Principia Ethica · Chapter
I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics explained
Moore introduces the fundamental question of ethics: the nature of 'good' as a simple, indefinable notion.
What happens
Moore introduces the fundamental question of ethics: the nature of 'good' as a simple, indefinable notion. He argues against the naturalistic fallacy—the attempt to define good in terms of natural properties like pleasure or desire—and emphasizes that judgments of intrinsic value are universal and not reducible to mere means. He also introduces the principle of organic unities, where the value of a whole is not simply the sum of its parts.
Themes in this chapter
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Moore identifies and critiques the fallacy of defining 'good' in terms of natural properties (e.g., pleasure, desire), arguing that 'good' is a simple, indefinable notion.
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
Moore distinguishes between things good as ends (intrinsic value) and things good as means, emphasizing that judgments of intrinsic value are universal.
Method of Ethical Reasoning
Moore discusses the importance of clear analysis and the principle of organic unities, arguing that the value of a whole is not simply the sum of its parts.
Characters to notice
- G. E. Moore
The author and primary voice, arguing for the indefinability of 'good' and critiquing naturalistic ethics.
- Henry Sidgwick
Cited as the only ethical writer who clearly recognized that 'good' is indefinable and unanalysable.
- Herbert Spencer
Mentioned as an example of attempting to prove that pleasure coincides with life, which Moore dismisses as irrelevant unless 'good' means something different.
- Jeremy Bentham
Discussed in relation to the naturalistic fallacy, as his definition of 'right' as 'conducive to general happiness' is used to illustrate the fallacy.
- J. S. Mill
Mentioned as having committed the naturalistic fallacy, to be examined later.
Key passages
“The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.”
The intrinsic worth of a complex entity cannot be calculated by simply adding up the values of its individual components.
Moore introduces the principle of organic unities, a key methodological point in ethical reasoning.
“It is absolutely useless, so far as Ethics is concerned, to prove, as Mr. Spencer tries to do, that increase of pleasure coincides with increase of life, unless good means something different from either life or pleasure.”
Proving a correlation between pleasure and life is irrelevant to ethics unless 'good' is understood as distinct from both pleasure and life.
Moore dismisses Spencer's evolutionary ethics as committing the naturalistic fallacy.
“Everyone does in fact understand the question 'Is this good?' When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked 'Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?'”
The concept of 'good' is intuitively distinct from concepts like pleasure, desire, or approval, even if people do not always recognize the difference.
Moore appeals to introspection to support his claim that 'good' is a unique, indefinable notion.