The Problems of Philosophy · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell.
Chapter 1
The Problems of Philosophy
This chapter introduces the fundamental problems of philosophy, beginning with the distinction between appearance and reality. Using the example of a table, Russell illustrates how our senses provide only appearances, not the true nature of objects. He discusses Descartes' method of systematic doubt, the rational belief in the existence of matter, and the role of physical science in describing matter. The chapter also examines Berkeley's idealism, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and description, the principle of induction, general principles of inference, Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, and Plato's theory of universals. It concludes by considering the value of philosophy.
Chapter 2
Appearance and Reality
Russell introduces the fundamental philosophical problem of distinguishing appearance from reality, using a table as a concrete example to show that sense-data (colors, textures, shapes) vary with perspective, lighting, and the observer, leading to doubt about the nature of physical objects. He raises two central questions: whether matter exists and, if so, what its nature is. Berkeley's idealism is presented as a key challenge to common-sense realism, arguing that the 'real' table may be an idea in the mind of God rather than an independent material substance.
Chapter 3
II: The Existence of Matter
Russell examines whether physical objects exist independently of our sense-data. He begins by affirming the certainty of immediate experiences (sense-data) and introduces Descartes' method of systematic doubt. While we cannot logically prove the existence of matter, instinctive belief in an external world is natural and useful for systematizing our experiences. Russell concludes that such belief is reasonable, as it harmonizes with other instinctive beliefs and simplifies our account of reality.
Chapter 4
III: The Nature of Matter
This chapter examines the nature of the physical world that persists independently of our perceptions. It begins by reaffirming the rational belief that sense-data are signs of an external reality, then turns to physical science's account of matter as something defined solely by position and motion in a neutral, public space. The chapter argues that the intrinsic qualities of physical objects—such as color, sound, and even the space we directly experience—are not part of the scientific world; rather, they are effects of wave-motions and other processes on our senses. It concludes by considering the idealist view that matter is fundamentally mental, a position to be critically examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Idealism
Russell examines and critiques the doctrine of idealism, particularly as advocated by Bishop Berkeley. He distinguishes between sense-data and physical objects, argues that Berkeley's central fallacy lies in confusing the act of apprehension with the object apprehended, and defends the possibility of knowledge of things that are not mental.
Chapter 6
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description
This chapter distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of things: knowledge by acquaintance, which is direct awareness without inference, and knowledge by description, which involves knowledge of truths and refers to objects through descriptions. It explores acquaintance with sense-data, memory, introspection, and universals, and argues that all knowledge rests on acquaintance. Physical objects and other minds are known only by description.
Chapter 7
On Induction
Russell examines the principle of induction, questioning whether past uniformities provide any rational ground for expecting future occurrences. He distinguishes between the instinctive formation of expectations based on habit and the logical justification for such expectations, concluding that induction can only yield probability, not certainty.
Chapter 8
VII: On Our Knowledge of General Principles
This chapter examines the nature and justification of general principles, particularly logical and a priori principles, which cannot be proved by experience but are necessary for inference and knowledge. It discusses the self-evidence of logical principles like the law of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, and contrasts empiricist and rationalist views, concluding that while all knowledge is elicited by experience, some knowledge is a priori and not provable by experience alone.
Chapter 9
How a Priori Knowledge Is Possible
This chapter explores the nature and possibility of a priori knowledge, particularly in mathematics and logic. Russell critiques Kant's solution that such knowledge arises from the mind's contribution to experience, arguing that this view fails to account for the certainty and universality of a priori truths. He proposes that a priori knowledge concerns entities like relations, which exist in a non-mental, non-physical world.
Chapter 10
IX: The World of Universals
Russell introduces the concept of universals, entities that are not physical, mental, or sense-data, and traces the idea back to Plato's theory of forms. He argues that universals such as relations and qualities are timeless, subsist independently of thought, and are necessary for all truths and knowledge. The chapter defends the reality of universals against empiricist objections, particularly those of Berkeley and Hume, and distinguishes between the world of being (universals) and the world of existence (particulars).
Chapter 11
X: On Our Knowledge of Universals
This chapter explores the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, focusing on universals. It argues that a priori knowledge deals exclusively with relations of universals, and that such knowledge does not depend on experience of particular instances. The chapter also discusses how we become acquainted with sensible qualities, relations, and resemblance, and clarifies that empirical generalizations require experiential evidence while a priori propositions do not.
Chapter 12
On Intuitive Knowledge
Russell examines the nature of self-evident truths, distinguishing between general principles (like logic and induction) and truths of perception. He argues that all knowledge ultimately rests on self-evident propositions that cannot be proven, and explores the degrees of self-evidence, particularly in memory and perception, noting that self-evidence varies in intensity and that the highest degree provides an infallible guarantee of truth.
Chapter 13
XII: Truth and Falsehood
This chapter explores the nature of truth and falsehood, distinguishing the question of what truth is from how we know whether a belief is true. Russell argues that truth consists in a correspondence between belief and fact, rejecting the coherence theory of truth due to its reliance on the law of contradiction and the possibility of multiple coherent systems. He emphasizes that truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs dependent on their relation to external facts, not on intrinsic qualities of the beliefs themselves. The chapter uses the example of Othello's false belief about Desdemona and Cassio to illustrate that belief cannot be a relation to a single object, as that would preclude falsehood.
Chapter 14
XIII: Knowledge, Error, and Probable Opinion
This chapter examines the nature of knowledge, distinguishing it from mere true belief. It explores derivative knowledge (based on intuitive premises) and intuitive knowledge, introduces the concept of self-evidence in two forms (absolute and partial), and discusses how error is possible even with self-evident truths. The chapter concludes that all knowledge of truths is subject to some degree of doubt.
Chapter 15
XIV: The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge
Russell argues that philosophy cannot provide a priori knowledge of the universe as a whole, contrary to the claims of metaphysicians like Hegel. He contends that philosophical knowledge is not fundamentally different from scientific knowledge, and that the essence of philosophy is criticism—examining the principles of science and daily life. He rejects absolute skepticism and Hegelian holism, advocating instead for a piecemeal, empirical approach to knowledge.
Chapter 16
XV: The Value of Philosophy
Russell concludes his review of philosophy by defending its value against practical and scientific criticisms. He argues that philosophy's worth lies not in providing definite answers, but in the questions themselves, which enlarge our conception of possibility, enrich intellectual imagination, and diminish dogmatic certainty. Through impartial contemplation, philosophy frees the mind from narrow personal interests, making us 'citizens of the universe' and achieving the highest good.
Chapter 17
Endnotes
This chapter contains endnotes referencing A. N. Whitehead's Introduction to Mathematics and clarifying Kant's concept of the 'thing in itself' as the cause of sensations, noting that Kant held categories inapplicable to it.
Chapter 18
Bibliographical Note
This brief chapter provides a list of recommended primary works by major philosophers for students seeking an elementary knowledge of philosophy, emphasizing the value of reading original texts over handbooks.
