Discourses · Chapter
What Is the Condition of a Common Kind of Man and of a Philosopher explained
Epictetus contrasts the common person, who blames external things for misfortune, with the philosopher, who recognizes that only the will can harm itself.
What happens
Epictetus contrasts the common person, who blames external things for misfortune, with the philosopher, who recognizes that only the will can harm itself. He illustrates how early upbringing reinforces this error, using examples of nurses and pedagogues who blame stones or cooks instead of correcting the child. True progress begins when we blame only ourselves and our opinions for disturbance.
Themes in this chapter
Dichotomy of Control
The philosopher recognizes that only the will can hinder or damage itself; external things are independent of the will and cannot truly harm it.
Rationality and Self-Examination
Progress requires blaming oneself rather than external causes, and correcting one's own opinions as the source of perturbation.
Characters to notice
- Epictetus
Speaker and teacher, defining the distinction between the common person and the philosopher.
Key passages
“The first difference between a common person and a philosopher is this: the common person says, 'Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for my father.' The philosopher, if he shall ever be compelled to say, 'Woe to me,' stops and says, 'but for myself.'”
The key distinction is that ordinary people lament over losses of loved ones, while the philosopher, if he laments at all, laments only over his own failings.
Epictetus emphasizes that the philosopher's concern is solely with what is within his own control—his judgments and choices.
“If then we ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when we are unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tranquillity except our own opinion, I swear to you by all the gods that we have made progress.”
If we can learn to blame only ourselves for our distress, recognizing that our own opinions are the sole cause of our turmoil, then we have truly advanced.
This encapsulates the Stoic doctrine that external events do not disturb us; rather, our judgments about them do.