Discourses · Chapters
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Chapter companions for Discourses by Epictetus.
Chapter 1
Discourses
A collection of Epictetus's teachings on Stoic philosophy, emphasizing the distinction between what is within our control and what is not, and the importance of rationality, self-examination, and acceptance of divine providence.
Chapter 2
Book I
Epictetus discusses the nature of self-regard and its compatibility with social duty, emphasizing that rational beings naturally contribute to the common interest while pursuing their own. He explores reason's capacity for self-examination, the proper use of appearances, and the importance of focusing only on what is within our power. The chapter includes critiques of valuing externals like political titles or wealth, and addresses anger, piety, and acceptance of divine providence.
Chapter 3
Of the Things Which Are in Our Power, and Not in Our Power
Epictetus introduces the foundational Stoic distinction between what is within our power (the right use of appearances, desire, aversion, pursuit, avoidance) and what is not (body, property, reputation, office). He argues that only the rational faculty can examine itself and all other faculties, and that the gods have placed this alone under our control. Using examples from Lateranus, Agrippinus, and Thrasea, he illustrates how to face death, exile, and chains with cheerfulness and contentment, because the will cannot be overpowered even by Zeus.
Chapter 4
II: How a Man on Every Occasion Can Maintain His Proper Character
Epictetus discusses how rational beings are pained by the irrational and attracted to the rational, emphasizing the need to adapt preconceptions of rational and irrational to nature. He uses examples of Agrippinus and Florus regarding Nero's spectacles, Priscus Helvidius defying Vespasian, and an athlete choosing death over amputation to illustrate maintaining one's proper character. The chapter concludes with the importance of self-discipline and knowing one's own worth.
Chapter 5
How a Man Should Proceed from the Principle of God Being the Father of All Men to the Rest
This chapter argues that recognizing God as the father of all men elevates one's self-conception, preventing ignoble thoughts. It contrasts those who identify with their divine reason and intelligence (common with the gods) with those who cling to their mortal, animal-like body, leading to base behaviors such as faithlessness, savagery, or malice.
Chapter 6
Of Progress or Improvement
Epictetus argues that true progress in philosophy is not measured by the quantity of books read or knowledge of Chrysippus, but by the practical application of principles to desire, aversion, pursuit, and avoidance—focusing only on what is within one's will. He emphasizes that virtue produces tranquillity, and improvement is shown through living conformably to nature, not through scholarly display.
Chapter 7
Against the Academics
Epictetus discusses the challenge of arguing with those who deny evident truths, comparing their stubbornness to a stone. He distinguishes between two kinds of hardening: one of the understanding and one of the sense of shame. He criticizes those who care more about bodily mortification than the soul's, and argues that a deadened sense of shame is worse than a dead man, as the rational faculty becomes brutalized.
Chapter 8
VI: Of Providence
Epictetus argues that Providence is evident in the design of the world and in the faculties given to humans. He emphasizes that humans have been endowed with reason, endurance, and greatness of soul to bear all events, and that difficulties serve to exercise and reveal virtue, as exemplified by Hercules. He criticizes those who fail to use their faculties and instead complain against God.
Chapter 9
Of the Use of Sophistical Arguments and Hypothetical and the Like
Epictetus argues that the study of logic, including sophistical and hypothetical arguments, is essential for the wise and good man to navigate life's duties. He compares it to the skill of distinguishing genuine from counterfeit coins, emphasizing the need for a faculty to examine truth and falsehood, and to understand consequences. He warns against rashness in argument and insists that neglecting logical training is a serious fault, akin to other moral errors.
Chapter 10
VIII: That the Faculties Are Not Safe to the Uninstructed
Epictetus argues that logical faculties and argumentative skills, when acquired by the uninstructed and morally weak, lead to arrogance and self-conceit rather than virtue. He emphasizes that such abilities should be subordinate to moral purpose, not pursued as ends in themselves, and warns against conflating accidental attributes of philosophers (like Plato's handsomeness or strength) with the essence of philosophy.
Chapter 11
IX: How from the Fact That We Are Akin to God a Man May Proceed to the Consequences
Epictetus argues that recognizing our kinship with God transforms our perspective on life, making us citizens of the world rather than of a particular city. He emphasizes that this realization frees us from fear of tyrants, thieves, and death, and calls us to endure our present circumstances until God releases us. He contrasts the philosopher's proper role—to prevent youths from rashly abandoning life—with the cowardly, body-obsessed mindset that leads to flattery and fear. Socrates and Musonius Rufus are held up as models of those who live as true kinsmen of God, indifferent to external goods and evils.
Chapter 12
Against Those Who Eagerly Seek Preferment at Rome
Epictetus contrasts the relentless ambition of Roman officials pursuing worldly preferment with the philosophical pursuit of self-knowledge and understanding one's place in the universe. He recounts the story of an older man who, despite vowing to live quietly after exile, immediately returns to political scheming upon receiving letters from Caesar. Epictetus urges his students to apply the same energy to studying philosophy—learning from Chrysippus about the administration of the world and the nature of good and bad—as others devote to grain quotas and land deals.
Chapter 13
XI: Of Natural Affection
Epictetus challenges a magistrate who abandoned his sick daughter, arguing that true natural affection must align with reason. He demonstrates that the man's flight was neither affectionate nor rational, and traces all actions to the will and opinion, not external causes.
Chapter 14
Of Contentment
Epictetus argues that true freedom and contentment come from aligning one's will with the divine order of the universe. He criticizes those who complain about their circumstances—parents, children, solitude, or society—and urges them to see solitude as tranquility and company as a festival. The wise person submits to Zeus's administration, accepting events as they happen, and focuses only on what is in their power: the proper use of appearances. Punishment for discontent is to remain in a self-made prison of dissatisfaction.
Chapter 15
XIII: How Everything May Be Done Acceptably to the Gods
Epictetus explains that eating and living acceptably to the gods involves justice, contentment, equanimity, temperance, and order. He uses the example of a slave bringing tepid water to illustrate that one should not become angry, but instead remember that all humans are kin, offspring of Zeus, and that ruling over others should not lead to tyranny. He criticizes those who focus on earthly laws of property rather than divine laws of kinship.
Chapter 16
That the Deity Oversees All Things
Epictetus argues that the universe is a unified whole, with all things—plants, bodies, and souls—interconnected under divine administration. He contends that just as plants respond to God's commands and the sun illuminates the world, so too are human souls parts of God, constantly perceived by Him. Each person is assigned a guardian daemon, and one should never feel alone, as God and the daemon are always present. Epictetus urges an oath of loyalty to God, akin to a soldier's oath to Caesar, promising obedience, acceptance, and endurance without complaint.
Chapter 17
What Philosophy Promises
Epictetus explains that philosophy does not promise to secure external things like a brother's reconciliation, but rather to maintain the governing part of one's own mind conformable to nature. He uses the analogy of a fig tree to illustrate that great inner change requires time and patience.
Chapter 18
Of Providence
Epictetus argues that the natural world and human body are evidence of divine providence, urging gratitude and the duty to praise God as rational beings.
Chapter 19
That the Logical Art Is Necessary
Epictetus argues that logic is essential as the tool for analyzing all other faculties, including reason itself. He compares it to a measuring instrument that must be calibrated before use. He defends the study of logic against those who deem it unproductive, asserting that it enables us to distinguish truth from falsehood and to understand nature. He illustrates his point with the metaphor of a diviner interpreting entrails, showing that the true value lies not in the interpreter but in the divine signs revealed.
Chapter 20
That We Ought Not to Be Angry with the Errors (Faults) of Others
Epictetus argues that since all people act according to their own judgment of what is advantageous, anger at others for their errors is irrational. Instead of anger, we should pity those who are mistaken about good and evil, and recognize that the things we lose (clothes, a lamp, a wife) are not truly ours. The only invincible person is one whose will remains undisturbed by externals.
Chapter 21
XIX: How We Should Behave to Tyrants
Epictetus argues that a tyrant's power is limited to external things like the body and possessions, but cannot touch a person's will or freedom. True freedom comes from valuing only what is within our control and recognizing that opinions, not tyrants, disturb us. He uses examples of a tyrant threatening to chain a leg, the respect given to Caesar's shoemaker Felicion, and the folly of seeking honors like the priesthood of Augustus, to illustrate how people mistakenly value externals over their own rational will.
Chapter 22
About Reason, How It Contemplates Itself
This chapter explores the unique capacity of reason to examine itself, contrasting it with other arts that cannot reflect on their own nature. It argues that reason, given by nature for the right use of appearances, can contemplate both itself and its opposites, making the examination of appearances the chief work of a philosopher. The chapter criticizes carelessness in moral judgment, emphasizing the need for rigorous preparation and study to distinguish good from evil, and contrasts the brevity of core philosophical doctrines with the extensive discussion required to fully understand them.
Chapter 23
XXI: Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired
Epictetus argues that a man who holds his proper station in life does not seek things beyond it. He questions the desire for admiration from those whom one considers mad, emphasizing that one should be satisfied with acting in accordance with nature in desires, aversions, and choices.
Chapter 24
On Precognitions
Epictetus explains that while all humans share common precognitions about good and justice, disputes arise when these are adapted to particular cases. He illustrates this with the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles over Chryseis. True education consists of learning to adapt precognitions naturally and distinguishing what is in our power from what is not. Placing the good in external things leads to conflict, impiety, and unhappiness; the philosopher must place it in the will, even if mocked.
Chapter 25
XXIII: Against Epicurus
Epictetus critiques Epicurus for acknowledging humanity's social nature yet advising against raising children and engaging in political life. He argues that natural affection for offspring is unavoidable and that even animals care for their young, so humans should not abandon their parental duties.
Chapter 26
How We Should Struggle with Circumstances
Epictetus uses the metaphor of a wrestling trainer to explain that difficulties are opportunities for growth, comparing the Stoic to an Olympic athlete. He contrasts the cowardly scout who fears death, exile, and poverty with Diogenes, who demonstrated through his life that these are not evils. The chapter urges the reader to recognize what is truly their own (their will and judgments) and to be ready to let go of externals, even the body, as one would leave a bed in an inn. The door is always open—one may choose to stay or leave, but if they stay, they must not complain.
Chapter 27
On the Same
Epictetus argues that if we truly believe good and evil lie only in our own will, we would not be disturbed or afraid. He reminds us that Zeus has given us what is our own (integrity, virtuous shame) free from hindrance, while what is not our own is subject to impediment. We must follow these divine precepts, play our role in life's game without breaking it, and remember that the door is always open—we can choose to leave any situation. Our opinions, not external things, squeeze and trouble us; like Socrates, we should remain unmoved by insults and reviling.
Chapter 28
What Is the Law of Life
Epictetus argues that the primary law of life is to act conformably to nature, and that philosophical training must begin with theory before tackling the more difficult matters of real life. He criticizes those who rush into practical application without first strengthening their ruling faculty, and emphasizes the importance of self-examination and knowing one's own abilities.
Chapter 29
In How Many Ways Appearances Exist, and What Aids We Should Provide Against Them
Epictetus outlines four ways appearances present themselves to us and emphasizes that the educated person must form correct judgments in each case. He prescribes remedies for different sources of trouble: contrary habit against habit, reason against sophistry, and clear preconceptions against deceptive appearances. Using the example of death, he argues that while we cannot escape death, we can escape the fear of death through proper reasoning. He dismisses skeptical objections from Pyrrhonists and Academics, asserting that practical certainty in everyday actions is sufficient, and that those who are troubled should focus on more pressing remedies rather than abstract debates.
Chapter 30
XXVIII: That We Ought Not to Be Angry with Men; and What Are the Small and the Great Things Among Men
Epictetus argues that anger toward others is irrational because all human actions are driven by appearances (opinions) of what is good or beneficial. He distinguishes between trivial external events (like loss of property or life) and the truly great evils: the corruption of one's character, fidelity, modesty, and intelligence. Using examples from Homer and Euripides, he shows that tragedies arise from mistaken appearances, and that we should pity rather than blame those who err, just as we pity the blind or lame.
Chapter 31
On Constancy (Or Firmness)
Epictetus argues that the essence of good and evil lies in the will, not in external events. He emphasizes that true constancy comes from recognizing that only our own judgments and choices are within our power, while externals like body, property, and reputation are not. He uses examples of Socrates and the Stoic ideal to illustrate how a philosopher should remain unshaken by threats, imprisonment, or death, and should treat the ignorant with patience, like children. The chapter calls for practical application of philosophical principles rather than mere theoretical debate.
Chapter 32
What We Ought to Have Ready in Difficult Circumstances
Epictetus instructs that when approaching a powerful person, one must remember that a higher divine observer sees all and should be pleased above the mortal. The student is to recall the Stoic teachings that exile, bonds, death, and disgrace are indifferent—nothing to the will—and that the only good is a rightly directed will and proper use of appearances. Armed with this discipline, the student enters boldly, realizing that worldly power and its trappings are trivial compared to the preparation gained through philosophy.
Chapter 33
Book II
Epictetus continues his discourses on Stoic philosophy, emphasizing the dichotomy of control, the importance of understanding what is truly good or bad, and the necessity of practical discipline. He uses examples from Socrates, Diogenes, and others to illustrate how one should remain indifferent to externals while acting with care and firmness. The chapter also discusses the role of God, the nature of the divine, and the need to learn and practice philosophy as a way of life.
Chapter 34
I: That Confidence (Courage) Is Not Inconsistent with Caution
Epictetus argues that confidence and caution are not contradictory when properly directed: caution should be applied to matters of the will (our own choices and judgments), while confidence should be applied to external events (death, pain, exile) that are not in our power. He uses the metaphor of tragic masks to illustrate that what we fear is often only appearance, and true freedom comes from education in these principles. The chapter concludes by urging the student to demonstrate their learning through their actions and reactions to life's trials, not through rhetorical display.
Chapter 35
Of Tranquillity (Freedom from Perturbation)
Epictetus argues that true tranquility comes from focusing only on what is within our power—our will, choices, and character—and being indifferent to externals like body, property, and reputation. He uses Socrates as a model of maintaining inner freedom even in the face of trial and death, and warns against subjecting oneself to externals, which leads to slavery. The chapter emphasizes that with proper preparation, one needs no external advice, as the mind can adapt to any circumstance.
Chapter 36
To Those Who Recommend Persons to Philosophers
Epictetus uses the analogy of a silver coin to argue that a philosopher does not need letters of recommendation; a person's character is evident to a skilled observer. He contrasts the ability to judge syllogisms with the inconsistency in judging good and bad in life, attributing the latter to ignorance and inexperience.
Chapter 37
Against a Person Who Had Once Been Detected in Adultery
Epictetus argues that fidelity is the defining characteristic of a human being, and that adultery destroys not only personal integrity but also the bonds of neighborhood, friendship, and community. He compares a faithless person to a useless utensil or a wasp, and uses the analogy of a shared feast to illustrate that while women may be common by nature, the legislator has distributed them, and one must not steal another's portion.
Chapter 38
How Magnanimity Is Consistent with Care
Epictetus explains how to balance careful attention to actions with inner indifference to outcomes, using the analogy of dice and ball games. He argues that externals are indifferent but their use is not, and that one must act with care while remaining detached from results. Socrates is presented as a model of this skill, playing with life-and-death matters as if they were a game. The chapter concludes with the idea that a person is part of a larger whole (humanity and the divine state), and must accept whatever roles and events that whole requires.
Chapter 39
VI: Of Indifference
Epictetus explores the concept of indifference, arguing that external things like life, health, and wealth are indifferent in themselves, but their use is not. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing what is within our control from what is not, and urges the reader to remain steadfast in their will regardless of external circumstances. Using examples from Chrysippus, Chrysantas, and Socrates, he illustrates how to maintain equanimity in the face of death, banishment, or other hardships.
Chapter 40
How We Ought to Use Divination
Epictetus argues that divination is often misused due to cowardice and a desire to know future outcomes, when instead one should rely on the internal diviner—reason—that discerns good and evil. He illustrates with the example of a woman who prioritizes her duty to send provisions to Gratilla over fear of Domitian's seizure, and advises approaching divination without desire or aversion, trusting only what is best according to God's will.
Chapter 41
VIII: What Is the Nature (Ἡ Οὐσία) of the Good
Epictetus argues that the nature of the good is identical with the nature of God, which is intelligence, knowledge, and right reason. Since humans are rational animals, the good resides in the rational faculty, not in plants or irrational animals. Humans are a portion of the deity and carry God within themselves, yet they often pollute this divine presence through impure thoughts and deeds. Epictetus exhorts the reader to honor their divine origin and guardianship, and to cultivate a character that is faithful, modest, noble, and free from perturbation, showing the true strength of a philosopher.
Chapter 42
IX: That When We Cannot Fulfil That Which the Character of a Man Promises, We Assume the Character of a Philosopher
Epictetus argues that fulfilling the promise of being a rational and mortal human is difficult enough, yet many who fail at this take on the even heavier burden of calling themselves philosophers. He warns against merely talking about virtue without practicing it, using analogies of sheep and wild beasts to show how we lose our rational nature. True philosophy requires not just learning but study and practice, so that doctrines become part of one's character like digested food becomes sinew and bone.
Chapter 43
X: How We May Discover the Duties of Life from Names
Epictetus explains that by examining our various roles or 'names'—such as man, citizen, son, brother, senator, youth, or old man—we can discern the specific duties attached to each. He emphasizes that the faculty of will is superior and free, and that we are citizens of the world, parts of a whole. Losing moral qualities like modesty, fidelity, or gentleness is a true damage, far greater than any loss of money or property.
Chapter 44
What the Beginning of Philosophy Is
The chapter argues that the true beginning of philosophy is the recognition of one's own weakness and inability regarding necessary things, particularly the proper adaptation of innate preconceptions of good and evil to particular cases. It emphasizes that mere opinion or 'seeming' is insufficient as a criterion for truth, and that philosophy requires discovering and using a standard or rule (like a balance or carpenter's square) to test and weigh impressions, thereby curing the madness of relying on subjective appearances.
Chapter 45
Of Disputation or Discussion
Epictetus criticizes the lack of practical skill in applying Stoic dialectic, contrasting it with Socrates' method of guiding an opponent to self-evident truth through natural notions rather than technical jargon. He warns that confronting powerful Romans about their neglect of the soul is dangerous, recounting his own experience of being threatened with violence.
Chapter 46
XIII: On Anxiety (Solicitude)
Epictetus argues that anxiety arises from wanting things outside our control, such as the approval of others or the favor of powerful figures. He contrasts the confidence that comes from practiced skill with the fear that comes from ignorance of what is truly good or bad. Using examples of a lute player, Socrates, Diogenes, and Zeno, he shows that the philosopher, who focuses only on what is within his own power, remains fearless and free.
Chapter 47
To Naso
Epictetus explains to a Roman visitor that philosophy, like any art, involves a difficult learning process but yields beneficial results. He outlines the philosopher's work: aligning one's will with events, living without fear or perturbation, and maintaining proper relationships. He emphasizes the necessity of learning about God, the nature of the divine, and the importance of self-knowledge, warning that most people are like cattle focused only on material goods rather than understanding the world and their place in it.
Chapter 48
To or Against Those Who Obstinately Persist in What They Have Determined
Epictetus warns against the blind persistence in one's determinations without first ensuring they are sound and rational. He illustrates this with the story of a companion who resolved to starve himself to death for no reason, arguing that firmness is only virtuous when grounded in truth and health, not in madness or folly.
Chapter 49
XVI: That We Do Not Strive to Use Our Opinions About Good and Evil
Epictetus argues that people fail to apply their philosophical training to real life, focusing on external goods rather than the will, which is the true seat of good and evil. He criticizes the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical action, urging readers to discipline their opinions and accept divine will with magnanimity, using examples like a lute player's anxiety and children crying for their nurse.
Chapter 50
How We Must Adapt Preconceptions to Particular Cases
Epictetus argues that the first task of philosophy is to discard self-conceit, because one cannot learn what one thinks one already knows. He explains that while everyone has natural preconceptions of good, bad, and the like, these must be properly adapted to particular cases through careful analysis. Without this adaptation, people remain unhappy and hindered, desiring what is not in their power and avoiding what is unavoidable. He criticizes those who study philosophy for mere intellectual elegance rather than for practical transformation, and urges the student to align desires and aversions with the will of God, using Medea as an example of misdirected desire leading to ruin.
Chapter 51
How We Should Struggle Against Appearances
Epictetus teaches that habits and faculties are strengthened by corresponding actions, so one must resist harmful impulses from the start. He urges the reader to pause before appearances, test them, and oppose them with noble examples like Socrates. By practicing self-control and invoking God as a helper, one can achieve true freedom and happiness.
Chapter 52
XIX: Against Those Who Embrace Philosophical Opinions Only in Words
Epictetus criticizes those who merely recite philosophical doctrines without embodying them in their actions. He challenges his students to show a true Stoic—one who is happy in sickness, danger, death, exile, or disgrace—rather than just repeating arguments. He emphasizes that philosophy is a practical discipline, not a set of verbal claims, and urges his students to begin living according to their principles.
Chapter 53
XX: Against the Epicureans and Academics
Epictetus argues against Epicureans and Academics who deny objective truth, natural fellowship, and the reliability of the senses. He contends that even those who deny these things must use them in their arguments, revealing the self-contradictory nature of their positions. He criticizes Epicurus for undermining social bonds while still writing to persuade others, and the Academics for denying sense perception while relying on it in daily life. He warns that such teachings corrupt youth and undermine piety, justice, and civic virtue.
Chapter 54
Of Inconsistency
Epictetus examines why people readily confess to some faults (timidity, compassion) but not others (foolishness, injustice, intemperance), attributing this to confusion about good and evil. He criticizes students who come to his school not to improve themselves but to display theoretical knowledge, and urges them to first heal their inner turmoil before seeking to learn.
Chapter 55
On Friendship
Epictetus argues that true friendship is only possible for the wise who understand what is truly good, because all animals are naturally drawn to their own interest. He illustrates how external goods like wealth, power, or beauty destroy friendships, using examples from mythology and history, and concludes that friendship requires placing one's interest in the will and right use of appearances, not in externals.
Chapter 56
On the Power of Speaking
Epictetus argues that while the faculty of speaking has value, it is subordinate to the faculty of the will (prohairesis), which alone determines happiness or unhappiness. He warns against becoming captivated by eloquence or logical theorems as ends in themselves, likening them to pleasant inns on a journey home. The true purpose is to align one's will with nature, obey Zeus, and achieve freedom from disturbance.
Chapter 57
To (Or Against) a Person Who Was One of Those Who Were Not Valued (Esteemed) by Him
Epictetus challenges a person who complains he never receives answers, arguing that both speaking and hearing require skill. He emphasizes that without understanding one's own nature, purpose, and the world, a person cannot benefit from philosophical discourse. Using the example of Agamemnon and Achilles, he shows how ignorance of what is profitable leads to conflict and error. He concludes that the listener must show himself worthy and prepared to hear, or else the speaker cannot be roused.
Chapter 58
That Logic Is Necessary
Epictetus demonstrates the necessity of logic by showing that any attempt to prove or disprove its necessity already relies on logical reasoning, thereby proving its foundational role in discourse and knowledge.
Chapter 59
What Is the Property of Error
This chapter explores the nature of error as a form of contradiction: every person who errs wishes to be right but fails to achieve what they truly want. It argues that a rational soul naturally recoils from contradiction once it is recognized, and that the art of persuasion lies in revealing this contradiction to others. Socrates is cited as a master of this method, relying on the interlocutor's own reason as the ultimate witness.
Chapter 60
Book III
Epictetus continues his discourses on Stoic philosophy, emphasizing the dichotomy of control, the nature of good and evil as residing only in the will, and the importance of accepting the divine administration of the universe. He uses examples from daily life, the Cynic ideal, and analogies of warfare and sailing to illustrate how one should live with desire and aversion free from restraint, and how to practice virtue in the face of external challenges.
Chapter 61
I: Of Finery in Dress
Epictetus confronts a young rhetorician who is overly concerned with his appearance, arguing that true beauty in a human being comes from cultivating virtue and rational excellence, not from external adornment. He warns that neglecting one's character for superficial grooming is a form of ugliness, and he invokes the examples of Socrates and Apollo to justify his frankness, insisting that a philosopher must speak the truth even if it risks offending the listener.
Chapter 62
In What a Man Ought to Be Exercised Who Has Made Proficiency; and That We Neglect the Chief Things
Epictetus outlines three topics of exercise for the wise and good: desires and aversions, duties, and freedom from deception. He criticizes contemporary philosophers for focusing on the third topic—sophistical arguments—while neglecting the more urgent first two. He illustrates how people are disturbed by external opinions and fail to cultivate their own will, using Diogenes' finger gesture and the example of a man undone by a mouse to show misplaced priorities.
Chapter 63
What Is the Matter on Which a Good Man Should Be Employed, and in What We Ought Chiefly to Practice Ourselves
The chapter argues that the proper material for a wise and good person is their own ruling faculty (prohairesis), not external things like the body or land. It emphasizes that the soul naturally assents to truth, desires good, and avoids evil, and that one must use appearances conformably to nature. The good is preferred over all relationships, and external things (like property or status) are indifferent. The chapter urges daily practice in applying the rule of what is within our will versus what is not, to eradicate false opinions and achieve firmness and constancy.
Chapter 64
Against a Person Who Showed His Partisanship in an Unseemly Way in a Theatre
Epictetus admonishes a governor of Epirus who displayed unseemly partisanship at a theatre and then resented being criticized for it. He argues that the governor, as a public figure, sets an example for others, and that he should not be angry when they imitate his behavior. Epictetus advises him to maintain a will conformable to nature, to not claim more than his due in public, and to accept blame if he acts like the many.
Chapter 65
Against Those Who on Account of Sickness Go Away Home
Epictetus challenges a student who wishes to return home due to sickness, arguing that the true purpose of study is to correct one's will and maintain a state conformable to nature. He emphasizes that disease and death should find us engaged in improving our ruling power, not in trivial pursuits. Using Socrates as a model, he contrasts the philosopher's daily joy in moral progress with the student's attachment to comfort and family.
Chapter 66
VI: Miscellaneous
Epictetus discusses the nature of progress in philosophy, contrasting modern cultivation of logic and syllogisms with the ancient focus on maintaining a faculty conformable to nature. He describes the invincibility of the good man who only contests what is within his will, defines common sense as the perception of common notions, and recounts Rufus's method of testing natural disposition by discouragement.
Chapter 67
To the Administrator of the Free Cities Who Was an Epicurean
Epictetus confronts an Epicurean administrator, arguing that Epicurean philosophy—which prioritizes pleasure—undermines civic duty, marriage, and moral integrity. He contrasts this with Stoic principles, emphasizing that true governance of rational beings requires guiding their desires and aversions toward what is profitable and virtuous, not coercing them through threats.
Chapter 68
VIII: How We Must Exercise Ourselves Against Appearances (Φαντασίας)
This chapter instructs the reader to train daily against appearances, just as one practices against sophistical questions. It presents a method of responding to external events—such as a son's death, disinheritance, or condemnation by Caesar—by recognizing that these are not within the power of the will and therefore not evils. The only true good or evil lies in our own judgments and afflictions, which are within our power. The chapter also criticizes those who complain about Zeus's governance, reminding us that we have been given the capacity for endurance and magnanimity, and that the door is always open to exit life without complaint.
Chapter 69
IX: To a Certain Rhetorician Who Was Going Up to Rome on a Suit
Epictetus challenges a rhetorician traveling to Rome for a lawsuit, arguing that success or failure depends not on external outcomes but on the quality of one's opinions. He criticizes the man for neglecting self-examination and pursuing status, contrasting the philosopher's focus on inner virtue and freedom from anxiety with the worldly man's insatiable desires.
Chapter 70
In What Manner We Ought to Bear Sickness
Epictetus argues that sickness is a test of philosophical discipline, not an excuse to abandon it. He insists that the philosopher's ruling faculty must remain conformable to nature even in fever, and that one should neither flatter the physician nor fear death. The chapter emphasizes that externals like the body are not our own, and that our only true business is to maintain right will and follow events as they happen.
Chapter 71
XI: Certain Miscellaneous Matters
This chapter discusses the fixed penalties for those who disobey divine administration, emphasizing that only things dependent on the will are good or evil. It uses the poet's words about the stranger to illustrate proper conduct toward a father and brother, noting that all are from Zeus, who oversees all relations.
Chapter 72
About Exercise
Epictetus distinguishes between true philosophical exercise—training desire and aversion to align with what is within our power—and ostentatious physical feats that merely impress spectators. He advocates practicing endurance against insults, abstaining from pleasure, and gradually testing oneself, while also introducing the three topics of practice: desire/aversion, action, and assent.
Chapter 73
What Solitude Is, and What Kind of Person a Solitary Man Is
Epictetus distinguishes between being alone and being solitary, arguing that true solitude is a state of helplessness, not mere isolation. He uses Zeus as an example of one who is alone yet self-sufficient, and contrasts the false peace provided by Caesar with the genuine security offered by philosophy. The chapter encourages self-sufficiency, inner tranquility, and the practice of virtue even in solitude, concluding with a call to live philosophically and be useful to others through example.
Chapter 74
Certain Miscellaneous Matters
Epictetus discusses the importance of self-examination and independence, warning against seeking validation from others or boasting about trivial achievements. He emphasizes rooting out arrogance and distrust, and defines true human superiority through virtues like modesty, fidelity, and justice rather than social status or physical prowess.
Chapter 75
That We Ought to Proceed with Circumspection to Everything
Epictetus urges careful deliberation before undertaking any action, using the example of Olympic competition and the pursuit of philosophy. He warns against impulsive imitation and emphasizes the need to examine both the consequences and one's own nature, advocating for consistent commitment over childish vacillation.
Chapter 76
That We Ought with Caution to Enter Into Familiar Intercourse with Men
Epictetus warns that frequent social intercourse with common people inevitably leads to assimilation, either corrupting the philosopher or requiring him to change others. He emphasizes the danger of being influenced by vulgar opinions and advises withdrawal from such associations until one's own philosophical principles are firmly established, comparing the process to a physician sending a patient to a different climate.
Chapter 77
On Providence
Epictetus argues that when we accuse Providence of injustice, we fail to see that events happen according to reason. The superior person has an advantage in virtue, not in external goods like money. He illustrates with a dialogue about Philostorgus and Sura, and advises that we must eliminate false opinions about poverty and other externals to achieve happiness.
Chapter 78
That We Ought Not to Be Disturbed by Any News
Epictetus advises that we should not be disturbed by any news, because the content of such reports is never about what is within our power—our will, opinions, and desires. External events, such as death, slander, or judicial condemnation, are not our own evils; only our responses and actions are. Using Socrates as an example, he emphasizes that we must focus on fulfilling our own duties with firmness and modesty, leaving the outcomes and the faults of others to themselves.
Chapter 79
What Is the Condition of a Common Kind of Man and of a Philosopher
Epictetus contrasts the common person, who blames external things for misfortune, with the philosopher, who recognizes that only the will can harm itself. He illustrates how early upbringing reinforces this error, using examples of nurses and pedagogues who blame stones or cooks instead of correcting the child. True progress begins when we blame only ourselves and our opinions for disturbance.
Chapter 80
That We Can Derive Advantage from All External Things
Epictetus argues that good and evil reside not in external things but in our own judgments and use of them. By applying right reason, we can turn even sickness, death, poverty, and abuse to our advantage, just as an athlete profits from a tough sparring partner. He urges us to stop admiring material things and making ourselves slaves to them, and instead to use every external event as an opportunity to practice virtue.
Chapter 81
Against Those Who Readily Come to the Profession of Sophists
Epictetus criticizes those who superficially adopt philosophical teachings without internalizing them, comparing them to a sick person vomiting undigested food. He argues that true philosophy requires transformation of one's ruling faculty, demonstrated through actions—eating, drinking, marriage, citizenship, and enduring hardship—not mere recitation of texts. He warns against treating philosophy as a casual profession, insisting it demands divine guidance, proper age, life, and purification, akin to the sacred mysteries of Eleusis.
Chapter 82
About Cynism
Epictetus discusses the true nature of Cynicism, emphasizing that it is a divine calling requiring complete purity of the ruling faculty, freedom from desire and aversion, and a role as a messenger from Zeus to guide humans toward true good and evil. He contrasts the superficial image of the Cynic (wallet, staff, begging) with the profound discipline of living openly, without concealment, and enduring hardship with love for all.
Chapter 83
To Those Who Read and Discuss for the Sake of Ostentation
Epictetus criticizes those who engage in philosophical reading and discussion for the sake of praise and display rather than for genuine self-improvement. He emphasizes that the true purpose of philosophy is to transform one's character and actions, not to impress others with eloquent speech or clever arguments. Using examples from Rufus, Socrates, Zeno, and Cleanthes, he argues that the philosopher's school is a surgery where one should come to be healed, not to receive applause. He warns against the vanity of seeking admiration and urges readers to first determine who they wish to be, then act accordingly.
Chapter 84
XXIV: That We Ought Not to Be Moved by a Desire of Those Things Which Are Not in Our Power
Epictetus argues that we should not be disturbed by desires for things outside our control, such as possessions, relationships, or places. He emphasizes that true freedom comes from recognizing what is our own—the use of appearances—and what belongs to others. Using examples from Diogenes, Socrates, and Hercules, he shows that an affectionate and happy life is possible only when we accept mortality and change, and do not cling to transient things.
Chapter 85
To Those Who Fall Off (Desist) from Their Purpose
Epictetus encourages those who have failed in their philosophical commitments to renew their efforts immediately, comparing the struggle for virtue to a combat that can be re-entered at any time. He warns against complacency derived from past failures and emphasizes that recalling past faults should serve as a deterrent, much like a slave remembers blows to avoid punishment.
Chapter 86
To Those Who Fear Want
Epictetus rebukes those who fear poverty and want, arguing that such fear stems from misplaced values and a failure to internalize philosophical principles. He contrasts the cowardice of the philosopher who fears hunger with the resourcefulness of fugitive slaves and the steadfastness of heroes like Hercules and Ulysses. True freedom lies in relying on one's own will and accepting death as a natural end, not in clinging to wealth or comfort.
Chapter 87
Book IV: On Freedom and Familiar Intimacy
Epictetus explores the nature of true freedom, arguing that it is not a matter of social status or political liberty but of internal mastery over desires and aversions. He contends that those who are attached to external goods or who live in fear of tyrants are slaves, regardless of their rank. The chapter also addresses the challenges of maintaining philosophical progress in the context of friendships, warning that one cannot simultaneously please former companions and improve oneself.
Chapter 88
About Freedom
Epictetus argues that true freedom lies in recognizing what is within our control—our judgments and choices—and treating all external things, including body, property, and life itself, as not our own. He contrasts the philosopher's theoretical knowledge with practical living, using examples like Diogenes and Socrates to show that freedom is achieved by removing desire for externals and by obedience to divine reason. He criticizes those who claim to be free while being slaves to passions, social status, or fear of tyrants.
Chapter 89
On Familiar Intimacy
Epictetus warns against maintaining close ties with former friends whose behavior conflicts with one's philosophical progress. He argues that one cannot simultaneously please old companions and improve oneself; a choice must be made between the two paths.
Chapter 90
III: What Things We Should Exchange for Other Things
Epictetus advises that when we lose something external, we should consider what we gain in its place, especially if it is of greater value—such as modesty, fidelity, tranquillity, or liberty. He warns that even a small deviation from reason can undo all our progress, like a slight turn of the helm sinking a ship. The true goods to preserve are inner virtues, not external positions or possessions, and we must obey the divine laws rather than human ones.
Chapter 91
To Those Who Are Desirous of Passing Life in Tranquillity
Epictetus warns that even the desire for tranquillity, leisure, or learning can enslave us if we treat them as external goods. True tranquility comes from focusing only on what is within our power—our judgments and actions—and referring all reading, writing, and daily activities to the goal of maintaining a rational and virtuous character. He urges readers to rejoice in present circumstances, to use every situation (solitude or crowd) as an opportunity for practice, and to measure progress not by verses read but by how well one has applied philosophical principles to life.
Chapter 92
Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious
Epictetus argues that the wise and good person avoids quarrels and fights, following the example of Socrates. He emphasizes that one's own ruling principle is the only thing within one's power, and that external things like insults or injuries do not harm the true self. The chapter teaches that true good and evil lie in the will (prohairesis), not in externals, and that this understanding leads to peace, love, and freedom from disturbance.
Chapter 93
VI: Against Those Who Lament Over Being Pitied
Epictetus argues against being troubled by others' pity, emphasizing that pity concerns the giver, not the receiver, and that one should focus on cultivating right opinions about externals like poverty and lack of power. He criticizes those who seek to avoid pity through display rather than inner conviction, and urges self-examination and consistent practice of Stoic principles to achieve freedom from disturbance.
Chapter 94
On Freedom from Fear
Epictetus argues that true freedom from fear comes from recognizing that only our own opinions and will are within our power, while external things like body, property, and status are not. By aligning our desires with what is in our control and accepting whatever happens as part of the divine order, we become fearless even in the face of tyrants, guards, or death.
Chapter 95
VIII: Against Those Who Hastily Rush Into the Use of the Philosophic Dress
Epictetus criticizes those who adopt the outward appearance of a philosopher—wearing a cloak and growing a beard—without first cultivating the inner discipline and understanding that philosophy requires. He argues that true philosophy is demonstrated through one's actions and character, not by external marks. Using the analogy of a seed that must grow slowly and naturally, he warns against rushing into public display before being ready. He cites Euphrates and Socrates as models of those who lived philosophically without seeking recognition, and emphasizes that the philosopher's material is reason, not dress.
Chapter 96
To a Person Who Had Been Changed to a Character of Shamelessness
Epictetus addresses a person who has abandoned modesty and virtue for the pursuit of power, wealth, and sensual pleasures. He argues that true loss is not of material possessions but of character—modesty, decency, and liberty. He urges the person to fight against their own decline, restore themselves through will, and not despair, emphasizing that the human soul is tractable and reform is possible from within.
Chapter 97
X: What Things We Ought to Despise, and What Things We Ought to Value
Epictetus argues that true good and evil lie only in what is within our power—our judgments, desires, and aversions—while external things like wealth, status, and even life itself are indifferent. He urges the reader to focus on managing their own ruling faculty, to accept all external events as given by God, and to face death with a clear conscience, having lived virtuously. The chapter contrasts the anxious pursuit of consulships and possessions with the tranquility of the Stoic who treats all appearances according to nature.
Chapter 98
XI: About Purity (Cleanliness)
Epictetus argues that a love of purity is a distinguishing characteristic of humans, derived from the gods. He distinguishes between the purity of the soul, which comes from correct judgments, and bodily cleanliness, which is a social duty. He criticizes those who neglect bodily hygiene, using examples like Socrates and Diogenes to show that a philosopher should appear cheerful and clean, not filthy, so as not to deter others from philosophy. He emphasizes that while the body is only earth, one should still maintain cleanliness to avoid being disagreeable and to fulfill one's role as a social being.
Chapter 99
On Attention
Epictetus warns against the habit of deferring attention, arguing that even a brief lapse in mindfulness creates a lasting pattern of neglect. He insists that attention must be constant and applied to every action—play, singing, work—because no part of life is exempt. The core principles to hold ready are that only the will is good or bad, and no external person or event can harm one's true self. He urges the reader to remember their identity and duties, to pursue only what is within their power, and to treat each moment as the time to begin attending, not tomorrow.
Chapter 100
XIII: Against or to Those Who Readily Tell Their Own Affairs
Epictetus warns against the reciprocal disclosure of personal secrets, arguing that trustworthiness is not established by mere candor but by a person's character and philosophical principles. He uses the analogy of a soldier in disguise to illustrate how incautious talk can lead to harm, and emphasizes that one should only confide in those who are faithful, modest, and have their will properly oriented toward what is within their control.
