Two Treatises of Government · Chapters
Chapters explained
Chapter companions for Two Treatises of Government by John Locke.
Chapter 1
Two Treatises of Government
Locke introduces his work as a two-part treatise: the first aims to detect and overthrow the false principles of Sir Robert Filmer and his followers, while the second presents an essay on the true origin, extent, and end of civil government.
Chapter 2
Book I: Of Government
Locke begins his critique of Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchal theory of absolute monarchy, arguing that Filmer's claims for Adam's sovereignty by creation, donation, and fatherhood are unfounded. He systematically dismantles Filmer's arguments, exposing the problem of identifying Adam's heir and laying the groundwork for his own political philosophy based on natural rights and consent.
Chapter 3
I
Locke summarizes his refutation of Filmer's patriarchal theory, concluding that Adam had no natural or granted sovereignty, that his heirs have no clear right, and that no certain heir can be identified. He argues that to avoid grounding government in mere force, a new origin of political power must be found, and he defines political power as the right to make laws for the preservation of property and the public good.
Chapter 4
II: Of Paternal and Regal Power
Locke examines Filmer's foundational claim that 'men are not naturally free' and his identification of paternal authority with royal authority. He criticizes Filmer for failing to define 'fatherly authority' and for assuming Adam's absolute sovereignty without proof. Locke argues that Filmer's entire case rests on unsubstantiated assertions and a selective reading of scripture, particularly the commandment 'Honour thy father,' which omits 'thy mother.' He concludes that Filmer's arguments for Adam's dominion—creation, dominion over Eve, and fatherhood—are insufficient to establish absolute monarchy.
Chapter 5
Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Creation
Locke critiques Sir Robert Filmer's argument that Adam's creation by God immediately granted him sovereignty over the world. He exposes logical inconsistencies in Filmer's claims, such as the confusion between Adam's creation and his fatherhood, the timing of God's donation, and the distinction between 'habit' and 'act.' Locke argues that creation alone does not confer political authority, and that natural freedom of mankind is compatible with belief in Adam's creation.
Chapter 6
Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty, by Donation, Gen. 1:28
Locke examines Filmer's argument that Adam received monarchical sovereignty over the world and private dominion over all creatures through God's donation in Genesis 1:28. Locke argues that the grant was made to all mankind in common, not to Adam alone, and that even if Adam had private property, it would not give him political power over others. He also critiques Filmer's attempt to deny the community granted to Noah and his sons in Genesis 9.
Chapter 7
Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty, by the Subjection of Eve
Locke critiques Filmer's claim that Genesis 3:16 grants Adam absolute monarchical power over Eve and all her descendants. He argues that the verse is a curse and punishment on Eve, not a grant of political authority, and that it only establishes conjugal, not political, subjection. Locke further challenges Filmer's interpretive methods, noting the absurdity of reading absolute monarchy into a text about husband-wife relations.
Chapter 8
Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood
Locke critiques Filmer's argument that Adam's sovereignty derives from fatherhood, showing that begetting does not grant absolute power over children, and that such a claim leads to contradictions where fathers are both subjects and absolute rulers. He reaffirms natural freedom and equality, arguing that only God gives life and that parental power is not absolute or political.
Chapter 9
VII: Of Fatherhood and Property Considered Together as Fountains of Sovereignty
Locke examines Filmer's claim that sovereignty is founded on both fatherhood and property, showing that these two titles cannot consistently descend together after Adam's death. He argues that if property and paternal power are distinct, they lead to divided sovereignty and confusion about who holds legitimate authority, undermining Filmer's theory of monarchical succession.
Chapter 10
VIII: Of the Conveyance of Adam’s Sovereign Monarchical Power
Locke examines Filmer's inconsistent arguments about how Adam's supposed monarchical power could be conveyed to future rulers—through inheritance, grant, usurpation, or election—and exposes the contradictions in Filmer's doctrine, ultimately arguing that if any means of obtaining supreme power makes one a king, then even usurpers and commoners could be considered legitimate monarchs.
Chapter 11
Of Monarchy, by Inheritance from Adam
Locke argues that even if absolute monarchy were divinely ordained, it would be useless without a clear method to identify the rightful ruler. He critiques Filmer's claim that Adam's sovereignty passes by inheritance, showing that Adam's property right was based on self-preservation and God's grant, which applies equally to all his children, not exclusively to one heir. Thus, inheritance cannot justify monarchical power.
Chapter 12
X: Of the Heir to Adam’s Monarchical Power
Locke critiques Filmer's claim that there is a single, identifiable heir to Adam who holds a natural right to rule all others. He argues that this doctrine is either self-defeating (if only one man is heir, all other kings are illegitimate) or absurd (if all are heirs, then all are kings and owe no obedience). In either case, the theory dissolves the bonds of government and obedience rather than supporting them.
Chapter 13
XI: Who Heir?
Locke argues that the central political question is not whether political power exists or its origin, but who should hold it. He criticizes Filmer's doctrine that civil power is assigned by divine institution to Adam's heir, pointing out that without a clear rule to identify that heir, the claim is meaningless and leads to endless disputes, usurpation, and the undermining of all legitimate government.
Chapter 14
Book II: Of Civil Government
Locke outlines the foundation of legitimate political authority based on natural rights, consent of the governed, and the social contract, arguing against absolute monarchy and for limited government.
Chapter 15
I
Locke summarizes his refutation of Filmer's patriarchal theory, concluding that Adam had no natural or granted sovereignty, that his heirs have no clear right, and that no certain heir can be identified. He argues that to avoid grounding government in mere force, a new origin of political power must be found, and he defines political power as the right to make laws for the preservation of property and the public good.
Chapter 16
II: Of the State of Nature
Locke defines the state of nature as a state of perfect freedom and equality, governed by the law of nature which obliges everyone not to harm another in life, health, liberty, or possessions. He argues that in this state, every man has the right to punish transgressors of the law of nature for restraint and reparation. Locke addresses objections, asserting that absolute monarchs are not better than the state of nature, and that all men are naturally in the state of nature until they consent to join a political society.
Chapter 17
III: Of the State of War
Locke defines the state of war as a state of enmity and destruction, distinct from the state of nature. He argues that when there is no common judge on earth to appeal to, or when the law is perverted, force without right creates a state of war. In such a state, the innocent party has a right to destroy the aggressor, even to the point of killing a thief who uses force to take property, because the aggressor's attempt to enslave or dominate threatens the victim's life and freedom. Locke emphasizes that the lack of an earthly appeal forces an appeal to heaven, as illustrated by Jephthah's appeal to God.
Chapter 18
IV: Of Slavery
Locke defines true liberty as freedom from arbitrary power, contrasting it with Filmer's misrepresentation. He argues that no man can enslave himself by consent because he lacks power over his own life, and true slavery is a state of war between a lawful conqueror and a captive, which ceases when a compact is made.
Chapter 19
Of Property
Locke argues that while God gave the earth to mankind in common, individuals can acquire private property by mixing their labor with natural resources, without the need for express consent from all commoners. He establishes that labor is the foundation of property, limited by the proviso that one must leave enough and as good for others and not take more than can be used before spoilage. The chapter also discusses the role of money in enabling the accumulation of durable goods and the eventual regulation of property by positive laws.
Chapter 20
VI: Of Paternal Power
Locke distinguishes paternal power from political power, arguing that parental authority is temporary and based on the duty to nurture children, not on absolute dominion. He critiques the term 'paternal power' as misleading, proposing 'parental power' to include mothers. Locke explains that children are born free but under temporary subjection to parents, and that fathers' political authority historically arose from tacit consent, not inherent right.
Chapter 21
Of Political or Civil Society
Locke distinguishes political society from other forms of human association—conjugal, parental, and master-servant—by emphasizing that civil society is founded on consent and the establishment of a common legislature and judiciary. He argues that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society because it leaves subjects without an appeal against the ruler, effectively keeping them in a state of nature. Locke traces the origin of government to the need to secure property, and he insists that no one in civil society can be exempt from its laws.
Chapter 22
Of the Beginning of Political Societies
Locke argues that political societies originate from the voluntary consent of free, equal, and independent individuals who agree to unite into a community. This consent creates a body politic where the majority has the right to act for the whole. He defends this theory against objections that no historical examples exist and that all men are born under government, citing instances from Rome, Venice, and America. Locke also explains why early governments were often monarchical, attributing it to familiarity with paternal rule and the simplicity of early societies, not to any natural paternal authority.
Chapter 23
IX: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
Locke explains why individuals leave the state of nature to form political society: the preservation of their property (life, liberty, and estates). He identifies three defects of the state of nature—lack of an established known law, lack of an impartial judge, and lack of enforcement power—that drive people to unite under government. In doing so, they give up their natural powers of self-preservation and punishment to the community, which then acts through established laws and an executive power, all directed to the common good.
Chapter 24
X: Of the Forms of a Commonwealth
Locke defines the forms of government based on where the legislative power is placed: democracy, oligarchy, monarchy (hereditary or elective), and mixed forms. He clarifies that 'commonwealth' means any independent community, not just a democracy, and that the community retains the power to change the form of government when the legislative power reverts to it.
Chapter 25
XI: Of the Extent of the Legislative Power
Locke delineates the bounds of legislative power, arguing it is supreme but not arbitrary, limited by the law of nature and the public good. He asserts that the legislative must govern by established laws, cannot tax without consent, and cannot transfer its lawmaking authority, as it is a delegated trust from the people.
Chapter 26
XII: Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth
Locke distinguishes three powers in a commonwealth: legislative, executive, and federative. The legislative power directs the use of force for preserving the community and should not be always in session, nor should the same persons who make laws also execute them, to prevent self-interest. The executive power is always in being to enforce laws. The federative power deals with foreign relations, war, peace, and alliances, and is naturally united with the executive, as both require the force of the society.
Chapter 27
XIII: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth
Locke argues that while the legislative power is supreme in a constituted commonwealth, it remains a fiduciary trust held by the people, who retain the ultimate authority to alter or remove the legislative if it acts against their preservation. He distinguishes between the legislative, executive, and federative powers, emphasizing that the executive is subordinate and accountable to the legislative, except when the executive shares in legislation. Locke also discusses the prerogative of the executive to convene and dissolve the legislative for the public good, and warns that using force without authority constitutes a state of war, justifying the people's right to resist.
Chapter 28
XIV: Of Prerogative
Locke defines prerogative as the executive's discretionary power to act for the public good when laws are silent or even against the letter of the law. He argues that in well-framed governments, the executive must have latitude to handle unforeseen events, but this power is limited by the end of government—the preservation of the community. Prerogative is legitimate only when used for the public benefit; when abused for private ends, the people may define it by positive laws. Locke warns that claiming arbitrary power harms the social contract, and ultimately the people retain the right to judge and appeal to heaven when no earthly judge exists.
Chapter 29
XV: Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, Considered Together
Locke distinguishes three forms of power—paternal, political, and despotical—to correct common confusions. Paternal power is natural, limited to parents' governance of children for their benefit until they reach reason. Political power arises from consent and compact, exercised by society for the preservation of life, liberty, and property. Despotical power is absolute and arbitrary, arising only from forfeiture in a state of war, and is incompatible with compact or property.
Chapter 30
XVI: Of Conquest
Locke argues that conquest, even in a just war, does not grant the conqueror legitimate political authority over the conquered people. He distinguishes between just and unjust wars, asserting that only consent of the governed can establish lawful government. The conqueror may have rights to reparation but not to dominion over the innocent, including women and children, who retain their natural rights to freedom and inheritance.
Chapter 31
Of Usurpation
Locke distinguishes usurpation from conquest, defining usurpation as a domestic seizure of power without right. He argues that usurpation changes only the person ruling, not the form of government, and that an usurper has no claim to obedience until the people freely consent to his authority. The chapter emphasizes that lawful government requires both a proper form and a legitimate designation of rulers, rooted in the consent of the governed.
Chapter 32
XVIII: Of Tyranny
Locke defines tyranny as the exercise of power beyond right, for private advantage rather than the public good. He argues that tyranny can occur in any form of government, not just monarchy, and that where law ends, tyranny begins. He justifies resistance to unlawful force, distinguishing between the sacred person of the prince and illegal acts by subordinates, and warns that a long train of actions showing a design to subvert the laws may justify opposition.
Chapter 33
Of the Dissolution of Government
Locke distinguishes between the dissolution of society (by foreign conquest) and the dissolution of government (from within). He argues that when the legislative is altered or acts contrary to its trust—by invading property, imposing arbitrary power, or corrupting elections—the government is dissolved and the people have the right to resist, resume their original liberty, and establish a new legislative for their safety and security.
Chapter 34
Endnotes
This chapter compiles endnotes and citations from Hooker's 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and other sources, reinforcing Locke's arguments on the origin of political society, the necessity of consent, the rule of law, and the limitations of governmental power.
