A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section I: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices explained
Hume examines the origin of natural virtues and vices, which are entirely natural and independent of human artifice.
What happens
Hume examines the origin of natural virtues and vices, which are entirely natural and independent of human artifice. He argues that moral distinctions arise from particular sentiments of pleasure or pain, which produce love or pride for virtue and hatred or humility for vice. He emphasizes the role of sympathy in moral approbation, showing that we approve of qualities beneficial or agreeable to others or the person himself, even when we personally gain nothing. He contrasts natural virtues with justice, noting that while each act of natural virtue is beneficial, justice's benefit arises from the whole scheme. He also refutes the idea that moral distinctions are merely the effect of artifice and education, asserting that a natural sentiment of approbation is necessary.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy and Social Influence
Hume argues that sympathy is the principle that allows us to approve of qualities beneficial to others, even when we are not directly affected, and that it is the foundation of moral approbation for natural virtues.
Morality as Sentiment
Moral distinctions are based on peculiar sentiments of pleasure and pain, not on reason alone. Virtue is whatever gives pleasure by survey, and vice whatever gives pain.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting his hypothesis on the origin of natural virtues and vices.
Key passages
“Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is called vicious.”
A mental quality is considered virtuous if merely contemplating it brings pleasure, and vicious if it brings pain.
Hume's core definition of virtue and vice based on sentiment.
“The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can anyone be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible.”
All human minds are alike in their emotions and functions, so no one can be moved by a feeling that others cannot also experience to some extent.
Hume's analogy of strings equally wound up to explain sympathy.
“The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the good, which results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion: Whereas a single act of justice, considered in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and it is only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous.”
Natural virtues benefit society through each individual act, while justice benefits society only through the whole system of actions, as a single act of justice may even harm the public good.
Hume's distinction between natural virtues and artificial justice.