A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section XI: Of the Laws of Nations explained
Hume examines the emergence of the laws of nations as a new set of duties arising from the commerce between independent states.
What happens
Hume examines the emergence of the laws of nations as a new set of duties arising from the commerce between independent states. He argues that while nations resemble individuals in needing mutual assistance and being prone to selfishness, they are governed by different maxims, leading to rules like the sacredness of ambassadors and the declaration of war. However, the fundamental rules of justice—stability of possession, transference by consent, and performance of promises—apply to princes as well as subjects, driven by the same interests of peace and commerce. Hume addresses the political maxim that princes have a more free morality, explaining that while the extent of public duties is the same, the force is weaker because the natural obligation to justice among states is less necessary than among individuals. This relaxation of morality arises from the diminished interest, and all men implicitly recognize that moral rules concerning justice are founded on human conventions and the interest in preserving peace and order.
Themes in this chapter
Artificial Virtues and Justice
Hume extends his account of justice as an artificial virtue to the realm of nations, showing that the same conventions of property, transfer, and promises apply to states, but with weaker force due to lesser necessity.
Morality as Sentiment
The moral obligation to justice among nations is derived from the natural obligation of interest, which gives rise to approval and disapproval through sentiment, but is weaker because the interest is less urgent.
Custom and General Rules
The laws of nations are established by custom and general rules, as seen in the practice of the world teaching degrees of duty, and the implicit notion that moral rules arise from human conventions.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author of the section, analyzing the laws of nations and their relation to justice and morality.
Key passages
“Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be considered as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord.”
Political theorists say that a state should be viewed as a single individual, and this is partly true because nations, like people, need help from each other, but they also have selfishness and ambition that lead to conflict.
Hume introduces the analogy between nations and individuals, setting the stage for his analysis of international justice.
“But though these rules be super-added to the laws of nature, the former do not entirely abolish the latter; and one may safely affirm, that the three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its transference by consent, and the performance of promises, are duties of princes, as well as of subjects.”
Even though the laws of nations are added to natural laws, they don't replace them; the three basic rules of justice—stable ownership, transfer by agreement, and keeping promises—apply to rulers and citizens alike.
Hume asserts that the core principles of justice are universal, applying to both individuals and states.
“The meaning, therefore, of this political maxim is, that though the morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully be transgressed from a more trivial motive.”
The saying that princes have a freer morality means that while the scope of their duties is the same, the binding force is weaker, so they can break rules for smaller reasons than private individuals.
Hume clarifies the common maxim about princely morality, explaining it in terms of the strength of obligation.
“Since, therefore, the natural obligation to justice, among different states, is not so strong as among individuals, the moral obligation, which arises from it, must partake of its weakness; and we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour.”
Because the natural duty to justice between states is weaker than between individuals, the moral duty that follows is also weaker, so we are more forgiving of a prince or minister who deceives than of a private person who breaks his word.
Hume explains why international morality is more lenient, linking it to the lesser necessity of justice among nations.
