A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section V: Of the Obligation of Promises explained
Hume argues that the obligation to keep promises is not natural but arises from human conventions and social interests.
What happens
Hume argues that the obligation to keep promises is not natural but arises from human conventions and social interests. He first shows that a promise is unintelligible without prior human agreement, as no act of the mind (resolution, desire, or will) can naturally create an obligation. He then argues that even if promises were intelligible, they could not produce a moral obligation because morality depends on sentiments, which cannot be changed by an act of will. The obligation to keep promises is therefore an artificial virtue, founded on the necessities of society, where mutual interest and the need for cooperation lead to the invention of promises. This obligation is reinforced by moral sentiment, education, and political artifice, but it remains a human invention rather than a natural moral law.
Themes in this chapter
Artificial Virtues and Justice
Promises are presented as an artificial virtue, invented for the convenience of society, similar to justice and property.
Morality as Sentiment
Hume argues that moral obligation depends on sentiments, which cannot be changed by an act of will, thus promises cannot create natural moral obligations.
Custom and General Rules
The obligation of promises is established through custom and convention, not through natural reason or passion.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting the argument that promises are artificial and not natural.
Key passages
“A promise would not be intelligible, before human conventions had established it; and that even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral obligation.”
Promises only make sense after society has agreed on them, and even then, they don't carry any natural moral weight.
Hume's central thesis that promises are artificial.
“The act of the mind, expressed by a promise, is not a resolution to perform anything: For that alone never imposes any obligation.”
Merely resolving to do something doesn't create a duty to do it.
Hume's analysis of the mental acts involved in promising.
“It is certain we can naturally no more change our own sentiments, than the motions of the heavens; nor by a single act of our will, that is, by a promise, render any action agreeable or disagreeable, moral or immoral.”
We cannot alter our moral feelings by an act of will, just as we cannot change the movement of the stars.
Hume's argument that will cannot create new moral sentiments.
“As the obligation of promises is an invention for the interest of society, it is warped into as many different forms as that interest requires, and even runs into direct contradictions, rather than lose sight of its object.”
Because promises are a social invention, they are flexible and can be adjusted to meet society's needs, even if that leads to inconsistencies.
Hume's explanation of the contradictions in promise-keeping rules.
“Men being naturally selfish, or endowed only with a confined generosity, they are not easily induced to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage.”
People are naturally self-interested and only help others when they expect something in return.
Hume's view of human nature as the basis for social conventions.