Human Nature and Conduct · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey.
Chapter 1
Human Nature and Conduct
This introductory chapter establishes the foundation for a social psychology of conduct, arguing that habits are the primary units of moral and social behavior, shaped by social environments rather than fixed instincts. Dewey critiques traditional moral theories that separate reason from impulse, advocating for a view of freedom as intelligent deliberation within social contexts.
Chapter 2
Part I: The Place of Habit in Conduct
This chapter establishes habit as the fundamental unit of conduct, arguing that habits are not mere mechanical repetitions but active, social functions that constitute the self and shape moral character. Dewey critiques traditional dualisms that separate mind from body, will from habit, and individual from environment, emphasizing that habits are formed through interaction with social conditions and are the primary means by which character and will are expressed.
Chapter 3
Habits as Social Functions
Dewey argues that habits are not merely individual possessions but social functions that incorporate and depend upon the environment. He compares habits to physiological functions and arts, emphasizing that they require cooperation between organism and surroundings. Moral judgments, blame, and praise are themselves social conditions that shape character. True moral change requires modifying objective conditions, not just inner sentiments. Dewey critiques the isolation of the self from its environment and insists that conduct is always shared, with responsibility extending to the social factors that produce habits.
Chapter 4
Habits and Will
This chapter argues that habits are not mere mechanical repetitions but active, projective forces that constitute the self and are the true meaning of will. Dewey distinguishes habits as acquired predispositions that organize minor elements of action, emphasizing their dynamic, operative quality. He critiques the tendency to limit habit to routine and the separation of moral from non-moral acts, showing that all habits have propulsive power and form our effective desires and capacities. The chapter also explores the relationship between habits and ideas, noting that good habits are necessary for knowing and executing the good, and that means and ends are continuous, with ends being remote acts in a series.
Chapter 5
III: Character and Conduct
This chapter explores the unity of character and conduct, arguing that will is not separate from action but consists of habits that project into consequences. Dewey critiques both purely internal theories of virtue and purely consequentialist theories, showing they share a mistaken separation of motive from act. He develops a naturalistic account of objectivity in morals, where subjective ideals arise when habits persist in a changed environment, serving as transitional guides for reorganizing conditions. The chapter emphasizes that moral deliberation is experimental and that ideals must be tested by their consequences, akin to scientific inquiry.
Chapter 6
Custom and Habit
Dewey argues that individual habits are largely formed by prior customs and social institutions, not the reverse. He critiques the dualism between habit and thought, showing how their separation leads to routine without intelligence and thought without practical effect. He also examines Bergson's vitalism as a sanction of this dualism, and warns against treating habit as mere mechanical repetition.
Chapter 7
Custom and Morality
Dewey argues that morals are fundamentally rooted in customs and collective habits, which provide the standards for personal conduct. He critiques the moral theorist's illusion that modern society is an exception, noting that while contemporary mobility offers a range of custom-patterns, habits still shape moral expectations and generate emotional and reflective responses when disrupted. Dewey distinguishes between routine, unintelligent habit and intelligent habit or art, and traces the emergence of reflective intelligence from social customs, using the Greeks as an example. He addresses objections that deriving morals from custom evacuates authority, drawing an analogy with language to show that institutions generate new demands and standards. The chapter concludes by highlighting the conflict between customs tied to the past and emotions oriented toward the future, with intelligence as the potential mediator.
Chapter 8
Habit and Social Psychology
Dewey argues that a psychology based on habit is inherently social and objective, rejecting the traditional notion of an independent, separate mind. He contends that individuality arises from the conflict of habits and impulses, which leads to the reconstruction of customs. The chapter critiques both orthodox psychology and clinical psychology for retaining the false premise of a separate psychic realm, and emphasizes that mind as individual is a product of social conditions and habitual adjustment.
Chapter 9
Part II: The Place of Impulse in Conduct
This chapter examines the role of impulse in human conduct, arguing that while habits form the stable foundation of behavior, impulse serves as the dynamic intermediary that disrupts old habits and initiates change. Dewey critiques the classification of separate instincts and emphasizes the plasticity of impulse, especially in youth, as a source of moral and social transformation.
Chapter 10
I: Impulses and Change of Habit
Dewey argues that while impulses are temporally first in individual life, they are secondary in significance to acquired habits, which are shaped by social conditions. Impulses gain meaning only through interaction with a matured social medium, and the diversity of customs and institutions cannot be explained by a universal stock of instincts alone. Instead, impulses serve as pivots for reorganizing habits and are crucial for understanding social change and reform.
Chapter 11
Plasticity of Impulse
Dewey examines the tension between rigid adult habits and the plasticity of youthful impulse, arguing that society tames children's originality through enforced conformity. He critiques the oscillation between strict custom and wild impulse in both savage and civilized life, and advocates for utilizing impulse as a continuous agent of habit reorganization to prevent social stagnation and enable intelligent growth.
Chapter 12
III: Changing Human Nature
Dewey examines the debate between radical reformers, who believe human nature is infinitely malleable through education and habit, and conservatives, who argue that innate instincts make human nature unchangeable. He argues that both sides are mistaken: customs and habits are actually more resistant to change than instincts, which are highly modifiable. Dewey uses historical examples, such as Aristotle's defense of slavery, to show that what is often attributed to fixed human nature is actually the product of social custom. He concludes that social institutions shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits, and that motives are not pre-existing forces but judgments made in light of consequences.
Chapter 13
Impulse and Conflict of Habits
Dewey examines the persistence of harmful institutions like war and economic exploitation, arguing that the problem lies not in an unalterable human nature but in the inertia of established habits. He explores the vicious circle where habits direct impulses yet can only be changed by redirecting impulses, and proposes education of the young as the chief means of gradual, intelligent social reform. He also notes that conflicts among incompatible habits in a complex culture can release impulse for constructive change, rejecting both conservative appeals to fixed tradition and revolutionary upheaval.
Chapter 14
V: Classification of Instincts
Dewey critiques the scientific and practical fallacy of reducing human nature to a fixed set of instincts, arguing that such classifications are artificial and hinder genuine understanding and social control. He emphasizes that impulses are numerous and fluid, shaped by social conditions, and that true moral and social progress requires detailed empirical study of how environments select and coordinate native activities.
Chapter 15
No Separate Instincts
Dewey argues that instincts are not fixed, separate forces but are shaped by social context and environment. He uses examples of anger, fear, hunger, and sex to show that the quality and meaning of an impulse vary with its consequences and surroundings. He also discusses the moral function of play and art as necessary outlets for surplus impulses, countering both Puritanical work-ethic and the view that art is morally indifferent.
Chapter 16
Impulse and Thought
This chapter explores the intermediary role of impulse in conduct, arguing that morality involves using impulse to refresh and renew habits rather than suppressing it or letting it run wild. It critiques the oscillation between rigid custom and unrestrained impulse, and emphasizes that intelligence—through observation, reflection, and invention—must guide impulse to transform habits into vital arts.
Chapter 17
Part III: The Place of Intelligence in Conduct
This chapter examines the role of intelligence in moral conduct, arguing that intelligence is not a separate faculty but an active, deliberative function that reorganizes habits and impulses in light of consequences. Dewey critiques traditional moral theories that separate reason from desire, and emphasizes that moral deliberation is a process of imaginative rehearsal and prospective judgment.
Chapter 18
Habit and Intelligence
Dewey examines the interplay between habit and intelligence, arguing that habits both constrain and enable thought. He critiques the philosophical fallacy of treating specific ends as universal ideals, and asserts that concrete habits—not a separate mind or consciousness—are the true agents of perception, judgment, and reasoning. Intelligence emerges from the delicate combination of habit and impulse, especially during moments of disruption and reorganization.
Chapter 19
The Psychology of Thinking
Dewey argues that moral knowledge is not derived from a separate, non-natural faculty like conscience or pure reason, but emerges from the interplay of habit and impulse in response to problematic situations. Thinking arises when habitual action is blocked, releasing impulse that drives inquiry, observation, and planning. Knowledge is thus a natural, acquired result of biological and social processes, continuous with other forms of conduct.
Chapter 20
III: The Nature of Deliberation
Dewey argues that deliberation is not a conflict between reason and desire, but a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of competing habits and impulses. Reason is the harmonious organization of diverse dispositions, not an antecedent force. Deliberation is rational when it flexibly remakes aims and habits, and irrational when biased by fixed ends.
Chapter 21
Deliberation and Calculation
Dewey critiques the utilitarian view of deliberation as a calculative accounting of future pleasures and pains, arguing instead that deliberation is a process of resolving present conflicts in activity by imaginatively testing possible courses of action. He emphasizes that the function of deliberation is to restore continuity and harmony to conduct, and that the true moral task is to cultivate habits and impulses that make us sensitive and impartial in perceiving the meaning of our acts.
Chapter 22
The Uniqueness of Good
Dewey argues that moral good is not a fixed quantity or a matter of calculating future pleasures and pains, as utilitarianism suggests. Instead, good is experienced in the present as the unified release of action when conflicting habits and impulses are harmonized through intelligent deliberation. Each genuine good is unique, never repeating itself, because it resolves a distinctive and unrepeatable conflict. Dewey critiques utilitarianism for reducing deliberation to a calculus of quantities, ignoring the qualitative differences that define serious moral choices—choices that shape the kind of person one becomes and the kind of world one makes. He insists that the true office of reflection is not to calculate amounts of pleasure but to discover the meaning of competing tendencies and to coordinate them into a coherent course of action.
Chapter 23
The Nature of Aims
Dewey argues that ends are not fixed goals beyond action but are ends-in-view that arise within activity as foreseen consequences. He critiques the Aristotelian tradition of final ends and the utilitarian notion of pleasure as an external aim, asserting that genuine aims emerge from the study of natural causation and are transformed from mere fancies into working ends through intelligent deliberation. The chapter emphasizes that fixed ends and principles are props for a false sense of certainty, and that true moral progress requires integrating scientific inquiry into the formation of ideals.
Chapter 24
The Nature of Principles
Dewey argues that moral principles are not fixed, universal rules but rather intellectual habits—generalized tools for inquiry and foresight that must be tested and revised in light of new experience. He critiques the quest for immutable moral laws as a form of dogmatic authority, contrasting it with the need for flexible, experimental principles that adapt to changing social conditions. Dewey uses Kant's categorical imperative as a case study to show that even a supposedly a priori principle, when applied, necessarily involves consideration of consequences, thereby revealing the true function of reason as impartial, broad deliberation.
Chapter 25
Desire and Intelligence
Dewey critiques the opposition between desire and intelligence, arguing that desire is not merely emotional but involves thought in its forward urge to overcome obstacles. He rejects the view that intellect is cold and unproductive, insisting that genuine desire includes an end-in-view that requires intelligent deliberation. He warns against separating warm emotion from cool intelligence, calling this division the great moral tragedy, and advocates for integrating impulse, habit, and thought to transform conduct.
Chapter 26
The Present and Future
Dewey argues against the subordination of present activity to future ends, insisting that happiness, reasonableness, and virtue are intrinsic to present action. He critiques the separation of means from ends, especially in economic life, where production is severed from consumption, leading to drudgery, class division, and a loss of meaning. True intelligence involves using foresight to enrich the present, not to sacrifice it for a remote goal.
Chapter 27
Part IV: Conclusion
Dewey concludes by arguing that dividing conduct into separate categories like habit, impulse, and intelligence is artificial, as each topic inevitably leads into the others. He synthesizes the discussion by reflecting on conduct as an integrated whole.
Chapter 28
The Good of Activity
Dewey argues that morals are coextensive with all deliberate action involving choice between alternatives, and that moral judgment is experimental and ongoing rather than fixed. He critiques traditional moral theories that separate morality from everyday life and subordinate present activity to remote ends. Instead, he presents morality as growth in meaning through present action, where progress is a continuous reconstruction of experience, not approximation to a static ideal.
Chapter 29
Morals Are Human
Dewey argues that morals are fundamentally empirical and human, rooted in concrete facts of human nature and environment rather than supernatural commands or abstract ideals. He critiques both the error of severing morals from actual facts and the opposite error of treating natural laws as moral norms, as seen in Stoicism, deism, and Spencer's evolutionary philosophy. Dewey emphasizes that knowledge of facts is not an end but a tool for intelligent action, and that conflict, far from being a final norm, serves as a stimulus for thought and deliberate change. He warns against idealizing conflict, as in Marx's class struggle or Darwinian competition, and calls for using facts to modify conditions rather than acquiescing to them.
Chapter 30
III: What Is Freedom?
Dewey argues that freedom is not a metaphysical property of the will but a practical achievement grounded in intelligent deliberation and the foresight of consequences. He identifies three components of freedom: efficiency in action, capacity for novelty and variation, and the power of desire and choice to influence events. Freedom is actualized when we use knowledge of natural laws and facts to foresee possibilities and guide present activity, rather than submitting to necessity or fleeing to an ideal realm. Dewey criticizes doctrines of arbitrary free will and laissez-faire individualism, emphasizing that genuine freedom depends on objective conditions and the intelligent adaptation of environment to human wants.
Chapter 31
Morality Is Social
Dewey argues that morality is inherently social, rooted in the interactions and pressures of communal life rather than in abstract principles or individual conscience. He critiques the tendency to equate moral judgment with praise and blame, which obscures the need for objective analysis of conduct. He emphasizes that all actions, including selfish ones, are shaped by social conditions, and that moral improvement requires attention to social environments and education, not mere appeals to an inner conscience.
Chapter 32
Endnotes
The endnotes provide references and commentary on topics such as habit, impulse, mob psychology, instinct, and moral theory, citing works by Alexander, Westermarck, Mitchell, Stuart, Moore, and Williams.
