A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section VI: Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice explained
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, not natural, by showing that property, rights, and obligations depend on human conventions and moral sentiments, not on natural qualities.
What happens
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, not natural, by showing that property, rights, and obligations depend on human conventions and moral sentiments, not on natural qualities. He presents three arguments: the vulgar definition of justice presupposes property, but property is not a sensible quality nor a mere external relation; justice and injustice do not admit of degrees, unlike natural qualities; and the inflexible rules of justice cannot derive from natural motives, which are variable. Thus, justice arises from conventions based on interest and is then supported by moral sentiment.
Themes in this chapter
Artificial Virtues and Justice
Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue, derived from human conventions and not from natural motives.
Morality as Sentiment
Hume ties the sense of justice to moral sentiments that arise after conventions are established.
Custom and General Rules
Hume discusses how general inflexible rules of justice are contrary to the natural variability of human motives.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting arguments for justice as artificial.
Key passages
“It is on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men, where these are neglected.”
The peace and security of society rely entirely on the strict adherence to the three fundamental laws: stability of possession, transference by consent, and performance of promises. Without these, no good correspondence among men is possible.
Hume emphasizes the necessity of these laws for social order.
“Justice is commonly defined to be a constant and perpetual will of giving everyone his due.”
Justice is often defined as a steady and enduring will to give each person what they deserve.
Hume critiques this definition as presupposing property independent of justice.
“It is evident property does not consist in any of the sensible qualities of the object. For these may continue invariably the same, while the property changes.”
Property is not a sensible quality of an object, because the object's sensible qualities can remain unchanged while its ownership changes.
Hume argues that property is not a natural quality but a relation.
“It is, therefore, in some internal relation, that the property consists; that is, in some influence, which the external relations of the object have on the mind and actions.”
Property consists in an internal relation, namely the influence that external relations of the object have on the mind and actions.
Hume locates property in the mind's response to external relations.
“If nature has given us no such sentiment, there is not, naturally, nor antecedent to human conventions, any such thing as property.”
If nature has not given us a sentiment of pleasure for such conduct, then property does not exist naturally or before human conventions.
Hume argues that property is a product of human conventions.
“It was, therefore, with a view to this inconvenience, that men have established those principles, and have agreed to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public interest.”
To avoid the confusion and disorder that would result from partial judgments, men have agreed to restrain themselves by general inflexible rules that are not swayed by personal feelings or interests.
Hume explains the origin of justice as a convention to prevent social chaos.