A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section II: Of the Origin of Justice and Property explained
Hume explores the origin of justice and property, arguing that justice is an artificial virtue arising from human conventions.
What happens
Hume explores the origin of justice and property, arguing that justice is an artificial virtue arising from human conventions. Self-interest motivates the establishment of rules for the stability of possession, while sympathy with public interest generates moral approbation. Politicians and education reinforce these sentiments, but nature provides the foundation. The state of nature is a philosophical fiction, and justice emerges from the conjunction of selfishness, limited generosity, and the scarcity of external goods.
Themes in this chapter
Artificial Virtues and Justice
Justice is presented as an artificial virtue, established by convention to remedy the inconveniences of selfishness and limited generosity.
Sympathy and Social Influence
Sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation for justice, and politicians and education extend natural sentiments.
Custom and General Rules
General rules of justice extend beyond particular instances, and custom and education reinforce the observance of these rules.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting his theory of justice as an artificial virtue.
Key passages
“Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.”
Justice is initially adopted because it serves our own interests, but we come to approve of it morally because we sympathize with the public good it promotes.
Highlights the dual origin of justice: self-interest and sympathy.
“These rules, therefore, are artificial, and seek their end in an oblique and indirect manner; nor is the interest, which gives rise to them, of a kind that could be pursued by the natural and inartificial passions of men.”
The rules of justice are not natural instincts but human inventions that achieve their purpose indirectly, since the interest they serve is not one that our natural passions could directly pursue.
Emphasizes the artificial nature of justice.
“And thus justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, supposed to be common to all, and where every single act is performed in expectation that others are to perform the like.”
Justice arises from a mutual understanding based on a shared sense of interest, where each person acts justly on the condition that others will do the same.
Describes the conventional basis of justice.