Discourses on Livy · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for Discourses on Livy by Niccolò Machiavelli.
Chapter 1
Dedication
Machiavelli dedicates his Discourses to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai, offering his work as the greatest gift he can give, drawn from long experience and study. He contrasts his choice of dedicating to worthy private citizens rather than to princes, emphasizing that true merit lies in being rather than in having power.
Chapter 2
Discourses on Livy
Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy is a commentary on the first ten books of Livy's history of Rome, exploring the political and military institutions that made Rome great. The work examines the interplay of liberty, class conflict, religion, and leadership in sustaining a republic, drawing lessons for contemporary Florence.
Chapter 3
Book I
Machiavelli introduces his project of recovering the political wisdom of ancient Rome through Livy's history, arguing that the study of ancient republics can provide lessons for contemporary political life. He discusses the founding of Rome, the role of Romulus and Numa in establishing laws and religion, and the necessity of a virtuous founder to impose order. The chapter explores the cyclical nature of political regimes, the importance of maintaining republican liberty through conflict between the nobles and the plebs, and the dangers of corruption and ingratitude. Machiavelli emphasizes that good laws and military strength are the foundations of a stable state, and that republics must be willing to use necessary force to preserve themselves.
Chapter 4
Chapter I: The Necessity of Renewal in Republics and Sects
Machiavelli argues that for a republic, sect, or kingdom to endure, it must be periodically renewed by being brought back to its founding principles. This renewal can occur through external shocks (like Rome's sack by the Gauls) or internal mechanisms (such as the tribuneship, censorship, and the virtuous actions of exemplary citizens). He emphasizes the importance of frequent, severe punishments to deter corruption and cites examples from Roman history and the renewal of Christianity by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic. The chapter concludes with Machiavelli's intention to examine the actions of individual citizens that made Rome great.
Chapter 5
Chapter II: That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
This chapter discusses the wisdom of feigning folly, using Junius Brutus as the prime example. Brutus pretended to be a fool to live securely and eventually overthrow the Roman kings. The chapter advises that those discontented with a prince should either openly declare war if strong enough, or if weak, should court the prince's favor and feign alignment with his desires. It warns that neutrality is dangerous for men of great station, as their professions of disinterest are not believed, and they will be forced into conflict. The chapter concludes by transitioning to discuss the severity Brutus used to maintain freedom after achieving it.
Chapter 6
III
Machiavelli argues that after a change in government, whether from tyranny to freedom or vice versa, it is necessary to eliminate enemies of the new order, using the example of Brutus who condemned his own sons to death. He contrasts this with Piero Soderini, whose reluctance to use severity led to his downfall.
Chapter 7
IV
This chapter examines the dangers faced by usurpers who allow those they have deposed to live, using the examples of the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius. It argues that old injuries cannot be healed by subsequent benefits, and that the desire to reign is so powerful it can override filial duty, as seen in the younger Tarquin's wife.
Chapter 8
How an hereditary king may come to lose his kingdom
Machiavelli uses the example of Tarquin the Proud to argue that kings lose their kingdoms not because of isolated scandals (like the rape of Lucretia) but because they systematically violate the laws, customs, and shared governance that sustain legitimate rule. Tarquin centralized power, alienated the senate, and oppressed the commons, thereby destroying the foundations of his authority. The chapter concludes by contrasting such tyranny with the secure and beloved rule of good princes like Timoleon and Aratus, who governed well and were constrained by their peoples to remain in power.
Chapter 9
VI
Machiavelli examines the nature of conspiracies against a prince or country, detailing the difficulties, dangers, and common causes of failure. He contrasts the relative ease for those with an army (like Caesar or Agathocles) with the need for stratagem and fraud for others, and discusses the psychological and practical obstacles that lead to failure, including the awe inspired by a prince, the confusion of conspirators, and unforeseen accidents.
Chapter 10
Why it is that changes from freedom to servitude, and from servitude to freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood.
Machiavelli examines why some political transitions between freedom and servitude are peaceful while others are violent. He argues that governments originating in violence necessarily injure many, leading to vengeful bloodshed upon their fall, whereas governments deriving authority from the whole community only harm the prince when authority is withdrawn, as seen in Rome's expulsion of the Tarquins and the Medici's fall in Florence.
Chapter 11
VIII
Machiavelli argues that a bad citizen cannot seriously harm an uncorrupted commonwealth, using the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus to show how Rome's virtuous institutions and people resisted tyranny. He emphasizes that the success of political change depends on the character and condition of the state, and that leaders must adapt their actions to the times.
Chapter 12
IX
Machiavelli argues that fortune depends on aligning one's methods with the times. He contrasts Fabius Maximus's cautious strategy, suited to the early Hannibalic war, with Scipio's boldness, which succeeded later. He notes that a republic, with its diversity of citizens, adapts better than a prince, who is bound by nature and habit. Examples include Piero Soderini's gentle rule failing when times demanded force, and Pope Julius II's impulsive success in favorable times.
Chapter 13
That a captain cannot escape battle when his enemy forces it on him at all risks
Machiavelli argues that modern princes and republics have deviated from ancient military prudence by instructing their captains to avoid battle at all costs, mistakenly imitating Fabius Maximus. He demonstrates through historical examples—including Fabius against Hannibal, Philip of Macedon against the Romans, and Hannibal against Scipio—that a commander who wishes to keep the field cannot always decline engagement; delay is only useful when one's army is so formidable that the enemy dares not attack, otherwise avoidance leads to dishonor or disaster.
Chapter 14
XI
Machiavelli discusses how a weaker party can prevail against a stronger coalition by withstanding the initial onslaught and using cunning to divide the opposition. He illustrates this with the Roman Senate's use of a compliant tribune to check the tribunes' power, and with modern examples of Venice and France.
Chapter 15
XII
Machiavelli discusses how a prudent captain manipulates necessity to compel his own soldiers to fight while relieving the enemy of that necessity. He illustrates with historical examples showing that when soldiers believe no other course is open, they fight desperately; conversely, offering the enemy an escape can weaken their resolve. He also notes that cities are harder to recover after revolt due to fear of punishment, and that neighboring republics resist conquest more stubbornly than subjects of princes.
Chapter 16
XIII
Machiavelli examines whether a valiant captain with a weak army or a valiant army with a weak captain is more trustworthy, using the example of Coriolanus and other Roman history to argue that both are interdependent, though a good captain who can discipline his own forces is ultimately more reliable.
Chapter 17
XIV
Machiavelli discusses the impact of strange and unexpected sights or sounds in battle, using historical examples to show how such stratagems can either cause confusion or backfire. He emphasizes the importance of discipline in an army to prevent panic from trivial incidents, and advises captains to both employ deceptive tactics and guard against them.
Chapter 18
XV
This chapter argues that a single commander should lead an army, using Roman history and a modern example to show that multiple leaders cause confusion and inefficiency. The Romans appointed three tribunes against the Fidenati and Veientines, but their discord led to discredit; a dictator was then appointed to restore order. Similarly, in 1500, joint Florentine commissaries failed until one took sole command. The chapter concludes that one man of ordinary prudence is better than two of great parts with divided command.
Chapter 19
Chapter XVI
Machiavelli discusses how in peaceful times, republics tend to neglect their most worthy citizens in favor of those with wealth or connections, leading to resentment and potential ruin. He cites examples from Athens (Nicias and Alcibiades) and Florence (Antonio Giacomini) to illustrate this pattern, and suggests remedies such as keeping citizens poor and maintaining constant readiness for war.
Chapter 20
XVII
Machiavelli warns against offending a citizen and then appointing him to an important command, using the example of Claudius Nero, who risked the entire Roman state to regain his honor after being disgraced by the Senate and people. The chapter argues that such resentment can lead to dangerous actions, especially in republics that lack the uncorrupted virtue of ancient Rome, and concludes that no republic can endure forever due to unforeseen causes of ruin.
Chapter 21
XVIII
This chapter discusses the importance of a commander's ability to foresee and understand the enemy's plans, using historical examples to illustrate how misjudgments about victory or defeat can lead to disastrous outcomes. It emphasizes that the side which first detects the other's distress often gains the advantage.
Chapter 22
XIX
This chapter examines whether indulgence or severity is more effective in controlling a multitude, using the contrasting examples of Quintius and Appius Claudius in the Roman Republic. It reconciles the opposing views of Tacitus by distinguishing between governing equals versus subjects, and concludes that humanity is often more effective among equals, while severity may be necessary for subjects, provided it is moderate to avoid hatred.
Chapter 23
How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman arms
Camillus's humane treatment of the schoolmaster and boys of Falerii leads to the city's surrender, illustrating that acts of kindness and integrity can achieve what force cannot. The chapter also references similar examples from Roman history, such as Fabritius's generosity toward Pyrrhus and Scipio's virtue in Spain, and contrasts these with Hannibal's opposite methods.
Chapter 24
XXI
Machiavelli examines how Hannibal and Scipio, despite using opposite methods—Hannibal through cruelty and violence, Scipio through humanity and generosity—both achieved similar successes in Italy and Spain respectively. He argues that men's love of change and the passions of love and fear make either approach effective if backed by transcendent valour, though each carries risks of contempt or hatred. The chapter concludes by noting that both leaders suffered disadvantages from their methods, but their extraordinary valour balanced these excesses.
Chapter 25
XXII
Machiavelli compares the contrasting leadership styles of Manlius Torquatus (severe) and Valerius Corvinus (gentle), showing how both achieved equal glory and obedience from their soldiers. He argues that severity is necessary for extraordinary commands and is safer for a republic, as it prevents personal ambition, while gentleness is more suitable for a prince. The chapter concludes that for a citizen in a republic, Manlius's methods are more praiseworthy and less dangerous.
Chapter 26
Why Camillus was banished from Rome
This chapter examines the reasons for Camillus's banishment, contrasting his stern and proud bearing with the more popular methods of Valerius. It highlights how Camillus's virtues—care for safety, prudence, magnanimity—earned admiration, but his severity in punishment, failure to share spoils, ostentatious triumph, and vow to Apollo that required reclaiming plunder from soldiers bred hatred. The chapter concludes that depriving people of advantage and appearing haughty are chief causes of popular hatred, especially in a free republic.
Chapter 27
XXIV
Machiavelli argues that the prolongation of military and civil commands was a key cause of Rome's eventual servitude, as it concentrated power in the hands of a few, undermined the authority of the Senate, and enabled ambitious commanders like Sylla, Marius, and Caesar to overthrow republican liberties. He contrasts the virtuous example of Lucius Quintius, who refused an extended consulship, with the precedent set by Publius Philo's proconsulship, which led to the ruinous practice of extended commands.
Chapter 28
Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman citizens
Machiavelli argues that poverty, enforced by custom rather than law, was a key source of Roman strength, as it kept citizens focused on merit and public service rather than wealth. He illustrates this with the story of Cincinnatus, who left his small farm to become dictator and save the Roman army, then returned to poverty. Further examples include Marcus Regulus and Paulus Emilius, showing how poverty fostered virtue and magnanimity in public life while humility in private.
Chapter 29
How women are a cause of the ruin of states
The chapter recounts a feud in Ardea over the marriage of an heiress, which escalates into armed conflict between plebeians and nobles, leading to foreign intervention and eventual Roman suppression. Machiavelli uses this to illustrate how women can cause state ruin, citing Lucretia and Virginia as examples, and warns rulers to prevent such disorders.
Chapter 30
XXVII
Machiavelli discusses how to reunite a divided city, arguing that the most effective method is to execute the ringleaders of disturbances, as the Roman consuls did at Ardea. He criticizes the modern tendency to keep subject cities divided as a means of control, using the examples of Pistoja and Florence to show that such policies lead to instability and corruption. He concludes that weak rulers resort to these faulty methods because they lack the strength and virtue to govern properly.
Chapter 31
XXVIII
Machiavelli warns that republics must vigilantly monitor citizens' actions, as seemingly generous deeds can conceal seeds of tyranny. He uses the example of Spurius Melius, a wealthy Roman who privately supplied grain during a famine, gaining popular favor that alarmed the Senate. The Senate appointed a dictator to execute Melius, illustrating how private benefactions can corrupt public liberty. Machiavelli distinguishes between public credit (gained through open service to the state) and secret credit (gained through private favors), arguing that the former should be rewarded and the latter suppressed to prevent tyranny.
Chapter 32
XXIX
Machiavelli argues that the faults of a people are caused by their prince, who either neglects his duty or shares the same defects. He uses the example of Romagna under corrupt lords and the story of Timasitheus of Lipari to illustrate how a ruler's character shapes the behavior of his subjects.
Chapter 33
On Envy, Authority, and the Defense of a City
This chapter examines how a citizen of great personal influence must overcome envy to serve his country, using Camillus as a model. It details Camillus's preparations for war against the Etruscans, Latins, and Hernicians, including his organization of three armies and his insistence on disciplined, enrolled troops rather than an undisciplined multitude. The chapter contrasts Camillus's success with the failures of Savonarola and Soderini, who could not extinguish envy through gentleness or lacked the authority to eliminate rivals. It concludes with lessons on the necessity of methodical defense and the dangers of envy in corrupt cities.
Chapter 34
XXXI
Machiavelli argues that strong republics and valiant men remain constant through all changes of fortune, neither elated by success nor dismayed by adversity. He contrasts the steadfastness of Rome—exemplified by Camillus's unwavering spirit and the Roman response to the defeat at Cannae—with the Venetian Republic's arrogance in prosperity and abject surrender in defeat. He concludes that such constancy depends on a well-trained citizen militia, as seen in Rome's institutions.
Chapter 35
Of the methods which some have used to make peace impossible
This chapter examines the deliberate strategies used by leaders or factions to make peace impossible, using the revolt of the Roman colonies Caere and Velitrae and the Carthaginian mercenary mutiny as examples. In both cases, instigators committed grave wrongs against the opposing party to eliminate any possibility of reconciliation, thereby forcing continued conflict.
Chapter 36
Chapter XXXIII: That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your men with confidence in one another and in you
Machiavelli argues that victory in battle depends on inspiring soldiers with confidence, achieved through good arms, discipline, mutual familiarity, and trust in their captain. He emphasizes the role of religion in Roman military success, citing Appius Claudius's speech on the importance of auspices, and illustrates how true valour overcomes superstition and misfortune, as seen in the Roman response to the Volscians and Fabius's strategic encouragement before entering Etruria.
Chapter 37
XXXIV
This chapter discusses how citizens in a republic form opinions about fellow citizens and whether the people or a prince are better at bestowing honors. It uses the example of Titus Manlius Torquatus, whose early act of defending his father led to his election as military tribune. The chapter argues that a people's judgment, when based on notable actions, is more reliable than a prince's, especially when advice is available to correct errors.
Chapter 38
Chapter XXXV: Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual the measures the greater the danger
Machiavelli discusses the risks faced by citizens or counselors who advocate for new and significant measures, noting that their fate often depends on the outcome rather than the wisdom of the advice. He illustrates with examples of Perseus killing a friend for belated criticism, and Selim executing a bashaw whose advice led to disaster. He recommends offering advice discreetly and without personal insistence to avoid blame if things go wrong.
Chapter 39
XXXVI
Machiavelli examines why the Gauls are fierce at the start of battle but weaken over time, contrasting their undisciplined impetuosity with the disciplined valor of the Roman army. He categorizes armies into three types: those with discipline and valor (like Rome), those with impetuosity without discipline (like the Gauls), and those lacking both (like contemporary Italian armies). He cites Livy's account of the combat between Titus Manlius and a Gaul, and Papirius Cursor's condemnation of disobedience, to illustrate the importance of military discipline.
Chapter 40
XXXVII
Machiavelli discusses the dilemma of whether to engage in skirmishes before a general engagement, especially against a new enemy. He argues that while skirmishes can help soldiers become familiar with an unfamiliar foe and reduce fear, they also risk demoralizing the army if lost. He advocates for avoiding skirmishes unless victory is certain, and for abandoning indefensible positions to preserve reputation and strength, citing examples from Philip of Macedon, the Romans after Cannae, Marius against the Cimbrians, and Valerius Corvinus against the Samnites.
Chapter 41
Of the qualities of a captain in whom his soldiers can confide
This chapter discusses the essential qualities of a military captain who can inspire confidence in his soldiers, using the example of Valerius Corvinus. It emphasizes that a captain must lead by example, demonstrating personal valor and skill in arms rather than relying solely on words. The chapter also addresses the challenges of commanding raw troops against unfamiliar enemies, citing the methods of Gracchus and Epaminondas who trained their men in mock battles to build discipline and confidence.
Chapter 42
XXXIX
Machiavelli argues that a good captain must have thorough knowledge of places and countries, which is best acquired through hunting. He illustrates this with the example of Publius Decius, who as military tribune saved the Roman army by seizing a strategically important hill that the Samnites had neglected, and by carefully scouting the enemy's positions to find a safe escape route.
Chapter 43
XL
Machiavelli argues that fraud in war is praiseworthy and glorious, citing examples such as Hannibal's feigned flight at Lake Thrasymene and his use of oxen with lighted horns to escape Fabius Maximus, as well as Pontius the Samnite's deception at the Caudine Forks. He distinguishes between fraud that breaks faith (which never gains glory) and military stratagems against an enemy who trusts you not. He concludes by endorsing the advice of Pontius's father Herennius to avoid a mean course in decisive matters.
Chapter 44
XLI
The chapter discusses the principle that when the safety of one's country is at stake, any means—whether honorable or dishonorable—are justified to preserve it. It recounts the Roman army's surrender to the Samnites and the counsel of Lucius Lentulus to accept ignominious terms to save the army and, thereby, Rome itself. The example of France is cited to illustrate that a king's dignity is not compromised by any decision made for the kingdom's preservation.
Chapter 45
XLII
Machiavelli discusses the principle that promises made under compulsion need not be observed, using the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks and Spurius Posthumius's argument that the peace was not binding on the Roman people. He notes that glory can be won even in defeat if one acts valiantly afterward, and that forced promises affecting public welfare are rightly broken when the pressure is removed.
Chapter 46
XLIII
Machiavelli argues that men born in the same province retain nearly the same character across all times, and that historical events repeat because human passions and dispositions remain constant. He illustrates this with examples of the perfidy of barbarian nations, comparing the ancient Etruscans' experience with the Gauls to the Florentines' dealings with the French and the Emperor, warning princes not to trust such peoples.
Chapter 47
XLIV
This chapter discusses how boldness and daring can succeed where ordinary methods fail, using the Samnites' strategy to pressure the Etruscans into war and examples from Pope Julius II and M. de Foix to illustrate the principle of forcing a decision without time for deliberation.
Chapter 48
XLV
Machiavelli compares the military tactics of the Roman consuls Decius and Fabius, arguing that it is safer and more praiseworthy to await and repel the enemy's attack rather than to anticipate it with an impetuous onset, as demonstrated by Fabius's successful strategy.
Chapter 49
XLVI
Machiavelli discusses how the characteristics of families are perpetuated not by blood but by education and training, using Roman examples such as the stern Manlii, courteous Valerii, and haughty Claudii. He illustrates this with the story of a Claudius censor who refused to resign after eighteen months, claiming a five-year term, causing tumult but ultimately respecting the laws.
Chapter 50
XLVII
A good citizen should set aside private grievances for the love of his country, as demonstrated by Fabius who, despite personal enmity, nominated his enemy Papirius Cursor as dictator when the public interest demanded it.
Chapter 51
XLVIII
This chapter discusses the importance of suspecting fraud when an enemy appears to make a grave blunder. It uses examples from Roman history and Florentine military campaigns to illustrate how eagerness for victory can blind commanders to deception.
Chapter 52
XLIX
This chapter discusses the necessity for a commonwealth to constantly create new ordinances to preserve its freedom, using examples from Rome such as the poisoning conspiracy among wives, the Bacchanalian conspiracy, and the punishment of soldiers after Cannae. It highlights how Quintius Fabius, as censor, wisely reorganized new citizens into four tribes to prevent corruption of the state, earning him the surname Maximus.
Chapter 53
Chapter L
This chapter discusses the danger of allowing any council or magistrate to bring the government of a city to a standstill, using the example of the Roman consuls T. Q. Cincinnatus and Cn. Julius Mento, whose disagreements halted public business. The senate's attempt to appoint a dictator was blocked by the consuls, forcing them to seek the tribunes' authority to compel compliance. The chapter also examines a similar problem in the Venetian Republic, where the Great Council's refusal to appoint successors caused disorder, later remedied by a law ensuring no magistracy is vacated until a successor is appointed.
Chapter 54
LI
The chapter discusses the prudence of making necessary actions appear as if they were chosen freely, using the Roman senate's decision to grant pay to soldiers as an example. The senate turned a necessity into a popular concession, earning the gratitude of the people despite the tribunes' objections about increased taxes.
Chapter 55
LII
Machiavelli argues that the safest way to check a powerful citizen's ambition is to anticipate and adopt his methods for gaining popular support, rather than opposing him directly. He illustrates this with examples from Rome, Cosimo de' Medici in Florence, Piero Soderini, and the Roman senate's error in trusting Octavianus against Antonius.
Chapter 56
LIII
The chapter examines how the people, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would ruin them, and how large hopes and brave promises easily sway them. Using the example of the Roman commons wanting to move half the population to conquered Veii, Machiavelli illustrates the danger of popular delusion. He contrasts this with the wisdom of the senate and the need for trusted leaders to restrain the populace. The chapter also discusses the difficulty of persuading a people to adopt cautious or seemingly base courses, even when they are truly advantageous, citing Fabius Maximus, the disastrous appointment of Varro, the foolhardy offer of Marcus Centenius Penula, and the Athenian expedition to Sicily. Machiavelli concludes that in republics where the people hold power, daring proposals are always welcomed, often leading to ruin for the state and for the commanders who undertake them.
Chapter 57
LIV
This chapter discusses how a grave and authoritative figure can restrain an excited multitude, using the example of Messer Francesco Soderini calming an armed crowd in Florence, and referencing the Roman people's stubborn desire to transplant themselves to Veii.
Chapter 58
LV
Machiavelli argues that a republic can only flourish where there is great equality and the populace is uncorrupted, while a principality is necessary where inequality and corruption prevail. He contrasts the virtue and religious sentiment of the ancient Romans and contemporary Germans with the corruption of Italy, France, and Spain, attributing German virtue to isolation and the absence of 'gentlemen'—idle lords with castles and retainers. He concludes that founding a republic in a land of gentlemen requires eliminating them, and founding a principality in an egalitarian land requires creating a new nobility.
Chapter 59
LVI
Machiavelli discusses how great calamities are often preceded by signs, prophecies, or portents, citing examples from ancient Rome and recent Italian history, including Savonarola's prediction of Charles VIII's invasion, lightning strikes before Lorenzo de' Medici's death and Piero Soderini's fall, and Livy's account of Marcus Ceditius hearing a voice warning of the Gauls.
Chapter 60
Chapter LVII
This chapter discusses the collective strength versus individual weakness of the people, using the example of Romans who moved to Veii after the Gallic invasion and later submitted to the senate's decree to return. It emphasizes that a multitude is formidable when united but becomes feeble when each person fears for their own safety, and that the most dangerous popular resentment arises from loss of liberty or a beloved prince.
Chapter 61
LVIII
Machiavelli defends the multitude against the common accusation of fickleness and inconstancy, arguing that a people restrained by laws is wiser, more constant, and more grateful than a prince. He compares popular governments favorably to princely rule, emphasizing that both require legal restraint, but that a people errs less and is more easily corrected. He cites Roman history to demonstrate the people's prudence, stability, and hatred of tyranny.
Chapter 62
LIX
Machiavelli compares the reliability of leagues and alliances made with commonwealths versus those made with princes, arguing that while both may break faith under duress, commonwealths are generally more stable and trustworthy due to their slower decision-making and greater resistance to breaking faith for slight advantages.
Chapter 63
LX
Machiavelli discusses how Rome granted the consulship and other magistracies without regard to age, emphasizing that excellence and merit were valued over birth or years. He argues that this practice was necessary for a republic aiming for greatness, as it allowed young, capable leaders like Valerius Corvinus and Scipio to serve the state while still vigorous.
Chapter 64
Book II
Machiavelli discusses the growth of the Roman empire, the methods used by the Romans to expand, and the importance of liberty and popular government. He contrasts the Roman approach with other republics and examines the role of fortune and virtue in the rise and fall of states.
Chapter 65
Chapter I: The Necessity of Renewal in Republics and Sects
Machiavelli argues that for a republic, sect, or kingdom to endure, it must be periodically renewed by being brought back to its founding principles. This renewal can occur through external shocks (like Rome's sack by the Gauls) or internal mechanisms (such as the tribuneship, censorship, and the virtuous actions of exemplary citizens). He emphasizes the importance of frequent, severe punishments to deter corruption and cites examples from Roman history and the renewal of Christianity by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic. The chapter concludes with Machiavelli's intention to examine the actions of individual citizens that made Rome great.
Chapter 66
Chapter II: That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
This chapter discusses the wisdom of feigning folly, using Junius Brutus as the prime example. Brutus pretended to be a fool to live securely and eventually overthrow the Roman kings. The chapter advises that those discontented with a prince should either openly declare war if strong enough, or if weak, should court the prince's favor and feign alignment with his desires. It warns that neutrality is dangerous for men of great station, as their professions of disinterest are not believed, and they will be forced into conflict. The chapter concludes by transitioning to discuss the severity Brutus used to maintain freedom after achieving it.
Chapter 67
III
Machiavelli argues that after a change in government, whether from tyranny to freedom or vice versa, it is necessary to eliminate enemies of the new order, using the example of Brutus who condemned his own sons to death. He contrasts this with Piero Soderini, whose reluctance to use severity led to his downfall.
Chapter 68
IV
This chapter examines the dangers faced by usurpers who allow those they have deposed to live, using the examples of the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius. It argues that old injuries cannot be healed by subsequent benefits, and that the desire to reign is so powerful it can override filial duty, as seen in the younger Tarquin's wife.
Chapter 69
How an hereditary king may come to lose his kingdom
Machiavelli uses the example of Tarquin the Proud to argue that kings lose their kingdoms not because of isolated scandals (like the rape of Lucretia) but because they systematically violate the laws, customs, and shared governance that sustain legitimate rule. Tarquin centralized power, alienated the senate, and oppressed the commons, thereby destroying the foundations of his authority. The chapter concludes by contrasting such tyranny with the secure and beloved rule of good princes like Timoleon and Aratus, who governed well and were constrained by their peoples to remain in power.
Chapter 70
VI
Machiavelli examines the nature of conspiracies against a prince or country, detailing the difficulties, dangers, and common causes of failure. He contrasts the relative ease for those with an army (like Caesar or Agathocles) with the need for stratagem and fraud for others, and discusses the psychological and practical obstacles that lead to failure, including the awe inspired by a prince, the confusion of conspirators, and unforeseen accidents.
Chapter 71
Why it is that changes from freedom to servitude, and from servitude to freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood.
Machiavelli examines why some political transitions between freedom and servitude are peaceful while others are violent. He argues that governments originating in violence necessarily injure many, leading to vengeful bloodshed upon their fall, whereas governments deriving authority from the whole community only harm the prince when authority is withdrawn, as seen in Rome's expulsion of the Tarquins and the Medici's fall in Florence.
Chapter 72
VIII
Machiavelli argues that a bad citizen cannot seriously harm an uncorrupted commonwealth, using the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus to show how Rome's virtuous institutions and people resisted tyranny. He emphasizes that the success of political change depends on the character and condition of the state, and that leaders must adapt their actions to the times.
Chapter 73
IX
Machiavelli argues that fortune depends on aligning one's methods with the times. He contrasts Fabius Maximus's cautious strategy, suited to the early Hannibalic war, with Scipio's boldness, which succeeded later. He notes that a republic, with its diversity of citizens, adapts better than a prince, who is bound by nature and habit. Examples include Piero Soderini's gentle rule failing when times demanded force, and Pope Julius II's impulsive success in favorable times.
Chapter 74
That a captain cannot escape battle when his enemy forces it on him at all risks
Machiavelli argues that modern princes and republics have deviated from ancient military prudence by instructing their captains to avoid battle at all costs, mistakenly imitating Fabius Maximus. He demonstrates through historical examples—including Fabius against Hannibal, Philip of Macedon against the Romans, and Hannibal against Scipio—that a commander who wishes to keep the field cannot always decline engagement; delay is only useful when one's army is so formidable that the enemy dares not attack, otherwise avoidance leads to dishonor or disaster.
Chapter 75
XI
Machiavelli discusses how a weaker party can prevail against a stronger coalition by withstanding the initial onslaught and using cunning to divide the opposition. He illustrates this with the Roman Senate's use of a compliant tribune to check the tribunes' power, and with modern examples of Venice and France.
Chapter 76
XII
Machiavelli discusses how a prudent captain manipulates necessity to compel his own soldiers to fight while relieving the enemy of that necessity. He illustrates with historical examples showing that when soldiers believe no other course is open, they fight desperately; conversely, offering the enemy an escape can weaken their resolve. He also notes that cities are harder to recover after revolt due to fear of punishment, and that neighboring republics resist conquest more stubbornly than subjects of princes.
Chapter 77
XIII
Machiavelli examines whether a valiant captain with a weak army or a valiant army with a weak captain is more trustworthy, using the example of Coriolanus and other Roman history to argue that both are interdependent, though a good captain who can discipline his own forces is ultimately more reliable.
Chapter 78
XIV
Machiavelli discusses the impact of strange and unexpected sights or sounds in battle, using historical examples to show how such stratagems can either cause confusion or backfire. He emphasizes the importance of discipline in an army to prevent panic from trivial incidents, and advises captains to both employ deceptive tactics and guard against them.
Chapter 79
XV
This chapter argues that a single commander should lead an army, using Roman history and a modern example to show that multiple leaders cause confusion and inefficiency. The Romans appointed three tribunes against the Fidenati and Veientines, but their discord led to discredit; a dictator was then appointed to restore order. Similarly, in 1500, joint Florentine commissaries failed until one took sole command. The chapter concludes that one man of ordinary prudence is better than two of great parts with divided command.
Chapter 80
Chapter XVI
Machiavelli discusses how in peaceful times, republics tend to neglect their most worthy citizens in favor of those with wealth or connections, leading to resentment and potential ruin. He cites examples from Athens (Nicias and Alcibiades) and Florence (Antonio Giacomini) to illustrate this pattern, and suggests remedies such as keeping citizens poor and maintaining constant readiness for war.
Chapter 81
XVII
Machiavelli warns against offending a citizen and then appointing him to an important command, using the example of Claudius Nero, who risked the entire Roman state to regain his honor after being disgraced by the Senate and people. The chapter argues that such resentment can lead to dangerous actions, especially in republics that lack the uncorrupted virtue of ancient Rome, and concludes that no republic can endure forever due to unforeseen causes of ruin.
Chapter 82
XVIII
This chapter discusses the importance of a commander's ability to foresee and understand the enemy's plans, using historical examples to illustrate how misjudgments about victory or defeat can lead to disastrous outcomes. It emphasizes that the side which first detects the other's distress often gains the advantage.
Chapter 83
XIX
This chapter examines whether indulgence or severity is more effective in controlling a multitude, using the contrasting examples of Quintius and Appius Claudius in the Roman Republic. It reconciles the opposing views of Tacitus by distinguishing between governing equals versus subjects, and concludes that humanity is often more effective among equals, while severity may be necessary for subjects, provided it is moderate to avoid hatred.
Chapter 84
How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman arms
Camillus's humane treatment of the schoolmaster and boys of Falerii leads to the city's surrender, illustrating that acts of kindness and integrity can achieve what force cannot. The chapter also references similar examples from Roman history, such as Fabritius's generosity toward Pyrrhus and Scipio's virtue in Spain, and contrasts these with Hannibal's opposite methods.
Chapter 85
XXI
Machiavelli examines how Hannibal and Scipio, despite using opposite methods—Hannibal through cruelty and violence, Scipio through humanity and generosity—both achieved similar successes in Italy and Spain respectively. He argues that men's love of change and the passions of love and fear make either approach effective if backed by transcendent valour, though each carries risks of contempt or hatred. The chapter concludes by noting that both leaders suffered disadvantages from their methods, but their extraordinary valour balanced these excesses.
Chapter 86
XXII
Machiavelli compares the contrasting leadership styles of Manlius Torquatus (severe) and Valerius Corvinus (gentle), showing how both achieved equal glory and obedience from their soldiers. He argues that severity is necessary for extraordinary commands and is safer for a republic, as it prevents personal ambition, while gentleness is more suitable for a prince. The chapter concludes that for a citizen in a republic, Manlius's methods are more praiseworthy and less dangerous.
Chapter 87
Why Camillus was banished from Rome
This chapter examines the reasons for Camillus's banishment, contrasting his stern and proud bearing with the more popular methods of Valerius. It highlights how Camillus's virtues—care for safety, prudence, magnanimity—earned admiration, but his severity in punishment, failure to share spoils, ostentatious triumph, and vow to Apollo that required reclaiming plunder from soldiers bred hatred. The chapter concludes that depriving people of advantage and appearing haughty are chief causes of popular hatred, especially in a free republic.
Chapter 88
XXIV
Machiavelli argues that the prolongation of military and civil commands was a key cause of Rome's eventual servitude, as it concentrated power in the hands of a few, undermined the authority of the Senate, and enabled ambitious commanders like Sylla, Marius, and Caesar to overthrow republican liberties. He contrasts the virtuous example of Lucius Quintius, who refused an extended consulship, with the precedent set by Publius Philo's proconsulship, which led to the ruinous practice of extended commands.
Chapter 89
Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman citizens
Machiavelli argues that poverty, enforced by custom rather than law, was a key source of Roman strength, as it kept citizens focused on merit and public service rather than wealth. He illustrates this with the story of Cincinnatus, who left his small farm to become dictator and save the Roman army, then returned to poverty. Further examples include Marcus Regulus and Paulus Emilius, showing how poverty fostered virtue and magnanimity in public life while humility in private.
Chapter 90
How women are a cause of the ruin of states
The chapter recounts a feud in Ardea over the marriage of an heiress, which escalates into armed conflict between plebeians and nobles, leading to foreign intervention and eventual Roman suppression. Machiavelli uses this to illustrate how women can cause state ruin, citing Lucretia and Virginia as examples, and warns rulers to prevent such disorders.
Chapter 91
XXVII
Machiavelli discusses how to reunite a divided city, arguing that the most effective method is to execute the ringleaders of disturbances, as the Roman consuls did at Ardea. He criticizes the modern tendency to keep subject cities divided as a means of control, using the examples of Pistoja and Florence to show that such policies lead to instability and corruption. He concludes that weak rulers resort to these faulty methods because they lack the strength and virtue to govern properly.
Chapter 92
XXVIII
Machiavelli warns that republics must vigilantly monitor citizens' actions, as seemingly generous deeds can conceal seeds of tyranny. He uses the example of Spurius Melius, a wealthy Roman who privately supplied grain during a famine, gaining popular favor that alarmed the Senate. The Senate appointed a dictator to execute Melius, illustrating how private benefactions can corrupt public liberty. Machiavelli distinguishes between public credit (gained through open service to the state) and secret credit (gained through private favors), arguing that the former should be rewarded and the latter suppressed to prevent tyranny.
Chapter 93
XXIX
Machiavelli argues that the faults of a people are caused by their prince, who either neglects his duty or shares the same defects. He uses the example of Romagna under corrupt lords and the story of Timasitheus of Lipari to illustrate how a ruler's character shapes the behavior of his subjects.
Chapter 94
On Envy, Authority, and the Defense of a City
This chapter examines how a citizen of great personal influence must overcome envy to serve his country, using Camillus as a model. It details Camillus's preparations for war against the Etruscans, Latins, and Hernicians, including his organization of three armies and his insistence on disciplined, enrolled troops rather than an undisciplined multitude. The chapter contrasts Camillus's success with the failures of Savonarola and Soderini, who could not extinguish envy through gentleness or lacked the authority to eliminate rivals. It concludes with lessons on the necessity of methodical defense and the dangers of envy in corrupt cities.
Chapter 95
XXXI
Machiavelli argues that strong republics and valiant men remain constant through all changes of fortune, neither elated by success nor dismayed by adversity. He contrasts the steadfastness of Rome—exemplified by Camillus's unwavering spirit and the Roman response to the defeat at Cannae—with the Venetian Republic's arrogance in prosperity and abject surrender in defeat. He concludes that such constancy depends on a well-trained citizen militia, as seen in Rome's institutions.
Chapter 96
Of the methods which some have used to make peace impossible
This chapter examines the deliberate strategies used by leaders or factions to make peace impossible, using the revolt of the Roman colonies Caere and Velitrae and the Carthaginian mercenary mutiny as examples. In both cases, instigators committed grave wrongs against the opposing party to eliminate any possibility of reconciliation, thereby forcing continued conflict.
Chapter 97
Chapter XXXIII: That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your men with confidence in one another and in you
Machiavelli argues that victory in battle depends on inspiring soldiers with confidence, achieved through good arms, discipline, mutual familiarity, and trust in their captain. He emphasizes the role of religion in Roman military success, citing Appius Claudius's speech on the importance of auspices, and illustrates how true valour overcomes superstition and misfortune, as seen in the Roman response to the Volscians and Fabius's strategic encouragement before entering Etruria.
Chapter 98
Book III
Machiavelli examines the necessity of returning to first principles for the preservation of republics and states, emphasizing the role of virtuous individuals, the renewal of institutions, and the cyclical nature of political life.
Chapter 99
Chapter I: The Necessity of Renewal in Republics and Sects
Machiavelli argues that for a republic, sect, or kingdom to endure, it must be periodically renewed by being brought back to its founding principles. This renewal can occur through external shocks (like Rome's sack by the Gauls) or internal mechanisms (such as the tribuneship, censorship, and the virtuous actions of exemplary citizens). He emphasizes the importance of frequent, severe punishments to deter corruption and cites examples from Roman history and the renewal of Christianity by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic. The chapter concludes with Machiavelli's intention to examine the actions of individual citizens that made Rome great.
Chapter 100
Chapter II: That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
This chapter discusses the wisdom of feigning folly, using Junius Brutus as the prime example. Brutus pretended to be a fool to live securely and eventually overthrow the Roman kings. The chapter advises that those discontented with a prince should either openly declare war if strong enough, or if weak, should court the prince's favor and feign alignment with his desires. It warns that neutrality is dangerous for men of great station, as their professions of disinterest are not believed, and they will be forced into conflict. The chapter concludes by transitioning to discuss the severity Brutus used to maintain freedom after achieving it.
Chapter 101
III
Machiavelli argues that after a change in government, whether from tyranny to freedom or vice versa, it is necessary to eliminate enemies of the new order, using the example of Brutus who condemned his own sons to death. He contrasts this with Piero Soderini, whose reluctance to use severity led to his downfall.
Chapter 102
IV
This chapter examines the dangers faced by usurpers who allow those they have deposed to live, using the examples of the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius. It argues that old injuries cannot be healed by subsequent benefits, and that the desire to reign is so powerful it can override filial duty, as seen in the younger Tarquin's wife.
Chapter 103
How an hereditary king may come to lose his kingdom
Machiavelli uses the example of Tarquin the Proud to argue that kings lose their kingdoms not because of isolated scandals (like the rape of Lucretia) but because they systematically violate the laws, customs, and shared governance that sustain legitimate rule. Tarquin centralized power, alienated the senate, and oppressed the commons, thereby destroying the foundations of his authority. The chapter concludes by contrasting such tyranny with the secure and beloved rule of good princes like Timoleon and Aratus, who governed well and were constrained by their peoples to remain in power.
Chapter 104
VI
Machiavelli examines the nature of conspiracies against a prince or country, detailing the difficulties, dangers, and common causes of failure. He contrasts the relative ease for those with an army (like Caesar or Agathocles) with the need for stratagem and fraud for others, and discusses the psychological and practical obstacles that lead to failure, including the awe inspired by a prince, the confusion of conspirators, and unforeseen accidents.
Chapter 105
Why it is that changes from freedom to servitude, and from servitude to freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood.
Machiavelli examines why some political transitions between freedom and servitude are peaceful while others are violent. He argues that governments originating in violence necessarily injure many, leading to vengeful bloodshed upon their fall, whereas governments deriving authority from the whole community only harm the prince when authority is withdrawn, as seen in Rome's expulsion of the Tarquins and the Medici's fall in Florence.
Chapter 106
VIII
Machiavelli argues that a bad citizen cannot seriously harm an uncorrupted commonwealth, using the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus to show how Rome's virtuous institutions and people resisted tyranny. He emphasizes that the success of political change depends on the character and condition of the state, and that leaders must adapt their actions to the times.
Chapter 107
IX
Machiavelli argues that fortune depends on aligning one's methods with the times. He contrasts Fabius Maximus's cautious strategy, suited to the early Hannibalic war, with Scipio's boldness, which succeeded later. He notes that a republic, with its diversity of citizens, adapts better than a prince, who is bound by nature and habit. Examples include Piero Soderini's gentle rule failing when times demanded force, and Pope Julius II's impulsive success in favorable times.
Chapter 108
That a captain cannot escape battle when his enemy forces it on him at all risks
Machiavelli argues that modern princes and republics have deviated from ancient military prudence by instructing their captains to avoid battle at all costs, mistakenly imitating Fabius Maximus. He demonstrates through historical examples—including Fabius against Hannibal, Philip of Macedon against the Romans, and Hannibal against Scipio—that a commander who wishes to keep the field cannot always decline engagement; delay is only useful when one's army is so formidable that the enemy dares not attack, otherwise avoidance leads to dishonor or disaster.
Chapter 109
XI
Machiavelli discusses how a weaker party can prevail against a stronger coalition by withstanding the initial onslaught and using cunning to divide the opposition. He illustrates this with the Roman Senate's use of a compliant tribune to check the tribunes' power, and with modern examples of Venice and France.
Chapter 110
XII
Machiavelli discusses how a prudent captain manipulates necessity to compel his own soldiers to fight while relieving the enemy of that necessity. He illustrates with historical examples showing that when soldiers believe no other course is open, they fight desperately; conversely, offering the enemy an escape can weaken their resolve. He also notes that cities are harder to recover after revolt due to fear of punishment, and that neighboring republics resist conquest more stubbornly than subjects of princes.
Chapter 111
XIII
Machiavelli examines whether a valiant captain with a weak army or a valiant army with a weak captain is more trustworthy, using the example of Coriolanus and other Roman history to argue that both are interdependent, though a good captain who can discipline his own forces is ultimately more reliable.
Chapter 112
XIV
Machiavelli discusses the impact of strange and unexpected sights or sounds in battle, using historical examples to show how such stratagems can either cause confusion or backfire. He emphasizes the importance of discipline in an army to prevent panic from trivial incidents, and advises captains to both employ deceptive tactics and guard against them.
Chapter 113
XV
This chapter argues that a single commander should lead an army, using Roman history and a modern example to show that multiple leaders cause confusion and inefficiency. The Romans appointed three tribunes against the Fidenati and Veientines, but their discord led to discredit; a dictator was then appointed to restore order. Similarly, in 1500, joint Florentine commissaries failed until one took sole command. The chapter concludes that one man of ordinary prudence is better than two of great parts with divided command.
Chapter 114
Chapter XVI
Machiavelli discusses how in peaceful times, republics tend to neglect their most worthy citizens in favor of those with wealth or connections, leading to resentment and potential ruin. He cites examples from Athens (Nicias and Alcibiades) and Florence (Antonio Giacomini) to illustrate this pattern, and suggests remedies such as keeping citizens poor and maintaining constant readiness for war.
Chapter 115
XVII
Machiavelli warns against offending a citizen and then appointing him to an important command, using the example of Claudius Nero, who risked the entire Roman state to regain his honor after being disgraced by the Senate and people. The chapter argues that such resentment can lead to dangerous actions, especially in republics that lack the uncorrupted virtue of ancient Rome, and concludes that no republic can endure forever due to unforeseen causes of ruin.
Chapter 116
XVIII
This chapter discusses the importance of a commander's ability to foresee and understand the enemy's plans, using historical examples to illustrate how misjudgments about victory or defeat can lead to disastrous outcomes. It emphasizes that the side which first detects the other's distress often gains the advantage.
Chapter 117
XIX
This chapter examines whether indulgence or severity is more effective in controlling a multitude, using the contrasting examples of Quintius and Appius Claudius in the Roman Republic. It reconciles the opposing views of Tacitus by distinguishing between governing equals versus subjects, and concludes that humanity is often more effective among equals, while severity may be necessary for subjects, provided it is moderate to avoid hatred.
Chapter 118
How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman arms
Camillus's humane treatment of the schoolmaster and boys of Falerii leads to the city's surrender, illustrating that acts of kindness and integrity can achieve what force cannot. The chapter also references similar examples from Roman history, such as Fabritius's generosity toward Pyrrhus and Scipio's virtue in Spain, and contrasts these with Hannibal's opposite methods.
Chapter 119
XXI
Machiavelli examines how Hannibal and Scipio, despite using opposite methods—Hannibal through cruelty and violence, Scipio through humanity and generosity—both achieved similar successes in Italy and Spain respectively. He argues that men's love of change and the passions of love and fear make either approach effective if backed by transcendent valour, though each carries risks of contempt or hatred. The chapter concludes by noting that both leaders suffered disadvantages from their methods, but their extraordinary valour balanced these excesses.
Chapter 120
XXII
Machiavelli compares the contrasting leadership styles of Manlius Torquatus (severe) and Valerius Corvinus (gentle), showing how both achieved equal glory and obedience from their soldiers. He argues that severity is necessary for extraordinary commands and is safer for a republic, as it prevents personal ambition, while gentleness is more suitable for a prince. The chapter concludes that for a citizen in a republic, Manlius's methods are more praiseworthy and less dangerous.
Chapter 121
Why Camillus was banished from Rome
This chapter examines the reasons for Camillus's banishment, contrasting his stern and proud bearing with the more popular methods of Valerius. It highlights how Camillus's virtues—care for safety, prudence, magnanimity—earned admiration, but his severity in punishment, failure to share spoils, ostentatious triumph, and vow to Apollo that required reclaiming plunder from soldiers bred hatred. The chapter concludes that depriving people of advantage and appearing haughty are chief causes of popular hatred, especially in a free republic.
Chapter 122
XXIV
Machiavelli argues that the prolongation of military and civil commands was a key cause of Rome's eventual servitude, as it concentrated power in the hands of a few, undermined the authority of the Senate, and enabled ambitious commanders like Sylla, Marius, and Caesar to overthrow republican liberties. He contrasts the virtuous example of Lucius Quintius, who refused an extended consulship, with the precedent set by Publius Philo's proconsulship, which led to the ruinous practice of extended commands.
Chapter 123
Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman citizens
Machiavelli argues that poverty, enforced by custom rather than law, was a key source of Roman strength, as it kept citizens focused on merit and public service rather than wealth. He illustrates this with the story of Cincinnatus, who left his small farm to become dictator and save the Roman army, then returned to poverty. Further examples include Marcus Regulus and Paulus Emilius, showing how poverty fostered virtue and magnanimity in public life while humility in private.
Chapter 124
How women are a cause of the ruin of states
The chapter recounts a feud in Ardea over the marriage of an heiress, which escalates into armed conflict between plebeians and nobles, leading to foreign intervention and eventual Roman suppression. Machiavelli uses this to illustrate how women can cause state ruin, citing Lucretia and Virginia as examples, and warns rulers to prevent such disorders.
Chapter 125
XXVII
Machiavelli discusses how to reunite a divided city, arguing that the most effective method is to execute the ringleaders of disturbances, as the Roman consuls did at Ardea. He criticizes the modern tendency to keep subject cities divided as a means of control, using the examples of Pistoja and Florence to show that such policies lead to instability and corruption. He concludes that weak rulers resort to these faulty methods because they lack the strength and virtue to govern properly.
Chapter 126
XXVIII
Machiavelli warns that republics must vigilantly monitor citizens' actions, as seemingly generous deeds can conceal seeds of tyranny. He uses the example of Spurius Melius, a wealthy Roman who privately supplied grain during a famine, gaining popular favor that alarmed the Senate. The Senate appointed a dictator to execute Melius, illustrating how private benefactions can corrupt public liberty. Machiavelli distinguishes between public credit (gained through open service to the state) and secret credit (gained through private favors), arguing that the former should be rewarded and the latter suppressed to prevent tyranny.
Chapter 127
XXIX
Machiavelli argues that the faults of a people are caused by their prince, who either neglects his duty or shares the same defects. He uses the example of Romagna under corrupt lords and the story of Timasitheus of Lipari to illustrate how a ruler's character shapes the behavior of his subjects.
Chapter 128
On Envy, Authority, and the Defense of a City
This chapter examines how a citizen of great personal influence must overcome envy to serve his country, using Camillus as a model. It details Camillus's preparations for war against the Etruscans, Latins, and Hernicians, including his organization of three armies and his insistence on disciplined, enrolled troops rather than an undisciplined multitude. The chapter contrasts Camillus's success with the failures of Savonarola and Soderini, who could not extinguish envy through gentleness or lacked the authority to eliminate rivals. It concludes with lessons on the necessity of methodical defense and the dangers of envy in corrupt cities.
Chapter 129
XXXI
Machiavelli argues that strong republics and valiant men remain constant through all changes of fortune, neither elated by success nor dismayed by adversity. He contrasts the steadfastness of Rome—exemplified by Camillus's unwavering spirit and the Roman response to the defeat at Cannae—with the Venetian Republic's arrogance in prosperity and abject surrender in defeat. He concludes that such constancy depends on a well-trained citizen militia, as seen in Rome's institutions.
Chapter 130
Of the methods which some have used to make peace impossible
This chapter examines the deliberate strategies used by leaders or factions to make peace impossible, using the revolt of the Roman colonies Caere and Velitrae and the Carthaginian mercenary mutiny as examples. In both cases, instigators committed grave wrongs against the opposing party to eliminate any possibility of reconciliation, thereby forcing continued conflict.
Chapter 131
Chapter XXXIII: That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your men with confidence in one another and in you
Machiavelli argues that victory in battle depends on inspiring soldiers with confidence, achieved through good arms, discipline, mutual familiarity, and trust in their captain. He emphasizes the role of religion in Roman military success, citing Appius Claudius's speech on the importance of auspices, and illustrates how true valour overcomes superstition and misfortune, as seen in the Roman response to the Volscians and Fabius's strategic encouragement before entering Etruria.
Chapter 132
XXXIV
This chapter discusses how citizens in a republic form opinions about fellow citizens and whether the people or a prince are better at bestowing honors. It uses the example of Titus Manlius Torquatus, whose early act of defending his father led to his election as military tribune. The chapter argues that a people's judgment, when based on notable actions, is more reliable than a prince's, especially when advice is available to correct errors.
Chapter 133
Chapter XXXV: Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual the measures the greater the danger
Machiavelli discusses the risks faced by citizens or counselors who advocate for new and significant measures, noting that their fate often depends on the outcome rather than the wisdom of the advice. He illustrates with examples of Perseus killing a friend for belated criticism, and Selim executing a bashaw whose advice led to disaster. He recommends offering advice discreetly and without personal insistence to avoid blame if things go wrong.
Chapter 134
XXXVI
Machiavelli examines why the Gauls are fierce at the start of battle but weaken over time, contrasting their undisciplined impetuosity with the disciplined valor of the Roman army. He categorizes armies into three types: those with discipline and valor (like Rome), those with impetuosity without discipline (like the Gauls), and those lacking both (like contemporary Italian armies). He cites Livy's account of the combat between Titus Manlius and a Gaul, and Papirius Cursor's condemnation of disobedience, to illustrate the importance of military discipline.
Chapter 135
XXXVII
Machiavelli discusses the dilemma of whether to engage in skirmishes before a general engagement, especially against a new enemy. He argues that while skirmishes can help soldiers become familiar with an unfamiliar foe and reduce fear, they also risk demoralizing the army if lost. He advocates for avoiding skirmishes unless victory is certain, and for abandoning indefensible positions to preserve reputation and strength, citing examples from Philip of Macedon, the Romans after Cannae, Marius against the Cimbrians, and Valerius Corvinus against the Samnites.
Chapter 136
Of the qualities of a captain in whom his soldiers can confide
This chapter discusses the essential qualities of a military captain who can inspire confidence in his soldiers, using the example of Valerius Corvinus. It emphasizes that a captain must lead by example, demonstrating personal valor and skill in arms rather than relying solely on words. The chapter also addresses the challenges of commanding raw troops against unfamiliar enemies, citing the methods of Gracchus and Epaminondas who trained their men in mock battles to build discipline and confidence.
Chapter 137
XXXIX
Machiavelli argues that a good captain must have thorough knowledge of places and countries, which is best acquired through hunting. He illustrates this with the example of Publius Decius, who as military tribune saved the Roman army by seizing a strategically important hill that the Samnites had neglected, and by carefully scouting the enemy's positions to find a safe escape route.
Chapter 138
XL
Machiavelli argues that fraud in war is praiseworthy and glorious, citing examples such as Hannibal's feigned flight at Lake Thrasymene and his use of oxen with lighted horns to escape Fabius Maximus, as well as Pontius the Samnite's deception at the Caudine Forks. He distinguishes between fraud that breaks faith (which never gains glory) and military stratagems against an enemy who trusts you not. He concludes by endorsing the advice of Pontius's father Herennius to avoid a mean course in decisive matters.
Chapter 139
XLI
The chapter discusses the principle that when the safety of one's country is at stake, any means—whether honorable or dishonorable—are justified to preserve it. It recounts the Roman army's surrender to the Samnites and the counsel of Lucius Lentulus to accept ignominious terms to save the army and, thereby, Rome itself. The example of France is cited to illustrate that a king's dignity is not compromised by any decision made for the kingdom's preservation.
Chapter 140
XLII
Machiavelli discusses the principle that promises made under compulsion need not be observed, using the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks and Spurius Posthumius's argument that the peace was not binding on the Roman people. He notes that glory can be won even in defeat if one acts valiantly afterward, and that forced promises affecting public welfare are rightly broken when the pressure is removed.
Chapter 141
XLIII
Machiavelli argues that men born in the same province retain nearly the same character across all times, and that historical events repeat because human passions and dispositions remain constant. He illustrates this with examples of the perfidy of barbarian nations, comparing the ancient Etruscans' experience with the Gauls to the Florentines' dealings with the French and the Emperor, warning princes not to trust such peoples.
Chapter 142
XLIV
This chapter discusses how boldness and daring can succeed where ordinary methods fail, using the Samnites' strategy to pressure the Etruscans into war and examples from Pope Julius II and M. de Foix to illustrate the principle of forcing a decision without time for deliberation.
Chapter 143
XLV
Machiavelli compares the military tactics of the Roman consuls Decius and Fabius, arguing that it is safer and more praiseworthy to await and repel the enemy's attack rather than to anticipate it with an impetuous onset, as demonstrated by Fabius's successful strategy.
Chapter 144
XLVI
Machiavelli discusses how the characteristics of families are perpetuated not by blood but by education and training, using Roman examples such as the stern Manlii, courteous Valerii, and haughty Claudii. He illustrates this with the story of a Claudius censor who refused to resign after eighteen months, claiming a five-year term, causing tumult but ultimately respecting the laws.
Chapter 145
XLVII
A good citizen should set aside private grievances for the love of his country, as demonstrated by Fabius who, despite personal enmity, nominated his enemy Papirius Cursor as dictator when the public interest demanded it.
Chapter 146
XLVIII
This chapter discusses the importance of suspecting fraud when an enemy appears to make a grave blunder. It uses examples from Roman history and Florentine military campaigns to illustrate how eagerness for victory can blind commanders to deception.
Chapter 147
XLIX
This chapter discusses the necessity for a commonwealth to constantly create new ordinances to preserve its freedom, using examples from Rome such as the poisoning conspiracy among wives, the Bacchanalian conspiracy, and the punishment of soldiers after Cannae. It highlights how Quintius Fabius, as censor, wisely reorganized new citizens into four tribes to prevent corruption of the state, earning him the surname Maximus.
Chapter 148
Endnotes
This chapter contains the endnotes for the book, including citations and references to classical and historical sources such as Dante, Virgil, Tacitus, Sallust, Procopius, Juvenal, Suetonius, and Flavio Biondo, among others.
