All chapters

A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter

Section IV: Of the Modern Philosophy explained

Hume defends his critique of ancient philosophy by distinguishing between permanent and universal principles of the imagination versus changeable and weak ones.

What happens

Hume defends his critique of ancient philosophy by distinguishing between permanent and universal principles of the imagination versus changeable and weak ones. He then examines the modern philosophy's claim to be founded on solid principles, focusing on its fundamental principle that secondary qualities (colors, sounds, tastes, etc.) are merely impressions in the mind. Hume finds only one satisfactory argument for this, based on variations of impressions. However, he argues that this principle leads to the annihilation of all external objects, including primary qualities like extension and solidity, thus reducing modern philosophy to extravagant skepticism.

Themes in this chapter

  • Skepticism About the External World

    Hume argues that the modern philosophy's principles lead to a total annihilation of external objects, leaving no just idea of solidity or matter, thus resulting in extravagant skepticism.

  • Custom and General Rules

    Hume distinguishes between permanent and universal principles of imagination (like custom) and changeable, weak ones, using this to justify rejecting ancient philosophy's fictions while questioning modern philosophy's pretensions.

Characters to notice

  • David Hume

    Author and narrator, presenting arguments against modern philosophy.

Key passages

  • But here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the ancient philosophers for making use of that faculty, and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings.

    One might object that since I admit imagination is the final arbiter in philosophy, it's unfair to criticize ancient philosophers for relying on it.

    Hume anticipates an objection to his critique of ancient philosophy.

  • The opinions of the ancient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident, and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities, are like the spectres in the dark, and are derived from principles, which, however common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature.

    The ancient philosophers' ideas about substance, accident, and occult qualities are like ghosts in the dark—they come from common but not universal or necessary principles.

    Hume compares ancient philosophical fictions to irrational fears.

  • The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects.

    Modern philosophy's core idea is that secondary qualities like colors and sounds are only mental impressions, not resembling anything in the objects themselves.

    Hume states the central tenet of modern philosophy he will critique.

  • I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them.

    I claim that modern philosophy, rather than explaining external objects, destroys them entirely, leading to extreme skepticism.

    Hume's decisive objection to modern philosophy.

  • Our modern philosophy, therefore, leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity; nor consequently of matter.

    Thus, modern philosophy gives us no proper idea of solidity, and therefore no idea of matter.

    Hume concludes that modern philosophy fails to provide a coherent concept of matter.