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A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter

Part II: Of Love and Hatred explained

This chapter examines the passions of love and hatred, their objects, causes, and the mechanisms by which they arise.

What happens

This chapter examines the passions of love and hatred, their objects, causes, and the mechanisms by which they arise. It explores how these passions are directed at persons and how various qualities in others, such as virtue, beauty, and even vice, can produce love or hatred. The chapter also discusses the role of sympathy, comparison, and the association of ideas in shaping these passions, including complex cases like malice, envy, and the love of relations.

Themes in this chapter

  • Passions and the Self

    The chapter explores how love and hatred are directed at the self or others, and how these passions are central to our sense of identity and social interactions.

  • Sympathy and Social Influence

    Hume discusses how sympathy with others' feelings and situations plays a crucial role in generating love and hatred, and how social comparison influences these passions.

Characters to notice

  • David Hume

    The author and primary voice, presenting the philosophical inquiry into the passions.

  • Alexander

    Mentioned as an example of how the love of fame and glory can be a motive for great actions.

  • Themistocles

    Cited as an example of a person whose virtues and abilities could be a source of pride or humility in others.

  • Julius Caesar

    Referenced as a figure whose greatness and power can influence the passions of love and hatred in others.

  • Cyrus

    Mentioned in the context of how the love of conquest and power can be a passion that drives individuals.

Key passages

  • The passions of love and hatred are always directed to some person, or at least to some thinking being, and are not excited by any object, which has not such a relation to a person.

    Love and hatred are always aimed at a person or thinking being, and are not triggered by objects that lack this personal connection.

    This establishes the fundamental object of these passions as persons, not things.

  • We may, therefore, conclude, that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking being; and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy.

    The target of love and hatred is clearly a thinking being, and the feeling of love is always pleasant, while hatred is always unpleasant.

    This clarifies the nature of these passions as agreeable or uneasy sensations directed at a thinking being.

  • The virtue, genius, and beauty of others, produce love; but 'tis not the virtue, genius, or beauty, that is the object of the passion, but the person who possesses these qualities.

    We love others for their virtue, genius, or beauty, but the love itself is directed at the person, not at the qualities themselves.

    This distinguishes the cause of love from its object, emphasizing that the person is the ultimate target.

  • We have a lively idea of the passion of another, which is converted into the passion itself, and becomes the object of our sympathy.

    We have a vivid idea of another's emotion, which then turns into that emotion in us through sympathy.

    This describes the mechanism of sympathy, where we come to feel what others feel.

  • The mind is satisfied with its own situation, and rejoices in the happiness of others, when it observes their prosperity and success.

    The mind is content with its own state and takes joy in the happiness of others when it sees them prosper and succeed.

    This highlights the role of sympathy in generating positive feelings towards others.