Principia Ethica · Chapter
VI: The Ideal explained
Moore concludes his investigation of intrinsic value by defining the class of things that are intrinsically good or evil.
What happens
Moore concludes his investigation of intrinsic value by defining the class of things that are intrinsically good or evil. He argues that the greatest goods are complex organic unities involving consciousness of an object and an appropriate emotion, specifically the love of beautiful things or good persons (including aesthetic enjoyments and personal affections). Great evils include the love of what is evil or ugly, hatred of what is good or beautiful, and the consciousness of pain. Mixed goods contain some evil element but are still valuable. Moore emphasizes that ethical inquiry must focus on two clear questions: 'Has it intrinsic value?' and 'Is it a means to the best possible?' He rejects the search for artificial symmetry or system in ethics, insisting that truth must be discovered by careful examination of instances.
Themes in this chapter
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
Moore distinguishes between things that are good in themselves (intrinsic value) and things that are good as means; he identifies personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments as the greatest intrinsic goods.
The Ideal and Good in Itself
The chapter defines the ideal as consisting of complex organic unities involving consciousness and emotion, and argues that these are the ultimate ends of human action.
Method of Ethical Reasoning
Moore insists that ethical truths must be discovered by careful examination of instances, not by assuming symmetry or system; he advocates focusing on two clear questions: intrinsic value and means to the best.
Characters to notice
- G. E. Moore
Author and primary voice; presents his conclusions on intrinsic goods and evils, and defends his method of ethical reasoning.
- Henry Sidgwick
Referenced in the discussion of the intrinsic value of the mere existence of beauty; Moore agrees with Sidgwick that such value is negligible compared to the consciousness of beauty.
Key passages
“By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.”
The greatest goods we can conceive are states of consciousness involving personal relationships and appreciation of beauty.
Moore's central positive thesis on intrinsic goods.
“That it is only for the sake of these things—in order that as much of them as possible may at some time exist—that anyone can be justified in performing any public or private duty; that they are the raison d’être of virtue; that it is they—these complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them—that form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of social progress.”
All duties and virtues are justified only insofar as they promote the existence of these valuable states of consciousness; they are the ultimate goal and measure of progress.
Moore's claim that personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments are the foundation of moral philosophy.
“We have no title whatever to assume that the truth on any subject-matter will display such symmetry as we desire to see—or (to use the common vague phrase) that it will possess any particular form of 'unity.'”
We cannot assume that ethical truths will be symmetrical or unified; we must discover them through careful examination, not by imposing a desired system.
Moore's rejection of the demand for systematic unity in ethics.