Human Nature and Conduct · Chapter
The Nature of Principles explained
Dewey argues that moral principles are not fixed, universal rules but rather intellectual habits—generalized tools for inquiry and foresight that must be tested and revised in light of new experience.
What happens
Dewey argues that moral principles are not fixed, universal rules but rather intellectual habits—generalized tools for inquiry and foresight that must be tested and revised in light of new experience. He critiques the quest for immutable moral laws as a form of dogmatic authority, contrasting it with the need for flexible, experimental principles that adapt to changing social conditions. Dewey uses Kant's categorical imperative as a case study to show that even a supposedly a priori principle, when applied, necessarily involves consideration of consequences, thereby revealing the true function of reason as impartial, broad deliberation.
Themes in this chapter
Habit and Custom as the Foundation of Conduct
Dewey defines principles as 'intellectually what a habit is for direct action,' linking the generalizing function of principles to the habitual grooves of conduct, and warning against rigid habits that masquerade as fixed rules.
Impulse and Intelligence as Agents of Change
Intelligence is portrayed as the capacity to foresee consequences and create new principles in response to novel situations, challenging the reliance on static, ready-made moral rules.
Critique of Traditional Morality and Dualisms
Dewey criticizes the traditional moral ambition for fixed, universal principles, the false dichotomy between absolute fixity and absolute looseness, and Kant's separation of reason from experience.
Characters to notice
- Kant
Dewey examines Kant's moral philosophy as a prime example of the error in seeking fixed, universal principles divorced from experience, showing that Kant's own method of universalization implicitly relies on surveying consequences.
- Bergson
Dewey briefly references Bergson to reject any dualism between fixed habit and pure flux, affirming instead a continuity of growth in moral principles.
Key passages
“a principle is intellectually what a habit is for direct action.”
A principle is the conscious, generalized counterpart of a habit, serving as a guide for thought just as habit guides action.
Dewey establishes the core analogy between habit and principle, emphasizing their functional continuity.
“Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification by the event; and the time honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics is only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority, or putting a new one upon the throne of the old.”
Moral principles are tools for investigation and prediction that must be tested by their actual consequences, not mathematical axioms; treating them as such merely props up dogmatic authority.
Dewey rejects the mathematical model of morality in favor of an experimental, fallibilist approach.
“To form the habit of asking how we should be willing to be treated in a similar case—which is what Kant's maxim amounts to—is to gain an ally for impartial and sincere deliberation and judgment.”
Kant's categorical imperative, when properly understood, is a practical habit that promotes impartiality and broad consideration of consequences, not a rejection of consequences.
Dewey reinterprets Kant's principle as a useful heuristic for deliberation, despite Kant's own intentions.