A Treatise of Human Nature · Chapter
Section V: Of the Immateriality of the Soul explained
Hume argues that the question of whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance is meaningless, since we have no idea of substance or inhesion.
What happens
Hume argues that the question of whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance is meaningless, since we have no idea of substance or inhesion. He contends that perceptions are distinct and separable, and can exist independently, thus they are substances in the only sense we can define. He also examines the local conjunction of perceptions with matter, concluding that most perceptions exist nowhere, and that the supposed union of extended bodies with non-extended qualities is an illusion based on custom and the propensity to complete relations.
Themes in this chapter
Empiricism and the Primacy of Impressions
Hume applies the principle that all ideas derive from impressions to argue that we have no idea of substance, as there is no corresponding impression.
Skepticism About the External World
Hume extends skepticism to the nature of the mind, questioning the very meaning of substance and inhesion, and showing that the question of the soul's immateriality is unintelligible.
Characters to notice
- David Hume
Author and narrator, presenting arguments against the notion of substance and the local conjunction of perceptions with matter.
Key passages
“As every idea is derived from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceived.”
Since all ideas come from prior impressions, if we had an idea of the mind's substance, there would have to be an impression of it, which is hard to imagine.
Hume challenges the notion of a mental substance by applying his empiricist principle.
“Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself.”
Since we cannot form a clear idea of substance either from impressions or from definitions, we should abandon the debate about whether the soul is material or immaterial, and even reject the question as meaningless.
Hume concludes that the entire dispute is based on a misunderstanding.
“This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere: and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner.”
I propose that an object can exist without being located anywhere, and in fact most beings exist in this way.
Hume argues that most perceptions, like thoughts and passions, have no spatial location.