The Problems of Philosophy · Chapter
Idealism explained
Russell examines and critiques the doctrine of idealism, particularly as advocated by Bishop Berkeley.
What happens
Russell examines and critiques the doctrine of idealism, particularly as advocated by Bishop Berkeley. He distinguishes between sense-data and physical objects, argues that Berkeley's central fallacy lies in confusing the act of apprehension with the object apprehended, and defends the possibility of knowledge of things that are not mental.
Themes in this chapter
Appearance vs. Reality
Russell distinguishes between sense-data (appearances) and physical objects (reality), and critiques Berkeley's claim that the latter are mental.
Truth and Falsehood
The chapter examines the validity of Berkeley's arguments and the distinction between knowledge of truths and knowledge by acquaintance.
The Value of Philosophy
Russell argues that even strange philosophical doctrines like idealism should not be dismissed without examination, highlighting the importance of critical inquiry.
Characters to notice
- Bishop Berkeley
Berkeley's idealism is the primary subject of the chapter; Russell analyzes his argument that to be is to be perceived and critiques the confusion between act and object.
- Descartes
Mentioned in the context of the method of systematic doubt and the question of certainty, though not central to this chapter.
Key passages
“The word 'idealism' is used by different philosophers in somewhat different senses. We shall understand by it the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental.”
Idealism, as Russell defines it, is the view that everything that exists—or at least everything we can know to exist—is in some way mental.
Russell sets up the definition of idealism that he will critique in the chapter.
“Berkeley's view, that obviously the colour must be in the mind, seems to depend for its plausibility upon confusing the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension.”
Berkeley's argument that color is mental relies on mistakenly conflating the object we perceive with the act of perceiving it.
This is Russell's central critique of Berkeley's idealism.