Principia Ethica · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore.
Chapter 1
Epigraph
The chapter presents a single epigraph from Bishop Butler: 'Everything is what it is, And not another thing.' This concise statement establishes a foundational principle of identity and logical clarity, suggesting that things have an intrinsic nature that cannot be reduced to or confused with something else.
Chapter 2
Dedication
The author dedicates this work to his teachers and friends at Cambridge, offering it as a first fruit of his studies.
Chapter 3
Preface to the 1903 Edition
Moore introduces his project of clarifying the fundamental questions of ethics, distinguishing between intrinsic value and right action, and critiquing the confusion that has plagued ethical philosophy. He outlines his method, his debt to Sidgwick and Brentano, and his intention to provide a 'Prolegomena to any future Ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific.'
Chapter 4
Preface to the 1922 Edition
G. E. Moore notes that the book is reprinted without alteration except for minor corrections, as he still agrees with its main tendency and conclusions, and any substantial revision would require rewriting the entire work.
Chapter 5
Principia Ethica
G. E. Moore introduces his foundational work in ethics, arguing that 'good' is a simple, indefinable notion and identifying the naturalistic fallacy as the error of defining it in natural terms. He critiques hedonism and metaphysical ethics, distinguishes between ethics and conduct, and begins to identify intrinsic goods.
Chapter 6
I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics
Moore introduces the fundamental question of ethics: the nature of 'good' as a simple, indefinable notion. He argues against the naturalistic fallacy—the attempt to define good in terms of natural properties like pleasure or desire—and emphasizes that judgments of intrinsic value are universal and not reducible to mere means. He also introduces the principle of organic unities, where the value of a whole is not simply the sum of its parts.
Chapter 7
II: Naturalistic Ethics
Moore critiques naturalistic ethical theories that define 'good' by reference to some natural property, such as 'natural,' 'evolved,' or 'pleasure.' He argues that these commit the naturalistic fallacy by equating goodness with a natural object. He examines Herbert Spencer's evolutionistic ethics, showing its inconsistency in treating both pleasure and evolution as ultimate ends. Moore distinguishes naturalistic ethics from metaphysical ethics and sets the stage for a separate treatment of hedonism in the next chapter.
Chapter 8
III: Hedonism
Moore examines Hedonism, the principle that pleasure is the sole good, arguing it is a form of Naturalistic Ethics rooted in the naturalistic fallacy. He critiques Mill's Utilitarianism for committing this fallacy by equating 'desirable' with 'desired,' and shows that pleasure is not the only object of desire. Moore then considers Hedonism as an intuition, pointing out that Mill's qualitative distinctions among pleasures imply a false intuition, and that Sidgwick fails to distinguish pleasure from consciousness of pleasure, leading to absurd implications. Finally, he argues that Egoism and Utilitarianism are contradictory, and that the refutation of Hedonism refutes both.
Chapter 9
IV: Metaphysical Ethics
Moore critiques metaphysical ethics, arguing that any attempt to derive ethical conclusions from metaphysical truths about supersensible reality commits the naturalistic fallacy. He distinguishes between the fundamental ethical question 'What is good in itself?' and practical ethics, asserting that metaphysics can only bear on the latter by informing us of future effects, not on intrinsic goodness. He examines and rejects the logical and epistemological confusions that lead to the assumption that 'good' denotes a real property, emphasizing that ethical truths are unique and irreducible.
Chapter 10
Ethics in Relation to Conduct
Moore transitions from the theoretical investigation of 'good' to the practical question of what we ought to do. He argues that 'right' means 'cause of a good result,' thus equating rightness with usefulness, and that all moral laws are causal generalizations about producing good effects. He then examines virtue, distinguishing between virtue as a mere means (often lacking intrinsic value) and virtue as containing intrinsically valuable elements, and criticizes the view that virtue is the sole good, pointing out inconsistencies in Kant and Christian thought.
Chapter 11
VI: The Ideal
Moore concludes his investigation of intrinsic value by defining the class of things that are intrinsically good or evil. He argues that the greatest goods are complex organic unities involving consciousness of an object and an appropriate emotion, specifically the love of beautiful things or good persons (including aesthetic enjoyments and personal affections). Great evils include the love of what is evil or ugly, hatred of what is good or beautiful, and the consciousness of pain. Mixed goods contain some evil element but are still valuable. Moore emphasizes that ethical inquiry must focus on two clear questions: 'Has it intrinsic value?' and 'Is it a means to the best possible?' He rejects the search for artificial symmetry or system in ethics, insisting that truth must be discovered by careful examination of instances.
Chapter 12
Endnotes
This chapter provides references and citations for the arguments and sources discussed in the main text, including works by Brentano, Sidgwick, Guyau, Spencer, Taylor, Mackenzie, and Kant, among others.
