Principia Ethica · Chapter
Ethics in Relation to Conduct explained
Moore transitions from the theoretical investigation of 'good' to the practical question of what we ought to do.
What happens
Moore transitions from the theoretical investigation of 'good' to the practical question of what we ought to do. He argues that 'right' means 'cause of a good result,' thus equating rightness with usefulness, and that all moral laws are causal generalizations about producing good effects. He then examines virtue, distinguishing between virtue as a mere means (often lacking intrinsic value) and virtue as containing intrinsically valuable elements, and criticizes the view that virtue is the sole good, pointing out inconsistencies in Kant and Christian thought.
Themes in this chapter
Ethics of Conduct and Duty
Moore redefines 'right' and 'duty' in terms of causal consequences, arguing that moral laws are empirical generalizations about producing good effects.
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
Distinguishes between virtue as a means (often lacking intrinsic value) and the intrinsic goodness of certain mental states included in virtue.
Critique of Hedonism
Acknowledges Hedonists' methodological insight but criticizes their failure to recognize non-hedonic intrinsic goods.
Characters to notice
- G. E. Moore
Author and primary voice; argues for the causal definition of 'right' and analyzes virtue's intrinsic value.
- Immanuel Kant
Criticized for inconsistency: holding that a Good Will is the sole good while also implying happiness is a reward for virtue.
- Hedonists
Acknowledged for emphasizing the distinction between means and ends, but faulted for not seeing that many other things have intrinsic value.
- Jesus Christ
Referenced in the context of the Christian conception of virtue and reward in heaven.
Key passages
“The expression 'self-evident' means properly that the proposition so called is evident or true, by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself.”
A self-evident proposition is one that is true on its own, not derived from any other proposition.
Moore clarifies the meaning of self-evidence in ethics, distinguishing it from psychological conviction.
“What I wish first to point out is that 'right' does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result,' and is thus identical with 'useful'; whence it follows that the end always will justify the means, and that no action which is not justified by its results can be right.”
Moore argues that 'right' simply means 'produces a good outcome,' so the end always justifies the means, and only actions with good results can be right.
This is a central thesis of the chapter, equating rightness with usefulness.
“Thus Kant's view that virtue renders us worthy of happiness is in flagrant contradiction with the view, which he implies and which is associated with his name, that a Good Will is the only thing having intrinsic value.”
Kant's claim that virtue deserves happiness contradicts his own assertion that only a Good Will has intrinsic value, because happiness must then also be good.
Moore points out an inconsistency in Kant's ethical system.