A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section II: Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses explained
Hume examines whether the senses can provide evidence for the continued and distinct existence of external objects.
What happens
Hume examines whether the senses can provide evidence for the continued and distinct existence of external objects. He argues that the senses cannot offer such notions, and that the belief in external existence arises from the imagination, specifically from the constancy and coherence of certain impressions. He critiques both the vulgar and philosophical systems, concluding that sceptical doubt is incurable and that we rely on carelessness and inattention for relief.
Themes in this chapter
Skepticism About the External World
Hume argues that the senses cannot give us a notion of continued or distinct existence, and that the belief in external objects is a product of the imagination, not reason.
Custom and General Rules
The belief in external existence is derived from the constancy and coherence of impressions, which are qualities that influence the imagination through custom and habit.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting his sceptical arguments regarding the senses and external existence.
Key passages
“It is certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person.”
The question of personal identity and what unites a person is one of the most difficult in philosophy.
Hume introduces the problem of identity, which he will later address in relation to the self.
“The difficulty, then, is how far we are ourselves the objects of our senses.”
We must ask whether we can perceive ourselves through the senses.
Hume questions whether the self is accessible to sensory perception.
“It is absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects.”
It is unreasonable to think that the senses can separate the self from external things.
Hume argues that the senses cannot provide a basis for distinguishing self from external objects.
“Since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such, the notion of their distinct and continued existence must arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination.”
Because all impressions are internal and temporary, the idea that they have a separate and ongoing existence must come from certain features of those impressions interacting with the imagination.
Hume explains that the belief in external existence is not from the senses but from the imagination.
“This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cured, but must return upon us every moment.”
This sceptical doubt about reason and the senses is a chronic condition that cannot be permanently cured and will always recur.
Hume acknowledges the persistent nature of sceptical doubt.