Principia Ethica · Chapter
II: Naturalistic Ethics explained
Moore critiques naturalistic ethical theories that define 'good' by reference to some natural property, such as 'natural,' 'evolved,' or 'pleasure.' He argues that these commit the naturalistic fallacy by equating goodness with a natural ob
What happens
Moore critiques naturalistic ethical theories that define 'good' by reference to some natural property, such as 'natural,' 'evolved,' or 'pleasure.' He argues that these commit the naturalistic fallacy by equating goodness with a natural object. He examines Herbert Spencer's evolutionistic ethics, showing its inconsistency in treating both pleasure and evolution as ultimate ends. Moore distinguishes naturalistic ethics from metaphysical ethics and sets the stage for a separate treatment of hedonism in the next chapter.
Themes in this chapter
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Central theme: Moore defines and applies the naturalistic fallacy to critique theories that define 'good' in terms of natural properties like evolution or pleasure.
Critique of Hedonism
Moore previews his critique of hedonism, arguing that pleasure cannot be the sole good without committing the naturalistic fallacy.
Characters to notice
- G. E. Moore
Author and primary voice; defines and critiques naturalistic ethics, identifies the naturalistic fallacy, and examines Spencer's views.
- Herbert Spencer
Exemplar of evolutionistic ethics; Moore analyzes Spencer's arguments linking pleasure and evolution, pointing out inconsistencies.
- J. S. Mill
Mentioned as a proponent of substituting psychology for ethics, illustrating the naturalistic fallacy.
Key passages
“Of naturalistic views, that which regards 'pleasure' as the sole good has received far the fullest and most serious treatment and was therefore reserved for Chapter III : all other forms of Naturalism may be first dismissed, by taking typical examples (24–26).”
Moore sets aside hedonism for the next chapter and focuses on other naturalistic theories, using representative examples.
Moore outlines the structure of his critique, separating hedonism from other naturalistic views.
“The influence of the fallacious opinion that to be 'better' means to be 'more evolved' was illustrated by an examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Ethics; and it was pointed out that, but for the influence of this opinion, Evolution could hardly have been supposed to have any important bearing upon Ethics (29–34).”
Moore argues that Spencer's ethics mistakenly equates moral goodness with evolutionary advancement, a key instance of the naturalistic fallacy.
Moore uses Spencer to show how evolution is wrongly taken as a moral standard.
“This method consists in substituting for 'good' some one property of a natural object or of a collection of natural objects; and in thus replacing Ethics by some one of the natural sciences.”
Naturalistic ethics reduces 'good' to a natural property, thereby turning ethics into a branch of natural science.
Moore defines the core error of naturalism: replacing ethical inquiry with empirical science.