Principia Ethica · Chapter
IV: Metaphysical Ethics explained
Moore critiques metaphysical ethics, arguing that any attempt to derive ethical conclusions from metaphysical truths about supersensible reality commits the naturalistic fallacy.
What happens
Moore critiques metaphysical ethics, arguing that any attempt to derive ethical conclusions from metaphysical truths about supersensible reality commits the naturalistic fallacy. He distinguishes between the fundamental ethical question 'What is good in itself?' and practical ethics, asserting that metaphysics can only bear on the latter by informing us of future effects, not on intrinsic goodness. He examines and rejects the logical and epistemological confusions that lead to the assumption that 'good' denotes a real property, emphasizing that ethical truths are unique and irreducible.
Themes in this chapter
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Moore argues that metaphysical ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy by inferring ethical conclusions from propositions about reality.
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
Distinguishes between the intrinsic goodness of things and their instrumental value in practical ethics.
Method of Ethical Reasoning
Critiques the logical and epistemological methods used by metaphysicians to ground ethics.
Characters to notice
- G. E. Moore
Author and central critic; argues against metaphysical ethics and the naturalistic fallacy.
- Immanuel Kant
Mentioned as a proponent of metaphysical ethics and for the erroneous view equating truth with being thought in a particular way.
- Herbert Spencer
Referenced as an example of a writer whose Data of Ethics fails to contribute to ethical solutions.
- T. H. Green
Mentioned as a metaphysical writer whose Prolegomena to Ethics is criticized for making no contribution to ethical solutions.
- Plato
Referenced in the context of metaphysicians who recognized universal truths.
Key passages
“To hold that from any proposition asserting 'Reality is of this nature' we can infer, or obtain confirmation for, any proposition asserting 'This is good in itself' is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.”
Claiming that facts about reality can prove what is good in itself is a logical mistake.
Core argument against metaphysical ethics.
“All the ethical truth which can possibly be conveyed by such an assertion would be just as well conveyed by saying that the ideal consisted in the realisation of a particular kind of self, which might be either real or purely imaginary.”
The ethical content of saying the ideal is the 'true self' is unchanged whether that self is real or imaginary.
Highlights the irrelevance of metaphysical reality to intrinsic value.
“If, for instance, Metaphysics could tell us not only that we are immortal, but also, in any degree, what effects our actions in this life will have upon our condition in a future one, such information would have an undoubted bearing upon the question what we ought to do.”
Metaphysical knowledge about future consequences can inform practical ethics, but not intrinsic goodness.
Distinction between practical and fundamental ethics.