A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section II: Of Greatness of Mind explained
This section applies the general system of morals to the passions of pride and humility, examining the virtue and vice in their excesses or just proportion.
What happens
This section applies the general system of morals to the passions of pride and humility, examining the virtue and vice in their excesses or just proportion. It argues that excessive pride is universally hated, while modesty is esteemed virtuous, and this distinction arises from the immediate agreeableness or disagreeableness of a quality to others. The analysis relies on two principles: sympathy, which diffuses sentiments between people, and comparison, which makes us judge objects relative to ourselves. The text explores how these opposing principles interact, leading to a double rebound of sympathy. It further discusses the merit of pride when it is useful and agreeable to oneself, and how it can contribute to heroism, even when it leads to ruin. Finally, it draws a parallel between establishing laws of nature to secure property and establishing rules of good-breeding to prevent the opposition of men's pride, requiring a 'fair outside' of modesty.
Themes in this chapter
Sympathy and Social Influence
The chapter's core mechanism for moral judgment, where sympathy with others' sentiments of pride or humility shapes our own approval or disapproval.
Passions and the Self
Examines pride and humility as passions directed at the self, and how their excess or just proportion is judged as virtuous or vicious.
Custom and General Rules
The chapter explains how a general rule against self-applause is formed due to the universal propensity to overvalue oneself, leading to the condemnation of pride even in men of merit.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
The author who presents the argument, using 'I' and 'me' to guide the analysis of pride and humility.
Key passages
“An excessive pride or over-weaning conceit of ourselves is always esteemed vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteemed virtuous, and procures the goodwill of everyone.”
Having too high an opinion of oneself is always seen as a flaw and is disliked by everyone, whereas being modest and aware of our limitations is seen as a virtue and earns us goodwill.
This sets up the central question of why pride is vicious and modesty is virtuous.
“So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree.”
Human minds are so interconnected that when someone comes near me, their opinions and sentiments influence my own thinking to some extent.
This introduces the principle of sympathy as a powerful force in human interaction.
“We judge more, of objects by comparison, than by their intrinsic worth and value; and regard everything as mean, when set in opposition to what is superior of the same kind.”
Our judgments about things are based more on how they compare to other things than on their own inherent value, and we see something as inferior when compared to something better of the same type.
This introduces the principle of comparison, which operates in opposition to sympathy.
“In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish the rules of good-breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men’s pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive.”
Just as we create laws to protect property and prevent conflicts from selfishness, we create rules of etiquette to prevent conflicts from pride and make conversation pleasant and non-offensive.
This draws a parallel between the artificial virtue of justice and the social rules of good-breeding.