A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section III: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will explained
Hume argues against the philosophical tradition that reason should govern passion, asserting that reason alone can never motivate action nor oppose passion in directing the will.
What happens
Hume argues against the philosophical tradition that reason should govern passion, asserting that reason alone can never motivate action nor oppose passion in directing the will. He distinguishes between demonstrative and probable reasoning, showing that reason only serves to discover means to ends, while the impulse to action arises from the prospect of pain or pleasure. Passions are original existences, not representations, and thus cannot be contrary to reason except when based on false judgments or insufficient means. Hume famously declares that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. He also notes that calm passions are often mistaken for reason, and that both calm and violent passions influence the will, with strength of mind consisting in the prevalence of calm passions over violent ones.
Themes in this chapter
Passions and the Self
Hume examines the nature of passions as original existences and their role in motivating the will, arguing they are not subject to rational contradiction.
Morality as Sentiment
The chapter lays groundwork for Hume's view that moral distinctions are based on sentiment rather than reason, as reason alone cannot influence action.
Custom and General Rules
Hume discusses how calm passions, often mistaken for reason, are shaped by custom and general rules, influencing our judgments and actions.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting arguments against the preeminence of reason over passion.
Key passages
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
Reason must always serve the passions, never the other way around.
This is a central thesis of the chapter, asserting the subordination of reason to passion.
“It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”
Reason does not dictate what we should value; even preferring global destruction over a minor personal discomfort is not irrational.
Hume illustrates that passions are not subject to rational evaluation except in terms of factual errors.