A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section VI: Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea explained
Hume examines how we infer causes from effects, arguing that this inference is not based on reason or the intrinsic nature of objects, but on experience of constant conjunction.
What happens
Hume examines how we infer causes from effects, arguing that this inference is not based on reason or the intrinsic nature of objects, but on experience of constant conjunction. He explores whether this transition is determined by the understanding or by imagination, concluding that it is a matter of custom and association, not rational demonstration. He also introduces the idea that necessary connection depends on the inference rather than the reverse.
Themes in this chapter
Empiricism and the Primacy of Impressions
Hume grounds causal inference in sensory impressions and remembered experiences, rejecting any a priori basis.
Custom and General Rules
The transition from impression to idea is guided by custom and habit, not by rational necessity.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting his empirical analysis of causal inference.
Key passages
“It is therefore by experience only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another.”
We can only know that one thing causes another through repeated experience, not by reasoning alone.
Hume emphasizes that causal knowledge is empirical, not rational.
“Perhaps it will appear in the end, that the necessary connection depends on the inference, instead of the inference’s depending on the necessary connection.”
It might turn out that our idea of necessary connection is a product of the inference we make, not the other way around.
Hume suggests a reversal of the traditional understanding of causation.
“We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoined together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable.”
Our concept of cause and effect is just the constant conjunction of objects in past experience.
Hume reduces causation to constant conjunction, denying any deeper connection.