a perception of the mind. He provides two definitions of cause, one as a philosophical relation and one as a natural relation, emphasizing the mind's determination to pass from one idea to another.
Chapter 35
Section XV: Rules by Which to Judge of Causes and Effects
Hume establishes general rules for determining causal relationships, emphasizing that causation is not discoverable by mere survey but requires experience. He lists eight rules, including contiguity, priority, constant conjunction, and the principle that like causes produce like effects. He concludes by noting the difficulty of applying these rules and the need for extensive experimentation, especially in moral philosophy.
Chapter 36
Section XVI: Of the Reason of Animals
Hume argues that animals possess reason and thought, and that their reasoning is based on the same principles as human reasoning, namely custom and experience. He uses this as a test for his own theory of belief, asserting that any valid system of the mind must apply equally to both humans and animals. He distinguishes between vulgar actions (like a dog avoiding fire) and extraordinary sagacity (like a bird building a nest), but maintains that both stem from the same causal inference grounded in custom. He concludes that reason is a kind of instinct, and that habit is a principle of nature.
Chapter 37
Part IV: Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy
This chapter explores various philosophical systems, particularly skepticism, and examines the limitations of human understanding regarding the external world, the self, and causation. It discusses the role of custom and imagination in forming beliefs, and critiques the notion of abstract ideas and the idea of necessary connection.
Chapter 38
Section I: Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason
Hume argues that all knowledge, including demonstrative reasoning, degenerates into probability due to the fallibility of human faculties. He introduces the idea that reason must be checked by a meta-judgment about its own reliability, leading to an infinite regress of probabilities. However, he notes that nature prevents total skepticism by making subtle reasoning less convincing as it becomes more complex, thus preserving belief in common life.
Chapter 39
Section II: Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses
Hume examines whether the senses can provide evidence for the continued and distinct existence of external objects. He argues that the senses cannot offer such notions, and that the belief in external existence arises from the imagination, specifically from the constancy and coherence of certain impressions. He critiques both the vulgar and philosophical systems, concluding that sceptical doubt is incurable and that we rely on carelessness and inattention for relief.
Chapter 40
Section III: Of the Ancient Philosophy
Hume criticizes the ancient philosophers' fictions of substance, substantial forms, accidents, and occult qualities, showing how these arise from the imagination's propensity to feign unknown entities to reconcile contradictions in our perceptions. He argues that our idea of identity in objects is a fiction produced by the smooth transition of thought, and that the ancient philosophy's inventions, like sympathy and antipathy, stem from a natural inclination to personify external objects. Hume concludes that true philosophy approaches the sentiments of the vulgar, while false philosophy errs by seeking hidden connections in matter.
Chapter 41
Section IV: Of the Modern Philosophy
Hume defends his critique of ancient philosophy by distinguishing between permanent and universal principles of the imagination versus changeable and weak ones. He then examines the modern philosophy's claim to be founded on solid principles, focusing on its fundamental principle that secondary qualities (colors, sounds, tastes, etc.) are merely impressions in the mind. Hume finds only one satisfactory argument for this, based on variations of impressions. However, he argues that this principle leads to the annihilation of all external objects, including primary qualities like extension and solidity, thus reducing modern philosophy to extravagant skepticism.
Chapter 42
Section V: Of the Immateriality of the Soul
Hume argues that the question of whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance is meaningless, since we have no idea of substance or inhesion. He contends that perceptions are distinct and separable, and can exist independently, thus they are substances in the only sense we can define. He also examines the local conjunction of perceptions with matter, concluding that most perceptions exist nowhere, and that the supposed union of extended bodies with non-extended qualities is an illusion based on custom and the propensity to complete relations.
Chapter 43
Section VI: Of Personal Identity
Hume argues against the notion of a constant, invariable self, asserting that we have no impression of such a self and that personal identity is merely a fiction we attribute to a bundle of perceptions connected by resemblance and causation, with memory playing a key role in producing this identity.
Chapter 44
Section VII: Conclusion of This Book
Hume reflects on the daunting voyage of philosophical inquiry, expressing deep skepticism about the weakness and disorder of human faculties. He describes his feeling of isolation and the opposition he faces from various intellectual groups. He argues that memory, senses, and understanding are all founded on the imagination and the vivacity of ideas. He contrasts the dangerous errors of religion with the merely ridiculous errors of philosophy, and expresses hope that his work on human nature will contribute to knowledge. He concludes by advocating for a moderate, true skepticism that is diffident of its own doubts and convictions.
Chapter 45
Book II: Of the Passions
This chapter introduces Hume's investigation of the passions, which he identifies as impressions of reflection. He outlines the distinction between original impressions (arising from the body) and secondary impressions (arising from the mind), placing the passions in the latter category. The chapter sets the stage for a detailed examination of the causes, objects, and effects of the passions, beginning with pride and humility.
Chapter 46
Part I: Of Pride and Humility
This chapter introduces the passions of pride and humility, establishing that their common object is the self. Hume argues that pride and humility are simple and uniform impressions, and that their causes are numerous and varied, including virtues, vices, beauty, deformity, wealth, poverty, and external objects. The chapter lays the groundwork for a systematic examination of these passions, their causes, and their relation to the self.
Chapter 47
Section I: Division of the Subject
Hume introduces a division of impressions into original (sensation) and secondary (reflective), and further distinguishes calm from violent emotions, and direct from indirect passions. He sets the scope of his inquiry to focus on the secondary, reflective impressions, particularly the violent passions, and outlines the plan to examine their nature, origin, causes, and effects.
Chapter 48
Section II: Of Pride and Humility, Their Objects and Causes
Hume examines the passions of pride and humility, noting that while they are simple impressions that cannot be defined, they can be described. He establishes that both passions have the same object—the self—but their causes are distinct. He distinguishes between the cause and the object of these passions, and further subdivides the cause into the quality that operates and the subject on which it is placed, using the example of a beautiful house owned by a person.
Chapter 49
Section III: Whence These Objects and Causes Are Derived
Hume investigates the origin of the objects and causes of pride and humility. He argues that the object (self) is determined by an original, natural property, while the causes are natural but not original, arising from general principles rather than distinct adaptations. He criticizes the multiplication of principles, comparing it to pre-Copernican astronomy, and advocates for simplicity in explaining the passions.
Chapter 50
Section IV: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas
Hume explores the association of impressions and ideas, noting that both follow principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, but impressions associate only by resemblance. He observes that these associations mutually reinforce each other, making transitions between passions and ideas more vivid and natural.
Chapter 51
Section V: Of the Influence of These Relations on Pride and Humility
Hume applies his principles of association to explain the causes of pride and humility. He argues that these passions arise from a double relation: the cause must produce a separate impression (pleasure for pride, pain for humility) and be related to self, the object of the passion. This double relation facilitates an easy transition of impressions and ideas, determining the specific causes of pride and humility. He also emphasizes that pride requires an external cause and is not produced immediately by nature.
Chapter 52
Section VI: Limitations of This System
Hume outlines five limitations to his general system that all agreeable objects related to self produce pride and disagreeable ones humility. The limitations are: (1) a close relation is required, closer than for joy; (2) the object must be peculiar to ourselves or shared with few; (3) the object must be discernible and obvious to others; (4) the cause must be constant and not inconstant; (5) general rules influence pride and humility. He concludes that the proudest are not always the happiest, and the most humble not always the most miserable, as real evils may lack the required relations.
Chapter 53
Section VII: Of Vice and Virtue
Hume examines the causes of pride and humility, focusing on vice and virtue as the most obvious causes. He argues that regardless of whether moral distinctions are natural or derived from interest and education, they produce pleasure or pain, which are the necessary impressions for pride and humility. He demonstrates that both moral hypotheses—one based on self-interest and the other on natural sentiment—support his system of double relations of impressions and ideas. He also extends the analysis to other qualities like wit, which produce pride or humility through the sensation of pleasure or uneasiness, and clarifies his definitions of pride and humility as impressions, not necessarily virtues or vices.
Chapter 54
Section VIII: Of Beauty and Deformity
Hume argues that beauty and deformity, whether in our own bodies or external objects, produce pleasure or pain, which, when related to self, give rise to pride or humility. He contends that beauty is essentially a form that produces pleasure, and deformity a structure that conveys pain, and that this power of producing sensations is the common cause of pride and humility. He supports this with examples from utility, architecture, and surprising adventures, and addresses objections regarding health and sickness, showing that only constant and peculiar causes affect pride and humility.
Chapter 55
Section IX: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages
Hume explores how external objects, such as possessions, family, and country, can become sources of pride and humility through their relation to the self. He argues that these objects must be associated with us via contiguity or causation, and that the double relation of impressions and ideas—where a related object produces a related emotion that transitions to pride or humility—is necessary for these passions to arise. The chapter also examines how the strength of these relations, such as the continuity of family possessions or the male line of descent, enhances or diminishes the resulting pride.
Chapter 56
Section X: Of Property and Riches
Hume explores how property and riches produce pride through the double relation of impressions and ideas. Property, as a close relation between person and object, transfers pleasure from the object to the self, generating pride. Riches, as the power to acquire property, similarly influence passions, even when not exercised, due to the idea of power and its probable exercise. The chapter also discusses how authority over others enhances pride through comparison, and how the uncertainty of another's power can cause uneasiness.
Chapter 57
Section XI: Of the Love of Fame
Hume explores the secondary causes of pride and humility, focusing on the influence of reputation and the opinions of others. He introduces sympathy as the mechanism by which we receive the sentiments of others, and explains how this sympathy, combined with relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, converts ideas of others' affections into our own impressions. He argues that our desire for fame and aversion to infamy are not original instincts but derive from sympathy, as evidenced by our greater concern for the judgments of those we esteem and the fact that praise only pleases when it aligns with our own self-opinion.
Chapter 58
Section XII: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals
Hume extends his analysis of pride and humility to animals, arguing that the same principles—relation to self and production of pleasure or pain—operate in beasts as in humans. He observes that animals exhibit pride and humility through their behavior, and that the causes (beauty, strength, etc.) are similar, though limited to bodily qualities since animals lack moral sense. He further argues that the association of ideas and impressions works the same way in animals, providing strong evidence for his hypothesis.
Chapter 59
Part II: Of Love and Hatred
This chapter examines the passions of love and hatred, their objects, causes, and the mechanisms by which they arise. It explores how these passions are directed at persons and how various qualities in others, such as virtue, beauty, and even vice, can produce love or hatred. The chapter also discusses the role of sympathy, comparison, and the association of ideas in shaping these passions, including complex cases like malice, envy, and the love of relations.
Chapter 60
Section I: Of the Object and Causes of Love and Hatred
Hume begins by noting that love and hatred, like pride and humility, are simple impressions that cannot be defined. He establishes that the object of love and hatred is always another person, not oneself, and that the cause of these passions must be distinct from their object. He argues that the causes are diverse, including virtues, talents, bodily accomplishments, and external advantages, and that these causes must be related to a thinking being and produce a separate pleasure or uneasiness. He draws parallels to his earlier analysis of pride and humility, suggesting that the same qualities that cause pride in oneself cause love in others.
Chapter 61
Section II: Experiments to Confirm This System
Hume conducts a series of experiments to confirm his system of the double relation of impressions and ideas in the production of pride, humility, love, and hatred. He demonstrates that objects must bear a double relation—of ideas to the object of the passion and of sensation to the passion itself—to produce these passions. Through successive experiments, he shows that neither a relation of ideas alone nor a relation of impressions alone is sufficient, but when both are present, the passions arise and transition along related objects. He also explores the effects of identity of passions, the greater facility of descending than ascending in passion transitions, and the influence of close personal connections, ultimately confirming his hypothesis.
Chapter 62
Section III: Difficulties Solved
Hume addresses difficulties in his account of love and hatred, focusing on the role of intention. He argues that while pleasure and uneasiness are the primary causes of these passions, the intention behind an action strengthens the relation between the action and the person, making it a more durable and effective cause. He distinguishes between constant qualities of character, which cause love or hatred independent of intention, and momentary actions, which require intention to connect them to the person. He also explores how the perception of justice or injustice can influence these passions, noting that harm from a just motive may diminish anger, but the natural tendency of uneasiness to excite hatred often leads us to view the harm-doer as criminal.
Chapter 63
Section IV: Of the Love of Relations
Hume explores how relations and acquaintance produce love and kindness, arguing that the force and liveliness of conception is the common principle. He discusses the effects of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and examines phenomena such as the weakening of ties upon a mother's second marriage, explaining it through the ease of the imagination's double motion.
Chapter 64
Section V: Of Our Esteem for the Rich and Powerful
Hume explores why we esteem the rich and powerful and despise the poor and mean. He considers three possible causes: the pleasure from agreeable objects, the expectation of advantage, and sympathy. He argues that sympathy is the chief and most powerful principle, as we enter into the sentiments of the possessor and share their satisfaction, which is then reflected back and amplified. This explains our esteem for riches even when we expect no personal benefit, and it extends to our appreciation of utility and beauty in objects.
Chapter 65
Section VI: Of Benevolence and Anger
Hume explores the distinction between love and hatred on one hand, and benevolence and anger on the other. He argues that while love and hatred are pure emotions, benevolence and anger are distinct desires that are conjoined with them by the original constitution of the mind, not by necessity.
Chapter 66
Section VII: Of Compassion
Hume examines the passions of pity and malice, arguing that they are not original instincts but secondary affections derived from the principle of sympathy. He explains that our concern for others arises from a lively idea of their passions, which is converted into an impression due to our resemblance to all humans. Pity is particularly influenced by contiguity and the imagination, and it can be intensified by the weakness or indifference of the sufferer, as the imagination follows general rules rather than the actual situation.
Chapter 67
Section VIII: Of Malice and Envy
Hume examines the passions of malice and envy, explaining how they arise from the principle of comparison. He argues that we judge objects and people not by their intrinsic worth but by comparing them with others, and that this comparison is influenced by the relation between the objects. Envy is triggered by proximity in merit or relation, while malice is an unprovoked desire to produce evil for the pleasure of comparison. Hume also discusses how general rules and the association of ideas affect these passions, and how even self-directed malice can occur through comparison with past or present states.
Chapter 68
Section IX: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger with Compassion and Malice
Hume explores how pity and malice, though seemingly contradictory to his system, are connected to love and hatred through a double relation of impressions and ideas. He argues that pity, a desire for another's happiness, is related to benevolence, which is connected to love; malice, a desire for another's misery, is related to anger, which is connected to hatred. The strength of sympathy determines whether we feel love or hatred: strong sympathy with misery produces benevolence and love, while weak sympathy produces hatred or contempt. He illustrates this with examples of rival tradesmen, merchants in partnership, and reactions to different degrees of poverty and suffering.
Chapter 69
Section X: Of Respect and Contempt
Hume explains the passions of respect and contempt as mixtures of love/humility and hatred/pride, arising from a comparison with ourselves. He notes that pride is more prevalent in contempt than humility in respect, and addresses why some objects produce pure love or hatred rather than mixed passions. He also accounts for the tendency to keep distance from those we contemn, linking it to the natural uneasiness caused by disproportion and the metaphorical connection between distance and difference.
Chapter 70
Section XI: Of the Amorous Passion, or Love Betwixt the Sexes
Hume examines the compound passion of love between the sexes, arguing that it arises from the conjunction of three distinct impressions: the pleasing sensation of beauty, the bodily appetite for generation, and a generous kindness or goodwill. He explains how these passions are connected through relations of resemblance and parallel desires, and how the double relation of impressions and ideas is necessary for the production of this passion. He also uses this example to illustrate his broader theory of pride, humility, love, and hatred, emphasizing that objects alone cannot cause passions without related emotions.
Chapter 71
Section XII: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals
Hume extends his analysis of love and hatred to animals, arguing that these passions are common to all sentient beings and operate through simple principles without requiring reflection. He observes that animals' affections are based on sensible good and evil, that sympathy communicates passions among them, and that envy and malice are more common than pity in animals.
Chapter 72
Part III: Of the Will and Direct Passions
This chapter examines the nature of the will and the direct passions, exploring how they arise from pain and pleasure and are influenced by reason, custom, and the imagination. It discusses the causes and effects of passions like desire, aversion, hope, fear, and the influence of probability and uncertainty on these emotions.
Chapter 73
Section I: Of Liberty and Necessity
Hume examines the will and the long-disputed question of liberty and necessity. He argues that the operations of the mind are as necessary as those of matter, since both are based on constant union and the inference of the mind. He contends that moral evidence, derived from the constant conjunction of motives and actions, is as reliable as physical evidence, and that liberty, if it removes necessity, is equivalent to chance and contradicts experience.
Chapter 74
Section II: The Same Subject Continued
Hume continues his discussion on liberty and necessity, arguing that the doctrine of necessity is not only compatible with morality and religion but essential to them. He addresses three reasons for the prevalence of the liberty doctrine, including the confusion between spontaneity and indifference, a false sensation of liberty, and religious concerns. He defines necessity in two ways, both consistent with his theory of causation, and asserts that without necessity, moral responsibility and justice would be impossible.
Chapter 75
Section III: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will
Hume argues against the philosophical tradition that reason should govern passion, asserting that reason alone can never motivate action nor oppose passion in directing the will. He distinguishes between demonstrative and probable reasoning, showing that reason only serves to discover means to ends, while the impulse to action arises from the prospect of pain or pleasure. Passions are original existences, not representations, and thus cannot be contrary to reason except when based on false judgments or insufficient means. Hume famously declares that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. He also notes that calm passions are often mistaken for reason, and that both calm and violent passions influence the will, with strength of mind consisting in the prevalence of calm passions over violent ones.
Chapter 76
Section IV: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions
Hume examines why some passions are violent and others calm, arguing that violence depends on the situation of the object rather than the passion's strength. He identifies several factors that increase passion: the conversion of any accompanying emotion into the predominant passion, the opposition of contrary passions, uncertainty, and obscurity. He also notes that absence can either weaken or strengthen passions depending on their initial intensity, and that security diminishes passion by removing uncertainty.
Chapter 77
Section V: Of the Effects of Custom
Hume explores how custom and repetition influence human passions and perceptions. He identifies two primary effects of custom: it facilitates actions or conceptions, and it creates an inclination toward them. Novelty initially excites the spirits, producing wonder and surprise, which can amplify both pleasure and pain. As repetition occurs, novelty fades, and a moderate facility becomes a source of pleasure, sometimes converting pain into pleasure. However, excessive custom can lead to languor and convert pleasure into pain. Custom also strengthens active habits while diminishing passive ones, as noted by a late eminent philosopher.
Chapter 78
Section VI: Of the Influence of the Imagination on the Passions
Hume explores how the imagination's vivacity influences the passions, arguing that lively ideas (beliefs) have a greater impact on our emotions than faint fictions. He illustrates this with the example of Themistocles' secret plan, where the Athenians rejected an advantageous but unjust proposal because the advantage was only conceived generally, lacking the force of a particular idea. The chapter also discusses how recent pleasures, eloquence, and sympathy enhance the influence of ideas on the passions.
Chapter 79
Section VII: Of Contiguity and Distance in Space and Time
Hume explores how spatial and temporal distance affects the force and vivacity of our ideas and passions. Objects contiguous to us in space or time are conceived with greater vivacity because of their relation to self. Distance weakens ideas by interrupting the mind's action, with temporal distance having a greater effect than spatial distance. Furthermore, future events have a stronger influence than past ones because the imagination naturally flows forward in time, making future objects seem closer and more vivid.
Chapter 80
Section VIII: The Same Subject Continued
Hume continues his exploration of how distance affects our passions and esteem, examining why great distances increase admiration, why temporal distance has a stronger effect than spatial distance, and why past distance affects us more than future distance. He introduces the principle that opposition invigorates the soul, and applies this to the imagination's difficulty in traversing time versus space, leading to greater veneration for ancient objects. He also summarizes his account of the passions and reason, noting the variable influence of calm and violent passions on the will.
Chapter 81
Section IX: Of the Direct Passions
Hume examines the direct passions, which arise immediately from good and evil (pain and pleasure). He distinguishes them from indirect passions like pride and humility, which require a double relation of impressions and ideas. He focuses on hope and fear, arguing that they are mixtures of joy and grief produced by the uncertainty of probable events. The mind fluctuates between contrary views, causing a union of opposite emotions, which results in hope or fear depending on the predominance of joy or grief. He also discusses how contrary passions interact, comparing them to chemical mixtures, and notes that some passions arise from instinct rather than from good or evil.
Chapter 82
Section X: Of Curiosity, or the Love of Truth
Hume investigates the passion of curiosity, or the love of truth, which he identifies as the original source of all inquiry. He distinguishes between two kinds of truth: relations of ideas and matters of fact. He argues that the pleasure derived from truth is not solely from its discovery but from the exercise of genius and the importance of the truth. He explains that the utility of truth supports the imagination and fixes attention, and he draws parallels between philosophy, hunting, and gaming to illustrate that the pleasure comes from the activity and the pursuit, not merely the end. He also explores a different kind of curiosity, the desire to know the actions of others, which arises from the uneasiness caused by doubt and the pleasure of belief's stability.
Chapter 83
Book III: Of Morals
This chapter introduces Book III, 'Of Morals,' with an epigraph from Lucan that inquires into the nature of virtue and seeks a model of what is honorable. The chapter sets the stage for an investigation into the foundations of morality, distinguishing between the enduring love of virtue and the need to define its essence.
Chapter 84
Part I: Of Virtue and Vice in General
This chapter introduces the general framework for understanding virtue and vice, likely setting the stage for a detailed examination of the moral sentiments. It establishes the foundational principles that will guide the subsequent analysis of specific virtues and vices.
Chapter 85
Section I: Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason
In this section, Hume argues that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but from sentiment. He challenges the view that morality consists in relations discoverable by reason, showing that such relations can apply to inanimate objects, and that reason alone cannot influence action. He introduces the famous is-ought problem, noting that moral systems often move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones without justification.
Chapter 86
Section II: Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense
Hume argues that moral distinctions are not discovered by reason alone but are felt through impressions or sentiments. Virtue produces agreeable sentiments, vice produces uneasy ones. These sentiments are distinct from other pleasures and pains, arising only when characters are considered in general, without reference to our particular interest. The origin of these moral sentiments is not from original instincts but from general principles, and the question of whether they are natural or artificial is deferred. Ultimately, virtue and vice are distinguished by the pleasure or pain they cause upon contemplation.
Chapter 87
Part II: Of Justice and Injustice
This chapter examines the origins and nature of justice and injustice, arguing that they are not natural virtues but artificial ones, arising from human conventions and the necessity of social cooperation. The text explores how the rules of justice are established through a shared sense of interest, and how property, right, and obligation are derived from these conventions.
Chapter 88
Section I: Justice, Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?
Hume argues that justice is not a natural virtue but an artificial one, arising from human conventions and necessity. He contends that virtuous actions derive their merit from virtuous motives, not from a regard to the virtue itself, which would be circular. He examines and rejects both public benevolence and private benevolence as the original motives for justice, concluding that the sense of justice is artificially produced through education and conventions, though it is still natural in the sense of being inseparable from the species.
Chapter 89
Section II: Of the Origin of Justice and Property
Hume explores the origin of justice and property, arguing that justice is an artificial virtue arising from human conventions. Self-interest motivates the establishment of rules for the stability of possession, while sympathy with public interest generates moral approbation. Politicians and education reinforce these sentiments, but nature provides the foundation. The state of nature is a philosophical fiction, and justice emerges from the conjunction of selfishness, limited generosity, and the scarcity of external goods.
Chapter 90
Section III: Of the Rules Which Determine Property
Hume examines the rules that determine property, arguing that the general rule of stability of possession must be supplemented by specific rules to assign particular goods to particular persons. He identifies four main rules: occupation (first possession), prescription (long possession), accession (connected inferior objects), and succession (inheritance). These rules are not based on utility or fitness but on the imagination and custom, reflecting the artificial nature of justice and property.
Chapter 91
Section IV: Of the Transference of Property by Consent
Hume discusses the necessity of consent in the transfer of property, arguing that while stability of possession is essential, it must be adjustable through mutual agreement to serve utility and commerce. He explains that the requirement of physical delivery in transferring property is a psychological aid to help the imagination conceive the otherwise insensible transition of ownership, drawing an analogy to Roman Catholic rituals.
Chapter 92
Section V: Of the Obligation of Promises
Hume argues that the obligation to keep promises is not natural but arises from human conventions and social interests. He first shows that a promise is unintelligible without prior human agreement, as no act of the mind (resolution, desire, or will) can naturally create an obligation. He then argues that even if promises were intelligible, they could not produce a moral obligation because morality depends on sentiments, which cannot be changed by an act of will. The obligation to keep promises is therefore an artificial virtue, founded on the necessities of society, where mutual interest and the need for cooperation lead to the invention of promises. This obligation is reinforced by moral sentiment, education, and political artifice, but it remains a human invention rather than a natural moral law.
Chapter 93
Section VI: Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, not natural, by showing that property, rights, and obligations depend on human conventions and moral sentiments, not on natural qualities. He presents three arguments: the vulgar definition of justice presupposes property, but property is not a sensible quality nor a mere external relation; justice and injustice do not admit of degrees, unlike natural qualities; and the inflexible rules of justice cannot derive from natural motives, which are variable. Thus, justice arises from conventions based on interest and is then supported by moral sentiment.
Chapter 94
Section VII: Of the Origin of Government
Hume explores the origin of government, arguing that while men are governed by interest and recognize the necessity of justice for society, they are naturally inclined to prefer immediate advantages over remote ones. This weakness leads to frequent violations of equity. The remedy is found in establishing civil magistrates who, being indifferent to most of society, have an immediate interest in enforcing justice. Government thus arises to correct human infirmity, ensuring both the execution and decision of justice, and enabling collective projects that individuals cannot coordinate.
Chapter 95
Section VIII: Of the Source of Allegiance
Hume argues that the obligation to obey government (allegiance) is not derived from any promise or contract, but rather from self-interest and the necessity of maintaining order in large societies. He distinguishes between natural obligations (interest) and moral obligations (honour and conscience), showing that both are distinct for promises and allegiance. He contends that while government may initially be founded on promises, it quickly acquires its own independent authority based on the general and avowed interest in obedience to magistrates, which is necessary for the execution of justice and the preservation of society.
Chapter 96
Section IX: Of the Measures of Allegiance
Hume examines the basis of political allegiance, arguing against the social contract theory while agreeing with its conclusion that resistance to egregious tyranny is justified. He grounds allegiance in self-interest—the security and protection provided by government—and explains that moral obligation arises from general rules, which can extend beyond their original reasons but admit exceptions in cases of extreme oppression.
Chapter 97
Section X: Of the Objects of Allegiance
Hume examines the principles that determine the legitimate objects of political allegiance, arguing that while resistance to supreme power may be justified in extreme cases, ordinary submission is necessary for social order. He identifies long possession, present possession, succession, and positive laws as the foundations of rightful authority, emphasizing that custom and general rules, rather than rational deliberation, guide our allegiance. He illustrates the complexity of succession disputes with historical examples and discusses the right of resistance in mixed governments, concluding that the determination of lawful magistrates is ultimately based on general interests and the preservation of peace.
Chapter 98
Section XI: Of the Laws of Nations
Hume examines the emergence of the laws of nations as a new set of duties arising from the commerce between independent states. He argues that while nations resemble individuals in needing mutual assistance and being prone to selfishness, they are governed by different maxims, leading to rules like the sacredness of ambassadors and the declaration of war. However, the fundamental rules of justice—stability of possession, transference by consent, and performance of promises—apply to princes as well as subjects, driven by the same interests of peace and commerce. Hume addresses the political maxim that princes have a more free morality, explaining that while the extent of public duties is the same, the force is weaker because the natural obligation to justice among states is less necessary than among individuals. This relaxation of morality arises from the diminished interest, and all men implicitly recognize that moral rules concerning justice are founded on human conventions and the interest in preserving peace and order.
Chapter 99
Section XII: Of Chastity and Modesty
Hume examines the virtues of chastity and modesty, particularly as applied to women, arguing that these are not natural but arise from education, social conventions, and the interests of society. He explains that the need for male certainty of paternity leads to a social imposition of shame on female infidelity, which is reinforced by custom and extended beyond its original rationale.
Chapter 100
Part III: Of the Other Virtues and Vices
This chapter explores the nature of virtues and vices beyond the artificial ones, focusing on natural abilities, the distinction between natural and moral qualities, and the role of sympathy in moral judgments.
Chapter 101
Section I: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices
Hume examines the origin of natural virtues and vices, which are entirely natural and independent of human artifice. He argues that moral distinctions arise from particular sentiments of pleasure or pain, which produce love or pride for virtue and hatred or humility for vice. He emphasizes the role of sympathy in moral approbation, showing that we approve of qualities beneficial or agreeable to others or the person himself, even when we personally gain nothing. He contrasts natural virtues with justice, noting that while each act of natural virtue is beneficial, justice's benefit arises from the whole scheme. He also refutes the idea that moral distinctions are merely the effect of artifice and education, asserting that a natural sentiment of approbation is necessary.
Chapter 102
Section II: Of Greatness of Mind
This section applies the general system of morals to the passions of pride and humility, examining the virtue and vice in their excesses or just proportion. It argues that excessive pride is universally hated, while modesty is esteemed virtuous, and this distinction arises from the immediate agreeableness or disagreeableness of a quality to others. The analysis relies on two principles: sympathy, which diffuses sentiments between people, and comparison, which makes us judge objects relative to ourselves. The text explores how these opposing principles interact, leading to a double rebound of sympathy. It further discusses the merit of pride when it is useful and agreeable to oneself, and how it can contribute to heroism, even when it leads to ruin. Finally, it draws a parallel between establishing laws of nature to secure property and establishing rules of good-breeding to prevent the opposition of men's pride, requiring a 'fair outside' of modesty.
Chapter 103
Section III: Of Goodness and Benevolence
Hume explores the origin of moral approbation for benevolent qualities, arguing that sympathy with those affected by a person's character forms the basis of moral judgment. He introduces the concept of a general, inalterable standard of virtue, correcting for the natural faintness of sympathy with distant persons. He distinguishes the merit of benevolence from utility, noting the immediate pleasure of tender sentiments, and acknowledges the naturalness of anger and hatred, which become vicious only when excessive.
Chapter 104
Section IV: Of Natural Abilities
Hume argues that natural abilities, such as good sense, wit, and memory, are not fundamentally different from moral virtues. Both are mental qualities that produce pleasure and gain esteem. He challenges the distinction based on voluntariness, noting that many moral virtues are equally involuntary. He also explores how the utility and agreeableness of these qualities, along with the importance they confer, generate approbation.
Chapter 105
Section V: Some Farther Reflections Concerning the Natural Virtues
Hume extends his analysis of moral sentiments to the advantages of body and fortune, arguing that our approbation of these qualities arises from the same principles of sympathy and utility that govern our moral judgments. He illustrates this with the example of 'good women's men' and the esteem for the rich, ultimately attributing our esteem to a direct sympathy with the pleasure and advantage the possessor receives. He also notes the flexibility of sentiments, which can vary in feeling despite similar sources.
Chapter 106
Section VI: Conclusion of This Book
In this concluding section, Hume summarizes his system of ethics, emphasizing that sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions. He argues that virtues are approved because of their utility to society or the individual, and that this approval is rooted in sympathy. He also addresses the artificial nature of justice, noting that while justice is a human invention, its moral sense is natural and immutable. Finally, he reflects on the role of the anatomist versus the painter, suggesting that abstract speculations about human nature serve practical morality.
Chapter 107
Appendix
In this appendix, Hume revisits his theory of belief and personal identity, acknowledging difficulties in reconciling the distinctness of perceptions with the felt connection that forms the self. He reaffirms that belief is a firmer conception, not a separate impression, and confesses to being entangled in a labyrinth regarding personal identity, proposing scepticism as a result. He also corrects two minor errors from earlier sections.
Chapter 108
Endnotes
The endnotes provide clarifications and elaborations on key concepts from the main text, including definitions of impressions and ideas, discussions on abstract ideas, infinite divisibility, vacuum, property and possession, and the nature of belief and reasoning. They also reference other philosophers and texts, offering additional context and addressing potential objections.
