Discourses · Chapter
XIX: How We Should Behave to Tyrants explained
Epictetus argues that a tyrant's power is limited to external things like the body and possessions, but cannot touch a person's will or freedom.
What happens
Epictetus argues that a tyrant's power is limited to external things like the body and possessions, but cannot touch a person's will or freedom. True freedom comes from valuing only what is within our control and recognizing that opinions, not tyrants, disturb us. He uses examples of a tyrant threatening to chain a leg, the respect given to Caesar's shoemaker Felicion, and the folly of seeking honors like the priesthood of Augustus, to illustrate how people mistakenly value externals over their own rational will.
Themes in this chapter
Freedom and Slavery
Epictetus distinguishes between external slavery (to tyrants) and internal freedom (of the will), asserting that only one's own opinions can enslave or free them.
Dichotomy of Control
The chapter centers on the Stoic principle that only what depends on the will is truly good or bad; external things like leg, carcass, and honors are indifferent.
Social Duty and Friendship
Epictetus notes that rational nature is designed to contribute to the common interest, so self-regard and social duty are not opposed.
Characters to notice
- Epictetus
Delivers the discourse on how to behave toward tyrants, emphasizing the inviolability of the will.
- Zeus
Cited as the one who has set the free man free, and as the model of rational nature that serves the common interest.
- Socrates
Mentioned as a model whom people imitate, in contrast to the tyrant whom no one wishes to become like.
- Felicion
Formerly a worthless shoemaker sold by Epaphroditus, later becomes Caesar's shoemaker and is suddenly treated with great respect.
- Epaphroditus
Epictetus's former master, who sold a shoemaker as good for nothing, later seen deferring to the same man when he became Caesar's shoemaker.
- Caesar
Implied as the tyrant figure whose favor elevates individuals like Felicion, illustrating the folly of valuing externals.
Key passages
“It is not possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing than by itself.”
A free mind cannot be troubled or obstructed by anything external—only by its own judgments.
Core Stoic principle: freedom is internal and invulnerable to external force.
“Zeus has set me free: do you think that he intended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of my carcass: take it.”
Zeus has granted me freedom; you cannot enslave me, only my body—take it if you wish.
Epictetus asserts that true freedom comes from divine nature, not from external circumstances.
“When absurd notions about things independent of our will, as if they were good and bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to tyrants.”
If we mistakenly believe that external things are good or bad, we inevitably become subservient to tyrants.
The root of servility is misvaluing externals as goods or evils.