What Is Property? · Chapter
§ 1 Of the Moral Sense in Man and the Animals explained
Proudhon examines the moral sense in both humans and animals, arguing that the difference is one of degree rather than kind.
What happens
Proudhon examines the moral sense in both humans and animals, arguing that the difference is one of degree rather than kind. He contends that social instinct, sympathy, and even a rudimentary sense of justice exist in animals, and that human morality is rooted in the same animal instincts, elevated only by reason and reflection. He criticizes philosophers who claim a unique divine conscience for humans, and sets the stage for his inquiry into the laws of society and justice.
Themes in this chapter
Sociability and Community
Proudhon explores the social instinct shared by humans and animals, arguing that society is based on mutual association and sympathy.
Equality and Justice
The chapter questions the uniqueness of human justice, suggesting that moral sense is a matter of degree, not a divine gift exclusive to humans.
Characters to notice
- Pierre Joseph Proudhon
Author and narrator; presents the argument that human morality differs from animal morality only in degree, not in kind.
- Aristotle
Quoted for his definition of man as a 'rational and social animal' (ζωον λογικον και πολιτικον), which Proudhon praises.
- F. Cuvier
Mentioned as the savant who distinguished instinct from intelligence, resolving the controversy about the line between human and animal intelligence.
- M. Ch. Comte
Cited for his statement that 'Justice is public utility' and his Treatise on Legislation, though Proudhon notes the tautology.
Key passages
“Man is a rational and social animal — ζωον λογικον και πολιτικον — said Aristotle. This definition is worth more than all which have been given since.”
Proudhon endorses Aristotle's definition of man as a rational and social animal, considering it superior to later definitions.
Proudhon uses Aristotle to ground his argument that human society and morality are rooted in animal nature.
“The social instinct, in man and beast, exists to a greater or less degree — its nature is the same.”
The social instinct is fundamentally the same in humans and animals, differing only in intensity.
This is the core thesis of the chapter: the moral sense is not unique to humans.
“Our highest virtues appear, in the last analysis, as blind, impulsive instincts. What subjects for canonization and apotheosis!”
Even our most admired virtues are ultimately just instinctual drives, which is ironic given how we exalt them.
Proudhon sarcastically critiques the glorification of human morality.