The Problems of Philosophy · Chapter
III: The Nature of Matter explained
This chapter examines the nature of the physical world that persists independently of our perceptions.
What happens
This chapter examines the nature of the physical world that persists independently of our perceptions. It begins by reaffirming the rational belief that sense-data are signs of an external reality, then turns to physical science's account of matter as something defined solely by position and motion in a neutral, public space. The chapter argues that the intrinsic qualities of physical objects—such as color, sound, and even the space we directly experience—are not part of the scientific world; rather, they are effects of wave-motions and other processes on our senses. It concludes by considering the idealist view that matter is fundamentally mental, a position to be critically examined in the next chapter.
Themes in this chapter
Appearance vs. Reality
The chapter systematically distinguishes between the sense-data we directly experience (appearances) and the physical objects that cause them (reality), arguing that the intrinsic nature of matter remains unknown.
The Existence of Matter
The chapter assumes the rational belief in an independent material world and explores its nature, while also addressing idealist objections to its existence.
Characters to notice
- Leibniz
Mentioned as holding that matter consists of more or less rudimentary minds.
- Bishop Berkeley
Mentioned as contending that matter is ideas in the minds of perceivers.
Key passages
“Physical science, more or less unconsciously, has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced to motions.”
Science has come to assume that everything in nature can be explained in terms of motion.
Summarizes the scientific reduction of phenomena to wave-motions and positions.
“The only properties which science assigns to it are position in space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion.”
Science only attributes to matter location and the ability to move according to physical laws.
Highlights the minimal properties science ascribes to matter.
“Thus we find that, although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature.”
While we can know how physical objects relate to each other through sense-data, we cannot know what they are in themselves.
Captures the central epistemological conclusion of the chapter.