Human Nature and Conduct · Chapter
III: Character and Conduct explained
This chapter explores the unity of character and conduct, arguing that will is not separate from action but consists of habits that project into consequences.
What happens
This chapter explores the unity of character and conduct, arguing that will is not separate from action but consists of habits that project into consequences. Dewey critiques both purely internal theories of virtue and purely consequentialist theories, showing they share a mistaken separation of motive from act. He develops a naturalistic account of objectivity in morals, where subjective ideals arise when habits persist in a changed environment, serving as transitional guides for reorganizing conditions. The chapter emphasizes that moral deliberation is experimental and that ideals must be tested by their consequences, akin to scientific inquiry.
Themes in this chapter
Habit and Custom as the Foundation of Conduct
Dewey argues that will is constituted by habits, which incorporate the environment and project into consequences, making habit the core of character and conduct.
Freedom as Intelligent Deliberation, Not Arbitrary Choice
The chapter emphasizes that moral deliberation involves experimental modification of habits in response to changing conditions, not arbitrary choice or fixed ideals.
Critique of Traditional Morality and Dualisms
Dewey criticizes the separation of motive and act, inner and outer, subjective and objective, arguing that these dualisms stem from ignoring the projective force of habit.
Characters to notice
- Kant
Cited as an example of a philosopher who excluded consequences from moral value yet assumed a society of good will would produce peace and cooperation, illustrating the inconsistency of separating will from deed.
- Plato
Mentioned for his view of ideal objects as patterns for reorganizing the actual scene, though criticized for converting a function of reorganization into a metaphysical reality.
Key passages
“no habit and no amount of habits can incorporate the entire environment within itself or themselves. There will always be disparity between them and the results actually attained. Hence the work of intelligence in observing consequences and in revising and readjusting habits, even the best of good habits, can never be foregone.”
No set of habits can fully account for the environment, so there is always a gap between habits and outcomes. Therefore, intelligence must continuously observe results and adjust habits, no matter how good they are.
Highlights the necessity of ongoing intelligent revision of habits due to environmental change.
“The utilitarian theory of equation of acts with consequences is as much a fiction of self-conceit as is the assumption of a fixed transcendental world wherein moral ideals are eternally and immutably real. Both of them deny in effect the relevancy of time, of change, to morals, while time is of the essence of the moral struggle.”
Both utilitarianism (which equates acts directly with consequences) and transcendental idealism (which posits fixed moral ideals) falsely ignore the role of time and change in morality, yet change is central to moral struggle.
Critique of both utilitarian and transcendental moral theories for neglecting temporal change.
“A habit impeded in overt operation continues nonetheless to operate. It manifests itself in desireful thought, that is in an ideal or imagined object which embodies within itself the force of a frustrated habit. There is therefore demand for a changed environment, a demand which can be achieved only by some modification and rearrangement of old habits.”
When a habit is blocked from outward expression, it still persists as desire and imagination, creating an ideal that drives the demand for environmental change, which requires modifying old habits.
Explains how frustrated habits generate ideals and motivate experimental change.
“The separation of motive from motive-force in action accounts both for the morbidities and futilities of the professionally good, and for the more or less subconscious contempt for morality entertained by men of a strong executive habit with their preference for 'getting things done.'”
Separating motive from its force in action leads to the ineffectiveness of those who focus only on inner virtue and the disdain of practical people who prioritize results over moral reflection.
Critique of the dualism between motive and action, linking it to practical and moral failures.
“In a changing world, old habits must perforce need modification, no matter how good they have been. Obviously any such change can be only experimental.”
Because the world changes, even good habits must be modified, and such modification is necessarily experimental.
Emphasizes the experimental nature of moral change in a dynamic environment.
