Nicomachean Ethics · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle.
Chapter 1
Editor's Note
This note explains that the original margin numbers used for line references have been omitted in the ebook format, and some of Peters' notes have been rewritten accordingly.
Chapter 2
Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics explores the nature of the highest good for human beings, arguing that happiness (eudaimonia) is the ultimate end of human action, achieved through a life of virtue in accordance with reason. The work examines moral and intellectual virtues, the doctrine of the mean, justice, friendship, and the contemplative life, establishing a framework for ethical conduct and human flourishing.
Chapter 3
Book I
Aristotle begins his inquiry into the highest good, which he identifies as happiness (eudaimonia). He argues that happiness is the final, self-sufficient end of all human action and defines it as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. He introduces the function argument, concluding that the good of man is the exercise of his rational faculties in accordance with excellence. He distinguishes parts of the soul and discusses the role of virtue, the necessity of a complete life, and the influence of fortune, referencing Solon and Priam.
Chapter 4
The End
This chapter concludes the inquiry into happiness by defining it as an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue, and transitions to an examination of virtue itself. It distinguishes the rational and irrational parts of the soul, introduces the function argument to establish man's proper end, and critiques popular conceptions of the good (pleasure, honor, wealth) as well as the Platonic theory of a universal good.
Chapter 5
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 6
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 7
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 8
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 9
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 10
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 11
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 12
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 13
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 14
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 15
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 16
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 17
Chapter XIII: The Varieties of Friendship and the Nature of Accusations
Aristotle examines the three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, pleasure, and utility—and explores how accusations and reproaches arise primarily in friendships motivated by profit. He distinguishes between friendships grounded in disposition versus those based on contract, and discusses the proper measure of requital in different types of friendships.
Chapter 18
Book II
Aristotle distinguishes moral virtue from intellectual virtue, arguing that moral virtue is acquired through habit and practice rather than nature. He emphasizes that virtues are developed by performing virtuous acts, and that virtue involves finding the mean between excess and deficiency in actions and passions. The chapter also discusses the role of pleasure and pain in moral development, and provides a preliminary table of specific virtues and their corresponding vices.
Chapter 19
Moral Virtue
This chapter defines moral virtue as a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, determined by reason. It emphasizes that virtue is acquired through habit and practice, not by nature, and that it is concerned with pleasures and pains. The chapter also distinguishes moral virtue from intellectual virtue, and discusses the importance of acting with knowledge, choice, and a stable character.
Chapter 20
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 21
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 22
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 23
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 24
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 25
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 26
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 27
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 28
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 29
Book III: Virtue, Choice, and the Voluntary Nature of Character
This chapter explores the voluntary nature of virtue and vice, arguing that individuals are responsible for their character through repeated actions. It examines the role of pleasure and pain in moral choice, the importance of the good man as a standard of truth, and the distinction between wishing for ends and deliberating about means. The chapter then analyzes specific virtues, beginning with courage—defined as the mean with respect to fear and confidence, especially in the face of death in war—and temperance, which concerns bodily pleasures.
Chapter 30
The Will
This chapter explores the nature of voluntary and involuntary actions, arguing that virtue and vice are both voluntary because individuals are responsible for their character and choices. It discusses the role of compulsion, ignorance, and deliberation in moral responsibility, emphasizing that the good man correctly discerns the true end, while pleasure often misleads people. The chapter also examines mixed actions, such as those done under duress, and concludes that habits are formed through repeated acts, making character a matter of personal responsibility.
Chapter 31
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 32
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 33
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 34
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 35
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 36
The Several Moral Virtues and Vices
This chapter examines specific moral virtues and vices, focusing on courage and temperance as means between extremes. Courage is defined as moderation regarding fear and confidence, especially in the face of noble death in war, while temperance concerns bodily pleasures, particularly those of touch and taste. The chapter also discusses other forms of courage, such as political courage driven by honor or compulsion.
Chapter 37
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 38
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 39
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 40
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 41
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 42
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 43
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 44
Book IV: The Several Moral Virtues and Vices Continued
This book examines specific moral virtues, focusing on liberality (moderation in wealth) and high-mindedness (greatness of soul). Liberality is defined as the mean in giving and taking wealth, with the liberal man giving rightly for the sake of the noble. High-mindedness is presented as the crown of virtues, involving a correct claim to great honor based on true worth and complete virtue, while avoiding the vices of vanity and small-mindedness.
Chapter 45
The Several Moral Virtues and Vices—Continued
This chapter continues the examination of moral virtues and vices, focusing on high-mindedness (greatness of soul) as a crowning virtue that requires the union of all virtues. It discusses the mean in relation to honour, the extremes of vanity and little-mindedness, and the virtue of gentleness as moderation in anger. The chapter also explores the proper attitude towards honour, wealth, power, and the behaviour of the high-minded man in conferring benefits and facing dangers.
Chapter 46
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 47
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 48
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 49
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 50
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 51
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 52
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 53
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 54
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 55
Book V: Justice and Injustice
Aristotle distinguishes between justice as complete virtue (lawfulness) and justice as a particular virtue (fairness). He explores how justice relates to the common good, the mean, and the various forms of injustice, including taking more than one's share. The chapter also touches on the relationship between justice and other virtues, and the idea of justice within the individual soul.
Chapter 56
Justice
This chapter explores the nature of justice and injustice, distinguishing between justice as complete virtue (lawfulness) and justice as a particular virtue (fairness). It examines how justice relates to the law, the common good, and equity, and discusses the equitable as a correction of legal justice where the law's generality fails.
Chapter 57
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 58
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 59
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 60
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 61
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 62
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 63
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 64
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 65
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 66
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 67
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 68
Book VI: Intellectual Virtues and the Unity of Prudence and Moral Virtue
Aristotle distinguishes between the intellectual virtues, focusing on prudence (practical wisdom) and wisdom (theoretical wisdom). He argues that prudence is not merely cleverness but requires moral virtue to discern the true end of action. Prudence and moral virtue are interdependent: one cannot be fully good without prudence, nor prudent without moral virtue. He also discusses the relationship between natural virtue and fully developed virtue, the role of reason in moral action, and the superiority of wisdom over prudence, as wisdom contemplates the highest, divine objects.
Chapter 69
The Intellectual Virtues
This chapter explores the intellectual virtues, distinguishing prudence (practical wisdom) from wisdom and science. It argues that prudence is necessary for moral virtue, as it enables right means to noble ends, and that full virtue requires prudence. The chapter also discusses cleverness, natural versus developed virtue, and the relationship between prudence and the other intellectual faculties.
Chapter 70
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 71
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 72
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 73
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 74
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 75
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 76
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 77
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 78
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 79
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 80
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 81
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 82
Chapter XIII: The Varieties of Friendship and the Nature of Accusations
Aristotle examines the three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, pleasure, and utility—and explores how accusations and reproaches arise primarily in friendships motivated by profit. He distinguishes between friendships grounded in disposition versus those based on contract, and discusses the proper measure of requital in different types of friendships.
Chapter 83
Book VII
Aristotle defends pleasure as a good and argues that unimpeded activity of a natural state is pleasure, which is essential to happiness. He refutes objections that pleasure is not good, distinguishes between necessary and excessive pleasures, and explains why bodily pleasures are often mistakenly considered the only pleasures.
Chapter 84
Characters Other Than Virtue and Vice
This chapter examines moral character types beyond virtue and vice, including continence, incontinence, softness, hardiness, and brutality. It distinguishes the continent man (who holds to reason despite bad desires) from the incontinent man (who knows the right but is swayed by passion), and contrasts both with the profligate and the temperate. The discussion addresses Socratic objections to incontinence, the role of knowledge and ignorance, and the relation of these states to prudence and moral character.
Chapter 85
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 86
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 87
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 88
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 89
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 90
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 91
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 92
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 93
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 94
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 95
Of Pleasure
Aristotle examines the nature of pleasure and pain, arguing that pleasure is not merely a process or transition but an unimpeded activity of faculties in their natural state. He refutes objections that pleasure is not good, distinguishes between necessary and excessive pleasures, and connects pleasure to happiness and the good life.
Chapter 96
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 97
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 98
Chapter XIII: The Varieties of Friendship and the Nature of Accusations
Aristotle examines the three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, pleasure, and utility—and explores how accusations and reproaches arise primarily in friendships motivated by profit. He distinguishes between friendships grounded in disposition versus those based on contract, and discusses the proper measure of requital in different types of friendships.
Chapter 99
XIV
This chapter examines quarrels in unequal friendships, where each party claims a larger share based on different criteria—the superior demands honor, the needy demands profit. It argues that both claims are valid but must be balanced proportionally, and extends this principle to political constitutions and familial obligations, particularly the debt of honor owed to parents and gods.
Chapter 100
Book VIII: Friendship or Love
Aristotle introduces friendship as a virtue or something that implies virtue, essential for life at all ages and in all circumstances. He explores the nature of the lovable (good, pleasant, useful), distinguishes between friendships of utility, pleasure, and virtue, and examines friendships based on equality and inequality (e.g., parent-child, ruler-subject). He also connects friendship to political constitutions, arguing that friendship holds states together and that justice and friendship are closely linked.
Chapter 101
Friendship or Love
This chapter explores the nature of friendship, distinguishing between friendships of utility, pleasure, and virtue, and examining how equality and inequality shape different types of relationships, including those between parents and children, brothers, spouses, and citizens under various political constitutions. It emphasizes that true friendship is based on virtue, habit, and mutual goodwill, and that it requires a certain equality or proportional reciprocity to endure.
Chapter 102
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 103
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 104
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 105
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 106
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 107
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 108
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 109
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 110
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 111
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 112
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 113
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 114
Chapter XIII: The Varieties of Friendship and the Nature of Accusations
Aristotle examines the three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, pleasure, and utility—and explores how accusations and reproaches arise primarily in friendships motivated by profit. He distinguishes between friendships grounded in disposition versus those based on contract, and discusses the proper measure of requital in different types of friendships.
Chapter 115
XIV
This chapter examines quarrels in unequal friendships, where each party claims a larger share based on different criteria—the superior demands honor, the needy demands profit. It argues that both claims are valid but must be balanced proportionally, and extends this principle to political constitutions and familial obligations, particularly the debt of honor owed to parents and gods.
Chapter 116
Book IX: Friendship, Self-Love, and the Happy Life
Aristotle argues that the happy man does need friends, contrary to the view that the self-sufficient have no need of them. He explains that happiness is an activity, not a static possession, and that friends provide the opportunity to contemplate good actions, share in virtuous activity, and practice virtue together. He also explores the proper form of self-love, where the good man prioritizes noble actions and benefits his friends and community, even at personal cost, while the bad man's self-love is harmful.
Chapter 117
Friendship or Love—Continued
This chapter continues the examination of friendship, arguing that the happy or blessed man does indeed need friends. It refutes the notion that self-sufficiency eliminates the need for friends, emphasizing that happiness is an ongoing activity, not a static possession. The good man finds pleasure in contemplating the virtuous actions of his friends, who serve as 'another self.' Living together with friends enhances virtuous activity and provides continuous practice in virtue. The chapter also explores self-love in the good man, who prioritizes the noble over personal gain, even sacrificing wealth, honor, or life for friends and country. It concludes that friendship is essential for a complete human life, as man is naturally social and finds his greatest fulfillment in shared existence with good companions.
Chapter 118
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 119
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 120
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 121
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 122
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 123
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 124
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 125
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 126
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 127
On the Number of Friends
Aristotle examines the question of how many friends one should have, arguing that while it is possible to have many friends of utility or pleasure, true friendship based on virtue is limited to a few, as it requires living together, mutual affection, and shared sympathy.
Chapter 128
XI
Aristotle examines whether friends are needed more in prosperity or adversity, concluding that while adversity makes the need for useful friends more pressing, friendship is nobler in prosperity where we seek good men to benefit. He discusses the complex effects of friends' presence in misfortune—sweet yet painful if they grieve—and advises summoning friends readily in their need but being slow to burden them with one's own troubles.
Chapter 129
XII
This chapter explores the nature of friendship as a form of community, emphasizing that friends desire to live together and share in activities that define their existence. It contrasts the friendships of good and bad people, noting that bad friendships reinforce vice while good friendships promote virtue through mutual correction and emulation.
Chapter 130
Book X: Pleasure and the Contemplative Life
Aristotle examines the nature of pleasure, arguing against those who claim it is wholly bad and against Eudoxus who identifies it with the good. He distinguishes between pleasures that hinder virtuous activity and those that complete it. He then argues that happiness (eudaimonia) is activity in accordance with virtue, and the highest happiness is the contemplative life of the intellect, which is most continuous, self-sufficient, and divine. Moral virtue yields a secondary form of happiness, suited to our composite human nature.
Chapter 131
Pleasure
Aristotle examines the nature of pleasure, its relationship to the good, and its role in moral education. He critiques the view of Eudoxus that pleasure is the good, and argues that while pleasure is desirable, not all pleasures are good—they differ in kind and source. He also distinguishes pleasure from motion, asserting that pleasure is complete at any moment and not a process of replenishment.
Chapter 132
I
Aristotle argues that pleasure is intimately connected with human nature and essential for moral education, as we steer the young by pleasure and pain. He critiques extreme views—that pleasure is the good or that it is wholly bad—and insists that true statements about pleasure are most useful for both theory and practice, since they harmonize with facts and guide conduct.
Chapter 133
Chapter II: Eudoxus on Pleasure as the Good
This chapter examines Eudoxus's arguments that pleasure is the highest good, based on universal desire for it, its desirability for its own sake, and the contrast with pain. It also presents Plato's counterargument that pleasure cannot be the good because it is improved by addition of wisdom, and defends Eudoxus against critics who dismiss universal desire or misuse the argument from opposites.
Chapter 134
Chapter III
Aristotle defends pleasure against objections that it is not a good, arguing that pleasure is not a quality or motion, and that not all pleasures are desirable; some differ in kind or source, and the good includes things like virtue and knowledge even without pleasure.
Chapter 135
Chapter IV: The Nature of Pleasure
Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a motion or a process of coming into being, but a complete, whole activity that perfects the exercise of a faculty. He distinguishes pleasure from motion by noting that pleasure is complete at any moment, whereas motion requires time and has parts. Pleasure accompanies the best exercise of sense or intellect when both the faculty and its object are in their finest condition, and it completes life itself, which is desirable.
Chapter 136
Chapter V: Pleasures, Activities, and the Good Man
Aristotle argues that pleasures differ in kind according to the activities they complete, and that proper pleasures enhance their corresponding activities while alien pleasures impede them. He distinguishes between the pleasures of the intellect and those of the senses, asserting that the good man's judgment determines what is truly pleasant, and that only the pleasures accompanying the virtuous man's activities are fully human pleasures.
Chapter 137
Conclusion
Aristotle concludes his ethical inquiry by arguing that happiness is not a habit or amusement but the exercise of virtue, especially the highest virtue of contemplation or speculative reason. He contrasts the self-sufficient, leisurely, and intrinsically desirable life of contemplation with practical and political lives, which aim at ulterior ends. He also emphasizes the need for law and proper nurture to cultivate virtue, noting that while state regulation is ideal, individual guidance and knowledge of legislation can help educate others toward the good.
Chapter 138
Happiness as the Exercise of Virtue
Aristotle argues that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty but an exercise of virtue that is desirable in itself. He contrasts this with amusement, which is sought for recreation and not as an end. True happiness belongs to the perfect man who exercises virtue, not to those who pursue bodily pleasures or pastimes.
Chapter 139
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life as Perfect Happiness
Aristotle argues that perfect happiness consists in the exercise of the highest virtue, which is the activity of reason or contemplation. He contrasts the speculative life with practical and political lives, emphasizing that contemplation is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity, and that it alone is desired for its own sake. He concludes that the life of reason is the best and happiest for man, as it realizes the divine element within human nature.
Chapter 140
Chapter VIII: Happiness as Contemplation
Aristotle argues that the life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary, human sense, while perfect happiness consists in contemplative activity akin to the divine. He contrasts the external goods needed for moral action with the self-sufficiency of contemplation, and concludes that the wise man, who cultivates reason, is happiest and most beloved by the gods.
Chapter 141
The Need for Law and Habit in Moral Education
Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of virtue is insufficient for making people good; practical habituation and legal compulsion are necessary, especially for the majority who are swayed by fear and pleasure. He emphasizes the role of law in nurturing virtue from youth and throughout life, and suggests that when the state neglects this, individuals should take responsibility for educating their own. The chapter concludes with a call to study legislation to complete the philosophy of human life.
Chapter 142
Endnotes
This chapter contains endnotes that provide commentary, textual clarifications, and cross-references for the main text of the Nicomachean Ethics. It discusses various topics such as justice, voluntary and involuntary action, intellectual virtues, pleasure, friendship, and equity, with references to earlier chapters and scholarly sources.
